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Abstract
Management in ubiquitous systems cannot rely on human intervention or cen-
tralised decision-making functions because systems are complex and devices
are inherently mobile and cannot refer to centralised management applications
for reconfiguration and adaptation directives. Management must be devolved,
based on local decision-making and feedback control-loops embedded in auton-
omous components. Previous work has introduced a Self-Managed Cell (SMC)
as an infrastructure for building ubiquitous applications. An SMC consists
of a set of hardware and software components that implement a policy-driven
feedback control-loop. This allows SMCs to adapt continually to changes in
their environment or in their usage requirements. Typical applications include
body-area networks for healthcare monitoring, and communities of unmanned
autonomous vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
Ubiquitous applications are typically formed from multiple interacting auton-
omous components, which establish peer-to-peer collaborations, federate and
compose into larger structures. Components must interact to distribute man-
agement tasks and to enforce communication strategies. This thesis presents
an integrated framework which supports the design and the rapid establish-
ment of policy-based SMC interactions by systematically composing simpler ab-
stractions as building elements of a more complex collaboration. Policy-based
interactions are realised – subject to an extensible set of security functions –
through the exchanges of interfaces, policies and events, and our framework
was designed to support the specification, instantiation and reuse of patterns of
interaction that prescribe the manner in which these exchanges are achieved.
We have defined a library of patterns that provide reusable abstractions for
the structure, task-allocation and communication aspects of an interaction,
which can be individually combined for building larger policy-based systems in
a methodical manner. We have specified a formal model to ensure the rigorous
verification of SMC interactions before policies are deployed in physical devices.
A prototype has been implemented that demonstrates the practical feasibility
of our framework in constrained resources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ubiquitous systems typically comprise numerous portable devices, such as
smartphones, sensors and electronic devices in general, which are inherently
mobile and cannot refer to centralised management applications for their re-
configuration and decision-making functions. In addition, the configuration
and management of these devices is too complex and cumbersome to be left to
general computer users. A typical example is a body-area network for health-
care monitoring, comprising sensors and actuators that must integrate with
external monitoring and diagnostic devices. To manage the intricacies and the
scale of these systems, they must be built from autonomous elements with
devolved management responsibilities. This goes against the tradition of large-
scale network management services, which are functionally integrated in cen-
tralised network operation centres by human administrators.
Work on pervasive and ubiquitous systems [RHC+02, GSSS02] often revolves
around centralised middleware services that offer supporting functionality for
applications, but these studies generally ignore how applications can be built
as dynamic ad-hoc collaborations of smaller and autonomous components. The
management of such systems frequently relies on centralised services for the
coordination of the resources available in the environment, which in turn must
be appropriately configured by the user. In order to mitigate the problems
related to centralised and manual management, autonomic computing investi-
1
2gates how a system can manage itself requiring minimal, if any, human inter-
vention; this was termed self-management. Self-management aims to enable
the system to configure, optimise, protect and heal itself autonomously [KC03].
This kind of devolved management is a promising approach to tackle the com-
plexity of large-scale ubiquitous systems, where autonomous components must
be able to perform local decision-making and automatically negotiate the re-
quired interactions with other components in their surroundings.
Previous work has introduced the Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [LDS+08] as an in-
frastructure for building ubiquitous computing applications. An SMC consists
of a set of hardware and software components that are able to work auton-
omously, based on a policy-driven feedback control-loop. Policies are used to
specify both adaptation rules that determine which management or reconfigu-
ration actions must be performed in response to changes in the context, and
access control rules that determine which actions can or cannot be performed
on the resources that an SMC provides. Policies separate the management
strategy from the implementation of the management actions, and new policies
can be dynamically loaded into an SMC, which permits the modification of the
run-time adaptation strategy without interrupting the SMC’s operation.
Although SMCs are autonomous, applications typically require a large num-
ber of SMCs to collaborate, which must be able to interact with each other in
complex ways, to federate or compose into larger structures. Examples include
body-area networks, which typically consist of various devices such as complex
physiological sensors that may be SMCs in their own right, smartphones, diag-
nostic devices and equipment available locally. Cross-SMC interactions permit
the realisation of pervasive environments in which SMCs can engage in ad-hoc
peer-to-peer collaborations with other SMCs, and can aggregate into larger au-
tonomous structures, scaling SMC management to larger environments. The
Self-Managed Cell defines an architectural pattern for building policy-based
autonomous systems composed of services interacting over an asynchronous
event bus. An SMC can be instantiated to individual devices, as well as scale
up to cater for management in larger ubiquitous systems.
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To support applications that demand the cooperation of a number of elemen-
tary autonomous components it is thus necessary to devise abstractions to
facilitate interactions between SMCs, allowing SMCs to compose and federate
into large-scale policy-based systems which are also SMCs. Policies provide a
method for adapting the SMC’s behaviour according to changes of state in its
local context, and also define how SMCs should behave when they dynamically
encounter new SMCs. In these interactions, SMCs exchange policies to pre-
scribe how a remote SMC must behave; SMCs can forward events which are
required for notifying changes of context and triggering management policies
in another SMC, and SMCs provide interfaces which offer functionality or fa-
cilitate access to the resources that the SMC owns. In this thesis we present
the infrastructure that makes SMC interactions possible. To address the de-
sign and the rapid establishment of complex policy-based SMC interactions we
advocate ways of structuring these collaborations, and the specification, in-
stantiation and reuse of patterns of interaction, which prescribe the algorithms
or protocols through which the exchanges of policies, events and interfaces are
achieved. The use of patterns supports the construction of more complex SMC
interactions in a methodical manner, by reusing simpler abstractions as design
elements of a more complex interaction.
1.1 Example Applications
The application scenarios below will be used throughout this thesis to illus-
trate specific concepts relevant to collaborations of Self-Managed Cells. They
describe how SMCs can be used in applications for healthcare monitoring and in
coalitions of unmanned autonomous vehicles. While the former illustrates ways
of organising and composing simpler SMCs into larger structures, e.g. body-
area networks of sensors and actuators, the latter brings to light issues related
to ad-hoc collaborations of mobile nodes and highlights the security aspects
that must be considered in these interactions.
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1.1.1 Healthcare Monitoring
Healthcare applications can be deployed both for automated monitoring in the
hospital and for home monitoring of the elderly or patients with chronic condi-
tions [LDS+08]. A body-area SMC running on a smartphone can interact with
a number of body-sensor SMCs monitoring properties such as temperature,
heart rate, blood pressure, glucose and oxygen saturation. The body-area can
also include actuator SMCs, such as a pacemaker or insulin pump, to perform
actions in response to measurements made by the sensors. Local equipment
available in the home environment, e.g. an ECG diagnostic device, may be used
in conjunction with the body-area SMC to perform more complex data process-
ing and condition assessment. A doctor or healthcare worker loads policy-
based monitoring tasks into the patient, which rely on the devices available in
the body-area SMC as well as on those in the home environment. Management
policies are triggered in response to measurements made by the sensors, and
then enforce actions for reporting abnormal physiological parameters, trigger-
ing a pacemaker or insulin infusion, or even automatically requesting emer-
gency medical service if necessary. Similarly, management policies are used to
reconfigure the SMC functioning in response to changes in its context, e.g. fail-
ures of components or performance degradation. The resources available in
the body-area SMC can only be accessed by certain SMCs, such as the doc-
tor or healthcare worker SMC, and in many cases they must be hidden from
other SMCs nearby both for security and privacy reasons. Interactions would
also be required when the patient SMC encounters an SMC controlling devices
in the General Practitioner’s (GP) clinic, which typically access the patient’s
resources to perform reconfiguration actions, e.g. to change dosage on drug
delivery pumps.
1.1.2 Coalitions of UAVs
Coalitions of unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) can be used in reconnais-
sance or rescue operations that are too dangerous or even impossible for hu-
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mans to undertake [ADK+06, ADL+07]. An SMC running on each device en-
ables local policy enforcement and decision-making in response to conditions
monitored in the field, e.g. obstacles or chemical detection. Policies are used
to govern the management actions taken by each individual vehicle, or to in-
voke actions on other UAVs in order to collaborate on the accomplishment of
a mission. Policies can be directly loaded from a single commander UAV, or
more elaborate task exchange mechanisms can be required, e.g. UAVs bidding
for tasks according to their capabilities. Rescue personnel carry SMCs running
on their portable communication devices, which interact with the UAVs and
retrieve the information collected during the mission. Multiple teams of UAVs
may need to collaborate to accomplish a mission, where some members partic-
ipate in two different teams, e.g. in a UK and US coalition. This requires teams
with relaxed restrictions on their structural organisation, allowing sharing of
resources and equipment among cooperating teams. The nature of the coalition
may demand more complex abstractions, for example a hierarchical organisa-
tion, in which a rescue team has as one of its members a medical team, which
is a coalition itself.
1.2 Requirements Summary
We can draw several requirements from the scenarios described earlier. In
order to form complex policy-based systems a number of autonomous SMCs
must be able to federate with minimum or no user intervention.
The SMCs in a federation must be able to exchange policies among them-
selves, as policies prescribe how an SMC should behave within the context of
an interaction. Policies are triggered in response to events, which can be local
events within the SMC or events generated by remote SMCs. Thus if manage-
ment actions involved in the feedback control-loop are to span the boundaries
of an SMC, federated SMCs must be able to exchange events among them-
selves and notify their partners of local context changes. The structure of
these federations varies depending on the nature of the involved SMCs, where
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SMCs may be required to share and expose some of their constituent resources
to their partners, or at least mediate access to these resources in some cases.
Often a federation of SMCs will be part of a larger, and more complex inter-
action, such as a body-area network interacting with the equipment available
at the GP, or two rescue teams of UAVs cooperating to accomplish a mission.
Expressing large-scale interactions using simple abstractions such as policies,
interfaces and events can be difficult to manage and deploy. Support is needed
for the rapid establishment of complex policy-based SMC interactions, through
the specification, instantiation and reuse of patterns of interaction that pre-
scribe the manner in which these exchanges are achieved. Patterns can then
be used for systematically composing abstractions as building elements of
a more complex collaboration.
Some applications are more susceptible to security threats, e.g. coalitions of
UAVs in a reconnaissance mission. These applications will necessitate stricter
controls on which SMCs are allowed to join the interaction, and which are to
be refused if they do not meet a set of criteria to ascertain their provenance.
Collaborations of SMCs thus require support for secure interaction estab-
lishment and operation with distributed nodes enforcing devolved security
functions.
Typically interactions will involve SMCs originating from different administra-
tive authorities, and their successful operation depends both on the correct
specification of their interactions and on the suitability of the participating
SMCs. Ideally, interactions must be checked prior to implementation and pol-
icy deployment in physical devices. Ensuring the robustness of these interac-
tions demands the verification of the interaction specification, and checking
whether the collaborating SMCs are able to enforce their policies and whether
these policies are correctly deployed among distributed SMCs.
Finally, an infrastructure is needed to enforce these interactions, i.e. an imple-
mentation.
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1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• The design of an integrated framework which supports the specification,
instantiation and reuse of policy-based interactions by systematically com-
posing simpler abstractions, using the Self-Managed Cell as the underly-
ing infrastructure.
• The identification of the basic mechanisms required for supporting SMC
interactions, in terms of dynamic loading of policies, the events required
for triggering these policies, and the interfaces that offer the functionality
required for enforcing the management actions prescribed by a policy.
• The definition of a catalogue of reusable patterns for engineering larger
policy-based interactions that distinguishes between the overall organisa-
tion of the interaction (structural aspects), the manner in which policies
are exchanged (task-allocation aspects) and how events are forwarded be-
tween SMCs (communication aspects).
• The definition of the minimum security aspects which must be considered
in collaborations of SMCs, and how the framework can be extended to
address additional requirements.
• The formal specification of the SMC behaviour, and the use of model-
checking techniques to enable the verification of properties and check the
correctness of SMC interactions before deployment.
• The implementation of a prototype and a library of interaction patterns
that demonstrate how the principles and techniques presented in this
thesis can be used for supporting the federation of SMCs.
Although this thesis focuses on the Self-Managed Cell framework as the in-
frastructure for building policy-based autonomous systems, the principles and
techniques that are proposed here have a wider applicability for engineering
pervasive and autonomous systems in general. This will become clear when
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the use of patterns is introduced, as patterns provide more general abstrac-
tions for structuring interactions between autonomous components.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents related work, both on
the Self-Managed Cell infrastructure and policy-based management in general,
as well as on research areas that will be relevant at different stages of this
thesis.
Chapter 3 investigates the underlying principles of SMC interactions. It de-
scribes the basic mechanisms that support interaction establishment and that
allow an SMC to access the functionality provided by other SMCs. It describes
how a group of policies can be loaded into an SMC to prescribe how it should
behave in the context of an interaction, and how events are used to trigger
these policies. The use of authorisation policies in SMC interactions is also
presented, as policy loading and invocations into a remote SMC are subject to
access control restrictions. This chapter concludes by illustrating how security
management in SMC interactions can be achieved by using policies and roles
to support secure interaction establishment and operation.
Chapter 4 introduces the use of software architecture principles for building
large-scale policy-based interactions, using the notion of architectural styles.
Styles can encode different aspects of an interaction, with respect to structure,
task-allocation and event-forwarding behaviour. This chapter also describes
how architectural styles can be used for composing and federating SMCs to
form complex interactions in a systematic manner.
Chapter 5 presents the formalisation of SMC behaviour using the Alloy [Jac02]
modelling language, which allows us to specify the functioning of SMC inter-
actions declaratively. The specification can then be used for model checking
specific SMC interactions and for verifying whether the SMCs in a collabora-
tion are able to enforce their policies.
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Chapter 6 provides details on the prototype implemented for supporting SMC
interactions, and on the library of reusable patterns for composing SMCs. The
chapter also presents the evaluation of the implementation, including memory
consumption and performance results in resource-constrained devices.
Chapter 7 outlines a case-study presenting how SMCs can be used for build-
ing a policy-based application for diabetes monitoring and treatment. It shows
how various SMCs can be composed in a body-area network, and the interac-
tions which occur with a doctor or healthcare worker. The interactions between
the body-area and a home monitoring SMC, involving a set of equipment and
diagnostic devices, are also described.
Chapter 8 presents a more general discussion and critical evaluation of the
framework proposed in this thesis, in terms of its usability, scalability and ex-
tensibility. The limitations and deficiencies of the framework are also discussed
in this chapter.
Chapter 9 presents a short summary of this thesis, and how future work can
make progress in some aspects that were not addressed yet. Finally, the closing
remarks are presented.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
The Self-Managed Cell was proposed as a platform for the construction of
policy-based autonomous systems. It is based on a policy-driven feedback
control-loop that determines which management or reconfiguration actions
must be performed in response to changes in the SMC context, e.g. failures
of components or performance degradation. Individual SMCs are autonomous
and charged with enforcing local decision rules that govern their own behaviour.
However, applications will typically require elementary SMCs to negotiate the
necessary interactions with other components in their surroundings and form
larger systems based on the same principles of self-management.
This chapter presents the related work in a top-down approach: Section 2.1
is a general discussion of pervasive environments, their characteristics, and
how autonomic computing aims to address the management aspects of these
systems. Section 2.2 then describes policy-based management within this con-
text, and Section 2.3 presents the background on Self-Managed Cells, which
relies on policies to provide an infrastructure for autonomous management in
pervasive and ubiquitous systems. Finally, Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 con-
centrate on specific techniques advocated for structuring the development of
software, component-based systems and multi-agent systems. We identify how
these research areas can benefit the systematic construction of policy-based
SMC interactions. They provide the background for the engineering principles
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for composing SMCs in patterns of interactions, which are described in greater
detail in Chapter 4.
2.1 Pervasive and Autonomous Systems
The work on Self-Managed Cells lies at the intersection of two broad research
areas: pervasive computing, which seeks to provide smart environments sat-
urated with technological capabilities, and autonomic computing, which inves-
tigates how to achieve the autonomous management of computing infrastruc-
tures, with minimal human intervention. This section presents a brief overview
of these two research areas.
2.1.1 Pervasive Computing
Pervasive (or ubiquitous) computing concerns environments saturated with
technological capabilities that are so integrated that they seem to “disappear”
[Sat01]. A “smart space” is a well-defined area where the computational in-
frastructure is embedded in the building infrastructure, allowing the computa-
tional and the real world to influence the behaviour of each other. One of the
main characteristics of a pervasive environment is its proactivity, as the system
is expected to anticipate the user’s needs rather than simply react to inputs.
Pervasive systems are expected to make adequate decisions on behalf of the
users, relying on contextual information and on the computational devices
available in the surroundings. Wearable (or implantable) devices form one type
of interface between users and the pervasive environment. A wearable device
can be a smartphone or a special vest with embedded sensors for health mon-
itoring of a person. They must be aware of the user’s context, and adapt their
behaviour to the state of the user. Several aspects must be considered, such
as types of I/O interaction and the restricted capabilities of these devices. A
detailed discussion on wearable devices is presented in [SS03].
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Several studies have been devoted to the design of infrastructures for perva-
sive spaces. Gaia [RHC+02] seeks to extend the traditional operating system
concept to the control of the devices available in a pervasive environment, as
though these were the resources available on a single computer, e.g. disk, mem-
ory, audio, thus providing a view of a meta-operating system. A fundamental
concept in Gaia is the active space which is an extension of a physical space
which contains physical objects, including electronic/computational devices.
An active space introduces a context-based coordination that caters for a trans-
parent interaction between its components, detecting and adapting them in an
autonomous way. Typically, active spaces are room-sized, and need to provide
central servers for running the middleware services, e.g. event and context ser-
vices. An active space follows a component-based infrastructure which extends
the Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern to reflect the wealth of input, output
and processing devices. Gaia recognises the importance of federating Gaia
spaces, but this is not part of the core view of its meta-operating system for
smart spaces. Support for the interactions between standalone active spaces
was later proposed in [AMCRC04] through the notion of super spaces. This
focuses on how the middleware services of independent spaces are integrated
in collections of peer-to-peer and hierarchical active spaces.
ISAM [A+02] addresses resource management and application adaptation in
large-scale environments. The ISAM architecture provides a pervasive environ-
ment which has a cellular organisation. Cells can be interpreted as institutional
boundaries in a multi-institutional environment similar to virtual organisations
in grid computing [FKT01], thus considering a coarser-grain notion of space
compared to Gaia. An execution cell knows a set of other cells, which form its
neighbourhood. However, ISAM relies on an administrator to inform the neigh-
bours of each cell, which remain static for most of the time. ISAM also relies
on a centralised server to host the services of an entire execution cell (discov-
ery, scheduling, context service). These assumptions make ISAM unsuitable
for ad-hoc environments.
One.world [Gri04, Gri02] focuses on an infrastructure that enables applica-
tions to follow users as they move through pervasive environments. One.world
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concentrates on three requirements of pervasive applications: (1) the system
needs to adapt its behaviour explicitly to contextual changes instead of hiding
it from applications; (2) the system needs to discover new resources dynam-
ically instead of assuming a static environment; and (3) the system needs to
facilitate sharing of information between applications and devices. One.world
mainly relies on discovery, event and migration services. The devices visible on
the local broadcast network are responsible for electing a centralised discov-
ery server. An asynchronous event service provides the basic communication
means, for both local and remote communication. The migration service is
used to move or copy applications to different devices (the application’s entire
state is moved, including execution state and persistent data). One.world relies
on environments, which are abstractions for structuring running applications,
much like processes in an operating system in that both environments and
processes represent an application being executed. Additionally, environments
can be composed in a hierarchical way, providing a mechanism for extending
applications where the outer environment has complete control over the in-
ner environments. An outer environment can intercept and modify events sent
by nested environments, providing an abstraction similar to nested processes
in operating systems. Its implementation is based on nested Java Classload-
ers. There are a few similarities between environments and the composition
of self-managed cells (as the outer environment having control over the inner,
and the integration of event-based infrastructures). However, the scalability
of One.world is limited, especially in relation to service discovery, making it
suitable for small pervasive environments, with only a few dozen people and
devices [Gri02].
iROS [JFW02, PJKF03] focuses on pervasive environments for meeting spaces.
It emphasises the ability to integrate legacy applications, where they can be
modified to be accessible in a standard way and customised to support differ-
ent input/output interactions, for example, using speech input and multiple
display output. In iROS the system is not expected to react to the user or con-
text, and whilst the users must take responsibility for their actions, the system
infrastructure is only responsible for providing a means of executing such ac-
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tions instead of trying to adapt the environment automatically to changes in
the context. iROS provides a message-passing infrastructure, which is cen-
tralised and broadcast-based and is limited to room-sized environments, which
are termed interactive workspaces. iROS deliberately assumes a standalone
pervasive space and does not provide support for the federation of multiple
interactive workspaces.
Oxygen [SPP+03, Oxy06] is a human-centred computing environment which
is mainly concerned with the human-computer interaction aspects of perva-
sive environments, where the user should not be required to type or click but
instead the system should be able to understand more natural forms of interac-
tion, e.g. human speech, gesture or even lip movements. Oxygen presents the
concept of collaborative regions, which are defined as self-organising collections
of computers and/or devices that share some degree of trust. Such collabora-
tive regions can be local-, building- or campus-wide, and they support multiple
communication protocols for low-power local or wide area communication as in
the SMC. Collaborative regions are formed to support the execution of specific
tasks automatically, for example, recording and archiving speech and video
fragments during a meeting (using a policy or script-based pre-configuration).
These high-level user goals are satisfied by assembling generic standalone com-
ponents that implement high-level functions (a voice recognition component,
for example). These components are composed according to their interfaces.
They are constantly monitored and if required, macro-level adaptation can be
performed, substituting entire components. In essence, applications are rep-
resented as a graph of connected modules. Although Oxygen recognises the
importance of establishing collaborative regions for executing specific tasks it
is not clear whether collaborative regions interact with each other and how they
can be federated.
These research studies address different aspects of pervasive computing, and
it is rather difficult to directly compare their functionality and assumptions.
However, they tend to share two limitations: they typically fail to provide a
systematic way of composing and federating independent pervasive spaces into
larger and more complex interactions, and they often focus on pervasive spaces
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of a relatively fixed size, e.g. a room, relying on a particular kind of infrastruc-
ture which does not permit the system to scale down to smaller spaces and
scale up to form larger interactions. In contrast, the SMC is intended as an
architectural pattern applicable at different scales, ranging from small body-
area networks, to large virtual organisations. SMCs are expected to discover
other SMCs dynamically, and support means of systematically specifying and
establishing peer-to-peer collaborations, federations and compositions of larger
structures.
2.1.2 Autonomic Computing
The other aspect of our work is autonomic computing, which advocates that the
management of hardware and software systems cannot be reliant on human
intervention, which is too expensive, error-prone and will not be able to cope
with the scale of emerging pervasive systems. Instead, the system must be
autonomous and capable of managing itself. The term “autonomic computing”
was coined by IBM, and is an analogy to the autonomic nervous system of the
human body which frees our conscious brain from the burden of controlling
the body’s vital functions and internal organs [Hor01, GC03].
The need for managing computing systems is not new, however the scale and
complexity of pervasive and ubiquitous systems makes manual management or
central coordination unworkable. Self-management thus enables the system to
configure (add new components and functions dynamically), optimise (adjust
system parameters), heal (detect, diagnose and repair failures) and protect (de-
fend against attacks) itself in an autonomous1 manner [KC03].
The industry work on autonomic computing, led primarily by IBM [KC03] but
also addressed by Motorola [SAL06] and HP [HP03], focuses on network man-
agement of large clusters and web servers. The IBM autonomic manager has
some similarity to the SMC approach in that it autonomously manages a set
of resources, while exposing a management interface to other autonomic man-
agers, as though it is a managed resource itself [BBC+03]. However, there is
1In this thesis the terms “autonomic” and “autonomous” are used interchangeably.
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no prescribed mode of operation for the specification or instantiation of inter-
actions between autonomic managers. In addition to monitoring events and
executing actions, the control-loop enforced by the autonomic manager is also
responsible for analysing what is monitored and planning which actions should
be taken. This control-loop relies on a knowledge base, which can grow dy-
namically as the autonomic manager learns about the system (Figure 2.1). The
autonomic manager describes the functional aspects of behaviour present in
the control-loop, but not a common architectural view or infrastructure that
defines how these components should be realised.
Figure 2.1: IBM autonomic manager’s control-loop
Several research studies also advocate the use of planning techniques to ad-
dress self-management in autonomous systems [SHMK08, KM07, GCH+04,
AHW04, OGT+99]. The Self-Managed Cell does not rely on planning services
or on the use of a knowledge base, although the SMC functionality can be
extended to include these additional services as required. Instead, the adap-
tation strategy used in SMCs is based primarily on policy-driven control-loops.
Planning does not scale as well as policies, since its generation is computation-
ally expensive, and plans require increased specification effort for defining the
domain model. Instead, writing policies is less cumbersome and they can be
rapidly loaded to change (parts of) the adaptation strategy without interrupting
the SMC’s functioning. This is a fundamental characteristic in permitting the
SMC to scale down to small resources as well as to scale up into more complex
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systems.
2.2 Policy Management
We advocate the use of policies for realising autonomous behaviour. Policy-
based management relies on the use of rules to specify the management as-
pects of a system. Damianou and colleagues [D+01] define a policy as “a rule
that defines a choice in the behaviour of a system”. Policies separate the man-
agement strategy from the implementation of the management actions, which
permits the modication of the run-time adaptation strategy without interrupt-
ing the operation of the system.
Policies can be applied in a number of areas, from adaptation of mobile de-
vices into limited modes of operation, to management of resources in large-
scale environments. According to Ganek and Corbi [GC03], policies will be
used by autonomous systems not only to define management and authori-
sation functions, but also for quality of service, storage backup and general
system configuration. Research on policies has been active for several years,
especially policies for network and systems management. Examples include
PCIM [MESW01], PDL [LBN99] and PMAC [ACG+05]. Frequently policy-based
management frameworks rely on infrastructured organisation models, e.g. us-
ing LDAP servers for implementing policy repositories [HCP07, HMP06]. Al-
though they use policies that are similar to the ones we advocate for encoding
adaptation, these approaches are targeted for the management of large-scale
and networked systems, and do not scale down for managing small devices.
2.2.1 Types of Policies
Policies typically either require activities to be performed (obligations) or give
authority to carry on a given activity (authorisations). For the purposes of this
discussion, obligations and authorisations are defined as follows.
Obligation policies are event-condition-action rules of the form:
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on 〈event〉 do
if 〈conditions〉 then
〈target〉 〈action〉
Obligations cater for the adaptive behaviour of the system and specify which
actions must be performed in response to events, provided conditions are sat-
isfied. The event is a term of the form e(a1,...,an), where e is the name of the
event and a1,...,an are the names of its attributes. The condition is a boolean
expression that checks local properties of the system enforcing the policy and
the attributes of the event. The policy designates a target upon which the ac-
tion will be invoked. The action is a term of the form a(a1,...,am), where a is
the name of the action and a1,...,am are the names of its attributes. The target
must support an operation that implements this action. The attributes of an
event can be used for evaluating the condition, or as arguments to the action.
Implicitly an obligation has a subject, which is the entity in charge of enforc-
ing the policy. The target may be the same as the subject, i.e. actions can be
performed locally.
Authorisation policies are access control rules of the form:
auth[+/-] 〈subject〉 −→ if 〈condition〉 then
〈target〉 〈action〉
Authorisations specify which actions a subject is permitted (positive authorisa-
tion) or forbidden (negative authorisation) to invoke on a target, provided con-
ditions are satisfied. The action and conditions have a similar format to those
defined in obligations. The system in charge of enforcing an authorisation is
typically the target of that policy, as it is usually assumed that targets normally
wish to protect themselves from unauthorised actions. However, policies could
be devolved to authorisation decision points if required.
2.2.2 Policy Conflicts
When policies originating from different systems are combined conflicts may oc-
cur if two or more policies apply to the same object. Policy conflict analysis pro-
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cesses are critical and have to be scalable and cope with the dynamism, hetero-
geneity and size of autonomic management infrastructures [DJS08]. Lupu and
Sloman [LS99] present two main classes of policy conflicts: modality conflicts
and application-specific conflicts. Modality conflicts arise when two or more
policies with different modalities (positive and negative) refer to the same sub-
ject, action and target. For example, a subject may be at the same time autho-
rised and forbidden (by both a positive and a negative authorisation) to perform
an action on a target, or a subject may be required (by an obligation) but for-
bidden (by a negative authorisation) to perform an action on a target. Typically,
modality conflicts can be identified through syntactic analysis of the policies,
and precedence schemes are often used for automatically solving such con-
flicts. Several research studies address policy conflicts from the perspective of
detecting overlapping subjects, targets and actions [UBJ+03, RDD07, KFJ03].
Conflict detection based on situations where the condition part of multiple poli-
cies may be simultaneously true, i.e. two policies become applicable and may
specify two incompatible actions, has been studied in [AGLL05].
Application-specific conflicts occur if what is contained in a policy is inconsis-
tent with specific concepts and semantics related to the application domain.
These involve separation of duty conflicts [CW87] (where the same manager
performs two or more tasks that are supposed to be performed by different
managers) and conflict of interests (where the same manager manages two or
more objects that are supposed to be managed by distinct managers), for ex-
ample. Application-specific conflicts cannot be automatically identified through
syntactic analysis, and they typically require the use of meta-policies to specify
constraints that provide additional information for conflict resolution. Frame-
works for policy analysis and detection of application-specific conflicts are pre-
sented in [BLR03, CFP+06, CLM+09].
2.2.3 Policy Refinement
User goals are typically expressed as high-level policies that are not directly im-
plementable. Policy refinement provides support for translating abstract goals
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into concrete, implementable policies that can be enforced by the system. The
main objectives of policy refinement are: (a) determine the resources which are
required for fulfilling the policy requirements, (b) translate the high-level poli-
cies into concrete policies that the system can enforce, (c) verify that the lower
level policies still meet the high-level goals [Ban05]. This ensures that the im-
plementable policies achieve the same functionality intended by the high-level
ones.
2.3 Self-Managed Cell Framework
The Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [LDS+08, SBD+05, DLS+05, DHL+05, S+06] frame-
work provides an infrastructure for building autonomous ubiquitous systems.
It relies on the use of policies as the principal mechanism for achieving autono-
mous behaviour and has evolved from previous work on policy-based manage-
ment developed at Imperial College [Slo94b, D+01, LSDD00, DLSD01, SL02].
An SMC consists of a set of hardware and software components that are able
to work autonomously, based on a policy-driven feedback control-loop that de-
termines which management or reconfiguration actions must be performed in
response to changes in the SMC context.
Figure 2.2: Body-area SMC
A typical SMC used for health monitoring (Figure 2.2) comprises a smartphone
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or a Gumstix2 device hosting SMC management services that control several
sensors such as heart rate, temperature, acceleration, blood pressure and
oxygen saturation hosted on body-sensor nodes3 (BSN) which may be SMCs
themselves. Actuators such as a pacemaker or an insulin pump SMC are acti-
vated according to conditions monitored by the sensors, or alarms are set de-
pending on the measurements made by these sensors. Smartphones or other
Gumstix devices are also used to host application services, e.g. a diagnostic
service hosted in a remote device. An SMC running on a doctor’s or nurse’s
smartphone can be used to interact with the patient’s body-area network, ei-
ther prescribing how monitoring must be conducted, or collecting its results.
Communication with BSN nodes typically occurs through IEEE 802.15.4 ra-
dio links while communication between Gumstix devices or with smartphones
occurs through Bluetooth or Wi-Fi.
Figure 2.3: Self-managed cell architecture
We regard the SMC as an architectural pattern, where the SMC can be instan-
tiated to individual devices, as well as scale up to cater for the management
of larger ubiquitous systems. The SMC framework relies on a dynamic set of
management services (Figure 2.3): an event bus that is used to carry events
between the various components and services within the SMC, a policy service
that enforces adaptive and access control rules, and a discovery service that
can discover new components which are able to join the SMC. Typically dif-
2http://www.gumstix.com
3http://vip.doc.ic.ac.uk/bsn/
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ferent implementations of these services would be used on small-scale devices
and on large-scale environments. The architecture is extensible and additional
services, e.g. for retrieving a specific type of contextual information, can be
added to extend the SMC architecture as required [LDS+08].
The Self-Managed Cell resembles a sentient object [GBCC02, VCC+02, BC04]
in that both are intended to model a set of hardware and software components
that interact with each other, and provide an infrastructure to support large-
scale distributed systems composed of mobile autonomous components. Both
rely on adapters to abstract low-level communication protocols, and use an
event-based infrastructure to support event dissemination among collaborat-
ing components. A sentient object accepts input via its sensors, and reacts by
acting upon the environment using actuators. Actuation decisions are defined
in a CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System) rule-based inference en-
gine. However, the sentient object model differs from SMCs in three important
aspects:
1. SMCs can discover each other and load new policies (as a mission) to de-
fine how remote SMCs must interact. Sentient objects do not exchange
policies, and each sentient object has a static set of production rules de-
fined in CLIPS which are used to infer other rules or generate events.
2. Their aims are different: sentient objects are intended for collaborative
inference of actuation decisions. In contrast, SMCs are used to enforce the
management actions and to distribute management policies dynamically
among remote SMCs.
3. Collaborating sentient objects follow a WAN-of-CANs [VCC+02] structure
(wide-area network of smaller, local controller-area networks). However,
this model does not support the dynamic assembly of sentient objects
using more general and reusable patterns of interaction, such as the ones
presented in this thesis.
The SMC management services are discussed in detail in the next sections.
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2.3.1 Event Bus
A publish/subscribe event bus is used to provide the underlying communica-
tion infrastructure within an SMC, although it is not required that all commu-
nications happen through events. This has the advantage of de-coupling the
services and resources that are part of an SMC, as an event publisher does not
need to have prior knowledge of the recipients when sending a message. This
also permits adding new services to the SMC without disrupting existing ones.
The event bus can be used for both management and application communica-
tion, such as alarms indicating that thresholds have been exceeded.
Figure 2.4: SMC event bus
The event bus implements a content-based delivery service, where event match-
ing can be performed over any field of the event message. Messages are routed
by the event bus using filters, which match the subscriptions with the content
of the events published (Figure 2.4). While the subscribers of an event must
specify their needs by explicitly registering themselves with the event bus, the
same does not apply to event publishers. This reduces the coupling of the
system and requires less information to be stored in the event bus service.
In [SB08, SVBM08], a publish/subscribe system tailored to the healthcare do-
main is presented, where personal data is highly sensitive and fine-grained
control for data transmission is needed, which may involve for example the
patient consent and context information, e.g. emergency situation. This uses
transformation policies to regulate information flow on a need-to-know basis,
and is built into a PostgreSQL database management system. Our event bus is
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less sophisticated as the SMC is intended to run both on resource-constrained
devices as well as on larger systems, but new services can be added to the SMC
to extend its functionality, e.g. a context service or event correlators.
2.3.2 Policy Service
Our main SMC implementation relies on a policy service which is based on the
Ponder2 policy framework4 (but we also provide a lightweight implementation
that can run on BSNs and other constrained devices [K+07]). It implements a
policy execution framework that supports the enforcement of both obligation
(event-condition-action) and authorisation (access control) policies. Policies can
be dynamically loaded, enabled, disabled and unloaded to change the behavior
of the SMC without interrupting its functioning.
Ponder2 comprises a general-purpose object management system. The policy
service maintains managed objects for each of the components on which man-
agement actions can be performed. This includes sensors and local resources
that the SMC owns, services within those devices, and adapters for remote
SMCs. Managed objects representing remote SMCs adapt invocations received
to platform-specific actions, thus providing a uniform interface for accessing
SMC services. Managed objects are kept in a domain structure [TS88] that im-
plements a hierarchical namespace within the SMC, similar to a file system. A
domain provides a way of grouping objects for the purposes of policy specifi-
cation, as the specification of policies in terms of a large number of individual
subjects and targets is impractical [Slo94a]. Grouping of objects can be based
on their type, management functionality, or simply convenience.
Policies are written in terms of managed objects. Domains and policies are
managed objects in their own right on which actions can be performed; for ex-
ample, adding or removing an object from a domain, or enabling or disabling
other policies. Thus, events can trigger obligation policies that enable or disable
other policies, allowing the SMC to modify its own adaptation strategy during
4http://www.ponder2.net
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Figure 2.5: SMC domain and managed objects
run-time. Policies specified in terms of a specific domain will apply to all ob-
jects inside that domain. The set of policies an SMC enforces will prescribe
how its managed objects should behave during SMC functioning. Thus, events
generated by managed objects within the SMC trigger obligation policies, which
specify what management actions must be invoked in other objects, provided
these actions are allowed by corresponding authorisation policies (Figure 2.5).
Management actions are invoked in remote SMCs via the adapters stored in the
local domain.
The policy service has been designed with particular focus on flexibility, in that
all the code needed can be loaded on demand. This is done via factory objects,
which are managed objects themselves and permit the creation of new objects
in the domain. Factories can be loaded dynamically and used for creating new
policies, for creating domain objects to form a hierarchy, for creating adapters
to communicate with external SMCs, and for creating event templates to com-
municate with the event bus. In particular, the latter enables the policy service
to subscribe to specific event notifications, which are used by the policies to
trigger adaptive actions on other managed objects.
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2.3.3 Discovery Service
Resource discovery provides a means for automatically locating devices and
services in a network [FDC01]. The SMC discovery service is used to detect
new devices capable of joining an SMC, e.g. sensors or other SMCs in the vicin-
ity. The discovery service interrogates newly discovered devices to establish a
profile describing the capabilities they offer, and then stores a managed ob-
ject as a reference to the discovered resource in the domain structure of the
discoverer SMC. This managed object works as an adapter that abstracts the
communication protocol, e.g. sockets, RMI, HTTP, between the discoverer and
discovered SMCs. All the policies applying to the specific domain where the
managed object was stored will then apply automatically to the discovered re-
source itself. An event describing the addition of a new device is generated, so
other components within the SMC can use the new resource as appropriate.
The discovery service broadcasts its identity message (id;type[;extra]) at fre-
quency R. This enables the SMC to advertise itself to both devices and other
SMCs, and enables current SMC members to determine whether they are still
within reach of the SMC. The discovery service is also capable of detecting when
one of the SMC’s resources has left, distinguishing transient failures, which are
common in wireless communications, from permanent departures, e.g. device
out of range, switched off, or failure. Each member device unicasts its identity
message at frequency D, and if the discovery service misses nD successive mes-
sages from a particular device, it concludes that the device has left the SMC
permanently. An event describing the departure of one of its current compo-
nents is then generated within the SMC, allowing other components to adapt
their behaviour accordingly.
2.3.4 Feedback Control-Loop
The SMC’s event bus, policy and discovery services implement a control-loop
which enables the execution of adaptive management actions in response to
changes in the SMC’s context. The control-loop operates as follows: managed
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resources within the SMC signal the occurrence of a particular event. Obli-
gation policies, in the form of event-condition-action rules, are used to specify
what actions are to be executed when a given event occurs (provided the pol-
icy’s condition is satisfied). The action prescribed by the policy is then executed
to adapt the operation of the SMC’s resources with respect to the event initially
detected, e.g. to adjust the monitoring frequency in a patient SMC in response
to an event indicating a high heart rate measurement (action enforcement is
itself dependent on the existence of authorisation policies). This in turn may
cause the managed resources to generate new events, which will trigger new
policies (Figure 2.6). Components in an SMC can change dynamically, e.g. a
sensor may be added, or a device may fail, and these circumstances also re-
quire adaptive or reconfiguration actions to be performed.
Figure 2.6: Policy-driven feedback control-loop
Although individual SMCs are autonomous and enforce their own feedback
control-loop, applications typically involve a large number of interacting SMCs
which must be composed and federated in complex ways. Thus support is
required for facilitating the specification, instantiation and reuse of SMC inter-
actions.
To realise the systematic construction of policy-based SMC interactions we
adapted and incorporated concepts from different research areas. In the follow-
ing we discuss techniques advocated for structuring the development of soft-
ware, component-based systems and multi-agent systems, and identify how
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these can benefit the engineering of policy-based interactions between SMCs.
2.4 Component-Based Systems and Design Patterns
Collaborations between SMCs will likely involve the combination of a number
of smaller interactions for realising more complex applications. As will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, interactions between SMCs are based on very specific
abstractions for defining how the interaction is organised, how roles are as-
signed and policies are exchanged, and how events for triggering these policies
are shared among the SMCs. The specification of SMC interactions can benefit
from component-based systems and software architectures, which have pro-
vided various means of organising software development. Moreover, the notion
of design patterns advocates the identification of reusable design solutions for
recurring problems in software development. This is of particular importance to
SMC interactions, as we seek means of systematically composing and reusing
simpler abstractions for building more complex policy-based interactions. This
section presents a brief literature review on these research areas.
2.4.1 Components and Software Architectures
Software architecture can be seen as a set of principal design decisions made
during the conceptualisation and development of a system [TMD09]. The soft-
ware engineering community has long investigated software architecture-based
approaches, which typically separate computation (components) from interac-
tions (connectors). Components and connectors are defined as follows [TMD09]:
• Component: architectural element that encapsulates functionality and
data. It provides access to these via an interface, and has explicit de-
pendencies on its required execution context.
• Connector: architectural element responsible for regulating the interac-
tions among a set of components.
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A component thus represents the computation and state of a system. It pro-
vides functionality to other components but also requires functionality provided
by other components in its context. A connector facilitates the interaction be-
tween a set of components. While components usually support functionality
that is specific to an application, software connectors are often application-
independent and thus can be used across applications repeatedly (yet, they
are not always considered a first-class entity in many examples of software
architectures) [TMD09]. The benefits brought by the distinction between com-
ponents and connectors have been widely recognised in the software commu-
nity as a means of structuring software development [GS93, SDK+95, SDZ96,
MMP00, MT00]. The separation of computation from interactions itself dates
back to the research on programming-in-the-large versus programming-in-the-
small [DK75]. Although components and connectors do not cater for the adap-
tive behaviour of SMCs as expressed in roles and policies, similar principles
can be applied for structuring and reusing SMC interactions to form larger
collaborations.
Software architectures often use architectural styles, and patterns, to design
and specify the overall structure of a system. The distinction between styles
and patterns is traditionally fuzzy and it is not always possible to define a clear
boundary between them [TMD09]:
• Architectural style: high-level architectural decisions that are applicable
in a given context, constraining the architecture of a particular system
while highlighting the benefits achieved by those decisions.
• Architectural pattern: more specific design decisions (usually from the re-
finement of a style) in order to be applied to a particular system. These
can be thought of as architectural styles that are instantiated with the
components and connectors that are pertinent to a given application.
Common examples of architectural styles are client-server, blackboard and pipe
and filter. Figure 2.7 shows an example of the pipe and filter architectural
style, where a filter component receives data from an input pipe, transforms
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this data and sends data to the next component via an output pipe. The main
characteristic of this style is that filters are independent from each other, and
do not have knowledge of other filters that come before or after them. Moreover,
the correctness of the output of the network of pipes and filters should not be
influenced by the order of the filters in the pipeline [GS93].
Figure 2.7: Pipe and filter architectural style
Systematic specification of SMC interactions can benefit from architectural de-
scription languages (ADLs), module interconnection languages (MILs) and coor-
dination schemas in general, such as Wright [AG94], UniCon [SDK+95], Conic
[Kra90], Darwin [MDEK95], Rapide [LKA+95] and Mobile UNITY [RP03]. How-
ever, although traditional architectural description languages and coordination
schemas can bind software components through connections, the semantics
of these connections (such as “sends data to”, “controls” or “is part of”) is not
always clear, failing to represent higher-level relationships between these com-
ponents [Cle96]. An exception to this is the notion of user-defined connectors
[ASCN03] and higher-order connectors [LWF01], which support the incremental
building of more complex connectors from simpler ones.
Darwin configurations, for example, use bindings to link the provided func-
tionality of one component’s interface to the required functionality of another
component’s interface, but these bindings usually do not have any higher-
level semantics associated with them, as connectors are not treated by Darwin
as a first-class concept. Figure 2.8 shows an example Darwin configuration
[MDEK95] between a client and server components (white circles represent re-
quired interfaces, black circles represent provided interfaces). In this example,
a system is defined by instantiating a client component and a server compo-
nent, and binding the required interface “r” of the client to the provided inter-
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face “p” of the server.
component Server { component System {
provide p; inst
} A: Client;
B: Server;
component Client { bind
require r; A.r −− B.p
} }
Figure 2.8: Darwin configuration
Self-Managed Cells are similar to components and SMC interactions can be
designed in a manner akin to software connectors that exhibit well-defined
properties for binding SMCs. In contrast to architectural description languages
however we are not interested in general-purpose component interactions, but
instead aim for a model that addresses the structuring of policy-based collabo-
rations using the SMC infrastructure.
2.4.2 Design Patterns
Design patterns are reusable solutions for recurring problems in software de-
sign [GHJV95]. Object-oriented design patterns, for example, address the limi-
tations of pure object-oriented design techniques, which are not well suited for
describing complex interactions between groups of objects or classes [MKMG97].
The design patterns presented in [GHJV95] are divided into three categories:
creational patterns, which provide mechanisms for object creation, e.g. Fac-
tory, Prototype, Singleton; structural patterns, which support different ways of
realising relationships between entities, e.g. Bridge, Decorator, Composite; and
behavioural patterns, which provide patterns that increase the flexibility in car-
rying out the communication between objects, e.g. Command, Observer, Media-
tor. These design patterns provide general templates on how to solve a problem
in different situations, without specifying the actual classes or objects that will
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be involved in the final application. The use of design patterns promotes a
better understanding of the software itself, and the reuse of well-understood
abstractions.
Multiple design patterns can be applied simultaneously to the design of the
same application. Each design pattern can thus define a different aspect of
the interaction between a group of classes. The composition of design pat-
terns [Don02, Don03, Don04], where the same class plays different roles in the
context of different design patterns, is analogous to an SMC playing different
roles in distinct interactions.
Software architectures and design patterns are complementary to each other.
Garlan and colleagues [GCK02] investigated the possibility of using object-
oriented notations for the specification of architectural descriptions, and map-
ping ADLs into UML notation. However, it is claimed that there is no single
best way of encoding one into another because of semantic mismatches be-
tween the two. Moreover, Monroe and colleagues [MKMG97] also observe that
architectural patterns and object-oriented design patterns can be seen as com-
plementary techniques for system design, where the former is concerned with
the coarse-grained composition of components and their interactions whereas
the latter can be used to refine the internal implementation of a more sophisti-
cated component or connector.
Finally, specific design patterns for pervasive systems are starting to emerge
[LB03, CHL+04], but these so far have focused on high-level HCI aspects of
these interactions, addressing patterns of user/computer interaction within
pervasive environments. An example of such a pattern is the context sensitive
I/O pattern, where the mobile phone detects that the owner is driving or in a
meeting and accordingly either rings or vibrates. Instead, our work on SMCs
concentrates on the management aspects of the system.
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2.5 Multi-Agent Systems
The work on multi-agent systems has investigated means of organising auton-
omous collaborating entities into more complex aggregates, whose principles
and techniques can also be applicable for constructing cross-SMC interactions.
In its most general sense an agent denotes a hardware or software system that
presents the following properties: autonomy (operate without human interven-
tion), social ability (agents interact with each other), reactivity (perception of
the environment and subsequent response to it) and pro-activeness (not only
react but also perform goal-directed behaviour) [WJ95]. This is considered a
weak notion of agency, usually adopted in agent-based software engineering.
Under this perspective, UNIX processes or software components that exhibit
the aforementioned properties can be seen as agents.
A stronger notion of agent is the one where an agent exhibits, in addition to the
above properties, an anthropomorphic behaviour relying on concepts and at-
tributes that are more usually applied to humans (for example, beliefs, desires,
intentions [RG95]). In the artificial intelligence community, this corresponds to
an intelligent agent which is usually also associated with the ability to reason
and learn, and how these techniques can be used by the agent to interpret and
use the knowledge it has access to. Intelligence varies from marginal intelli-
gence (e.g. expressed as preferences) to advanced intelligence (e.g. derive new
knowledge via learning techniques) [CH97]. The Self-Managed Cell concept is
based on a feedback control-loop that relies on policies to govern its adaptive
behaviour and interactions with other SMCs, which does not involve learning
or reasoning (although these techniques could be used to extend the SMC’s
functionality) and is therefore closer to the notion of weak agency.
A multi-agent system (MAS) [Woo02] is composed of multiple interacting agents
that need to cooperate, coordinate and negotiate, in order to solve problems
that could not be solved by individual agents alone. Agent-oriented software
engineering has recognised the need for organisational structures for design-
ing multi-agent societies. In general, multi-agent systems focus on a role
model for agents, however more than a simple collection of roles, complex
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systems require further organisational abstractions for assisting their design
and analysis [ZJW03]. Expressing organisational structures explicitly enables
the construction of a system in a robust and repeatable fashion. Holonic mod-
els [HKR08, RHK03, UG02] often support hierarchical structures, but not more
sophisticated organisations. A few multi-agent systems have attempted to iden-
tify a comprehensive catalogue of generic and reusable patterns for interactions
between agents, which express pre-defined and common organisational struc-
tures that could be reused across different systems [ZJW01, ZJW03, HCY99,
TOH99, KKPS98]. In addition to the organisational structure of SMC interac-
tions, there is also a need to define how SMCs interact with each other in such
aggregated groups to distribute management responsibility, application tasks
or to implement communication patterns.
Deugo and colleagues [DOKvO99] present patterns for mobile and intelligent
agents, and patterns to manage the communication between agents, e.g. creat-
ing a proxy in its home location when the agent moves away to hide its change
in position, or a session pattern for managing complex conversations between
multiple agents over a period of time. These patterns highlight the impor-
tance of engineering complex multi-agent systems and a methodology for pat-
tern choice, which specifies the context where a pattern should be applied and
the forces that influence or constrain the choice of a specific pattern. Aridor
and Lange [AL98] propose specific patterns for mobile agent applications con-
centrating on issues related to the agent’s ability to move from one machine
to another. These include travelling patterns used for managing the movement
of mobile agents, e.g. patterns for specification of an agent’s itinerary involving
multiple destination hosts or patterns for moving groups of agents that must
travel together, as well as patterns for coordinating the meeting with other
agents when arriving at a specific destination. Examples of mobility patterns
proposed in [TOH99] are illustrated in Figure 2.9. These are called itinerary,
where an agent iterates around several destination hosts performing tasks in
each one, star-shaped, where agents move back and forth between the nec-
essary hosts, and branching, where an agent generates copies according to
the number of hosts it needs to visit. Kolp and colleagues [KGM02] propose
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a macro-level catalogue for interactions between agents for business process
by using real world business organisations as an analogy, e.g. structure-in-5,
pyramid, bidding, joint-venture (agreement between partners), etc.
Figure 2.9: Agent mobility patterns
However, most of the work in multi-agent systems focus on a subset of prob-
lems known as distributed problem solving [Smi88]. This corresponds to the co-
operative solution of problems by a decentralised collection of agents that pos-
sess different knowledge sources, and need to delegate tasks to other agents
that might be more suitable for solving the problem or parts of it. None of
these efforts focuses on patterns for engineering autonomous policy-based sys-
tems. It is thus needed to adapt these general principles to the requirements of
the SMC architecture, as we are interested in patterns for systematically com-
posing and federating SMCs in complex collaborations but concentrate on the
policy-based aspects of these interactions.
2.6 Discussion
This chapter started by presenting the more general related work on perva-
sive and ubiquitous systems, and how devolved management is a promising
approach to tackle the complexity of large-scale ubiquitous systems, where
autonomous components endowed with self-adapting capacity are able to ef-
fect local decision-making behaviour. We then presented the background work
on policy-based management and on the Self-Managed Cell framework, which
advocates the use of policies as the principal mechanism for achieving auton-
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omous behaviour. The SMC relies on a policy-based feedback control-loop to
perform adaptive actions in response to changes in its context, or changes in
the context of its managed resources. Using its discovery service an SMC is able
to discover other resources that are capable of joining the SMC. Discovered re-
sources are stored in a specific domain within the SMC, and policies written for
that domain will then automatically apply to resources assigned to it. The ser-
vices and resources within the SMC communicate via an asynchronous event
bus, which facilitates event exchanges among these components.
The SMC serves as an infrastructure for building ubiquitous computing appli-
cations. Although the SMC concept provides a suitable abstraction for repre-
senting autonomous components, applications will typically consist of ad-hoc
collaborations of devices and resources and therefore require a large number
of elementary SMCs to negotiate the necessary interactions with other compo-
nents in their surroundings and be assembled into larger and more complex
structures based on the same principles of self-management. We incorporate
ideas from multi-agent systems, software engineering and software architecture
principles, and apply these to describe policy-based collaborations of SMCs, in
particular, techniques for structuring the software organisation, its reuse and
the identification of recurring patterns or catalogues for composing software
components and agents. Our overall goal is to use the SMC as an architec-
tural pattern for building policy-based autonomous systems, where individual
SMCs can be assembled systematically into larger and more complex struc-
tures. Unlike general purpose component models we need to adapt, design and
implement the general principles to the specifics of the SMC architecture and
its policy-based operational model.
Basic SMCs, such as the one representing a personal device or body-sensor,
can be part of more complex SMCs, such as a body-area network or a home
monitoring system, which form a collection of smaller, yet autonomous, SMCs.
In the next chapter we describe the concepts that provide the underpinnings
for facilitating SMC interactions. These will serve as the basis for building an
infrastructure for the collaboration of policy-based autonomous systems.
Chapter 3
Basic SMC Interactions
This chapter discusses the elementary issues related to interactions between
self-managed cells. We focus on the underlying principles that facilitate the es-
tablishment of interactions and describe how SMCs can provide functionality to
other SMCs and how they can exchange policies that prescribe SMC behaviour
within the context of an interaction.
3.1 Motivation and Requirements
Although SMCs are autonomous, applications typically require a large number
of SMCs to collaborate, and SMCs must be able to interact with each other
in complex ways, to federate or compose into larger structures. This chap-
ter discusses basic interactions for collaborating SMCs in either peer-to-peer
or compositional settings. We can draw several requirements from the exam-
ple applications for healthcare monitoring and coalitions of autonomous UAVs
presented in Section 1.1.
Firstly, SMCs must detect the presence of remote SMCs and decide autono-
mously whether to establish an interaction. Interfaces specify the operations
one SMC provides to another, the events an SMC is able to receive from other
SMCs and the selected internal events that an SMC can use to notify oth-
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ers. More complex interactions may require exchanges of policies between the
SMCs, e.g. when an SMC can request another to behave in a specific way. Sec-
ondly, the interface exposed to a remote SMC may include only a subset of the
available functionality depending on the kind of SMC and the role, e.g. doctor
or nurse, it can play in the interaction. Finally, an SMC may wish to provide
access to its internal resources to other SMCs and to mediate the access to
those resources.
Whilst peer-to-peer interactions occur frequently as SMCs interact with neigh-
bouring autonomous components, composition interactions enable grouping
SMCs into larger autonomous structures and scaling SMC management to
larger environments. Composition encapsulates an SMC with its own resources,
as a managed resource within the containing SMC. This implies that the SMC
can be programmed by the containing SMC in terms of policies that it must
enforce. Moreover, the device exposes to its containing SMC a management
interface for re-configuration. For example a diagnostic device may be part of a
body-area network that will load new decision algorithms and new policies into
it. Similarly, larger sensors may be autonomous components and thus SMCs
in their own right.
Composition also implies that the contained SMC behaves as a managed re-
source within the outer SMC and ceases to advertise itself independently. In-
teractions between the contained SMC and external SMCs are subject to the
authorisation and possibly mediation from the outer SMC which may require
preventing external access. An SMC cannot be contained by more than one
containing SMC, although it may interact with other SMCs for application pur-
poses subject to authorisation from its managing SMC. Although a contained
SMC is a managed resource, it must retain control of the interfaces it exposes
and the policies it accepts from its managing SMC. This is for reasons of in-
tegrity rather than security as it is important to ensure that an autonomous
device cannot be compromised i.e., devices preserve their autonomy.
Thus a composition differs from a peer-to-peer interaction in the degree of ac-
cess permitted, i.e. which methods and events are exposed and which policies
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are accepted from the containing SMC, and in the fact that interactions between
the contained SMC with external resources must be mediated by the contain-
ing SMC. However, compositions and peer-to-peer interactions have similar
requirements in terms of the mechanisms required for supporting these inter-
actions:
• Firstly, an SMC must expose functionality to interacting SMCs and fa-
cilitate access to its services or own internal resources, e.g. sensors in a
body-area SMC. Thus an SMC must be able to offer an interface that
specifies the SMC’s functionality and which can be exchanged among re-
mote SMCs in a collaboration.
• Secondly, an SMC must be aware of the state or context of their collabora-
tors, as this may influence its own behaviour. Thus an SMC must be able
both to receive events from other SMCs and also to notify remote SMCs
of selected internal events occurring within itself.
• Finally, more complex interactions require an SMC to load new tasks dy-
namically into a remote SMC. This can be achieved through exchanges of
policies between the SMCs, where an SMC can request another to behave
in a specific way within the context of the interaction.
The exchanges of interfaces, events and policies provide the basic mechanisms
for supporting SMC interactions. These will be discussed in detail in the follow-
ing sections. In Chapter 4 we will describe how more complex interactions can
be engineered in terms of patterns of interaction, which are based on the use of
specific algorithms or protocols for realising these exchange mechanisms.
3.2 Interfaces
An SMC specifies the functionality it provides to other SMCs through an inter-
face. This must support both the core management functions of the SMC and
also the management of application-specific behaviour (customised interfaces).
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An interface specification defines the operations supported by the SMC, as well
as the events that can be sent and received to/from remote SMCs (Figure 3.1).
Formally, an interface description i is defined as:
Interfacei = 〈O,E,N〉
Where:
• O is a set of operations, which are methods the interface provides to re-
mote SMCs;
• E is a set of events, which can be published externally by the SMC (i.e. to
which external SMCs can subscribe); and
• N is a set of notifications, which are external events of which the SMC can
be notified (i.e. that external entities publish within the SMC).
Figure 3.1: SMC interface
3.2.1 Core Interface
The SMC’s core interface is application-independent and defines the function-
ality required for supporting the basic exchanges of events and policies, and for
retrieving the interfaces that define the application-specific functionality which
an SMC supports. The core interface is therefore required for enabling the es-
tablishment of SMC interactions in terms of the basic exchange mechanisms.
The operations supplied by the SMC’s core interface are:
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• “notify”: sends an event notification to a remote SMC;
• “load”: loads a group of policies into a remote SMC;
• “unload”: unloads a group of policies from a remote SMC;
• “getInterface”: retrieves a specific customised interface for a remote SMC.
Additionally, the events and notifications specified by the core interface define
application-independent phenomena in the establishment of SMC interactions,
namely the discovery/departure of SMCs, and the loading/unloading of poli-
cies:
• “foundSMC”: a new SMC has been discovered;
• “leftSMC”: an SMC has departed from the interaction;
• “loaded”: a group of policies has been loaded into the SMC;
• “unloaded”: a group of policies has been unloaded from the SMC.
3.2.2 Customised Interface
The management of an SMC’s application-specific behaviour is defined through
its customised interface. For example, in applications for healthcare monitor-
ing, a patient SMC may provide an interface which allows the doctor to read
sensor measurements or set new alarm thresholds. An SMC can support mul-
tiple customised interfaces, which allow different partner SMCs to have a dif-
ferent view of the functionality the SMC exports. Although it would be possible
to expose all the functions on a single application interface and use autho-
risation policies to restrict access from external entities, this would make all
operations to services and resources visible externally even if they are not ac-
cessible. Exposing the same functionality to all partners could thus have se-
curity implications in military applications or unwanted privacy implications
for example in medical applications, as any patient SMC would be able to find
out what other patients are up to. Typically, the customised interfaces an SMC
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exposes depend on the kind of SMC it is interacting with, e.g. a doctor and or-
dinary hospital staff will have different “views” of the functionality provided by
a patient SMC, and may also depend on the specific instance SMC, e.g. the GP
treating that patient will have access to more functions compared to any other
GP. Thus, an external SMC should see only those functions that an SMC wants
to expose in a customised interface generated specifically for that interaction.
Complex SMCs typically comprise internal resources and smaller SMCs. In
this case, the functionality provided by the patient SMC’s customised interface
will rely on the functionality of its resources. This can be achieved by map-
ping the functions exposed in the interface of the containing SMC to operations
supported by its internal resources, e.g., the patient interface may support a
“readTemperature” operation, which is mapped to a specific operation in a sen-
sor object that is part of the SMC’s internal structure. Additionally, this per-
mits controlling which methods are exposed by a specific customised interface
by dynamically adding or removing the mappings.
1 <interface>
2 <event name="monitoringReady" localEvent="ready"/>
3 <notification name="startMonitoring" localEvent="start"/>
4 <notification name="stopMonitoring" localEvent="stop"/>
5 <operation name="readECG" localOp="/local/hearBeatSensor.read"/>
6 <operation name="scheduleTask" localOp="/local/jTimer.createTask"/>
7 </interface>
Figure 3.2: Customised interface of a patient (Ponder2 XML notation)
Figure 3.2 illustrates the customised interface of a patient SMC: it defines the
events, notifications and operations supported by that interface. This interface
in particular is able to generate the event “monitoringReady”, and be notified of
the events “startMonitoring” and “stopMonitoring”. The interface supports the
operations “readECG” and “scheduleTask”, which are mapped to the function-
ality provided by local resources within the SMC. Events and notifications have
an external name, but these are mapped to specific local events defined within
the context of that SMC.
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3.3 Interaction Establishment
The establishment of a new interaction between SMCs is a three-step process:
(1) a remote SMC that is capable of joining an interaction is dynamically discov-
ered; (2) information about the discovered SMC is used to classify and deter-
mine how the interaction will occur; and (3) a policy-based interaction between
the SMCs is set up. The first two steps of the process are detailed below, and
the third step is discussed in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 SMC Discovery
Interaction establishment is initiated as a result of the discovery service of an
SMC (Section 2.3) detecting the presence of another SMC. An SMC’s discovery
service broadcasts its identity message (id;type[;extra]) at frequency R, where:
• id: the address of the SMC, e.g. rmi://gumstix4.doc.ic.ac.uk/smc;
• type: the type of the SMC, e.g. doctor, patient;
• extra: additional information about the SMC, such as capabilities sup-
ported by the SMC, e.g. heart rate monitoring, and credentials that the
SMC possesses, e.g. public-key digital certificate.
When a remote SMC is detected, the discoverer SMC generates the event found-
SMC within its local event bus [LDS+08]. The event contains the information
broadcast by the discovered SMC, and allows the components and services
within the discoverer SMC to handle it as appropriate. In particular, the ad-
dress of the remote SMC is used to obtain that SMC’s core interface.
The patient provides one interface to a doctor, via the core interface, which is
possibly different from the interface provided to a nurse (Figure 3.3). When an
SMC provides an interface to other interacting SMCs, this is pre-determined
by the type information of both discoverer and discovered SMCs. In our imple-
mentation, local policies running in each SMC define which interfaces should
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be provided to other SMCs based on their types. This may in turn cause the
discovered SMC to obtain a customised interface for the discoverer. An SMC
may need to authenticate its partner using the extra information supplied in
the identity message before handling a specific customised interface to the re-
mote SMC, e.g. a malicious SMC could pretend to be a doctor in order to acquire
an interface for the patient SMC.
Figure 3.3: SMC interface exchange
3.3.2 Role Assignment
The use of roles for structuring responsibility in the context of distributed sys-
tems management has been thoroughly discussed in [Lup98, LMR98, Lin01,
San96, SCFY96, SBM99, HBM98, HYBM00]. We use roles as placeholders for
remote SMCs that are discovered at run-time, and these placeholders are kept
within the local domain structure of each SMC. Each role is associated with a
specific behaviour that can be performed by a single SMC within the context of
an interaction.
When an SMC is discovered and a customised interface for the interaction is
obtained, the role this SMC will be playing within the context of the interaction
is determined based on the type and/or capabilities of the discovered SMC,
i.e. doctor SMC will be assigned to a role for doctors, whereas a patient SMC
will be assigned to a role for patients (Figure 3.4). A role specifies an expected
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interface, in terms of operations, events and notifications, that a remote SMC
needs to satisfy in order to be assigned to that role.
Formally, let Interfacec = 〈Oc, Ec, Nc〉 be the customised interface provided
by a discovered SMC, let r be a role defined within the discoverer SMC, and
let Interfacer = 〈Or, Er, Nr〉 be the expected interface for that role, then the
assignment of the SMC which provides Interfacec to role r is subject to the
following condition being satisfied:
assign(Interfacec, r)→ (Or ⊆ Oc) ∧ (Er ⊆ Ec) ∧ (Nr ⊆ Nc)
The role’s expected interface serves as a “scope” for the specification of policies
associated with that role. Policies can be written in terms of the functionality
specified by the role’s expected interfaces because any SMC assigned to the re-
spective role must support at least that minimum functionality. This ensures
that SMCs complying with a role’s expected interface will be capable of execut-
ing the policies previously written for that role. This is discussed in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.4: SMC assignment
Complex interactions can be encoded in terms of a group of policies that are
dynamically loaded and enforced by one or more SMCs within the context of an
interaction, as discussed in the next section.
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3.4 Missions: Behaviour of SMC Interactions
Complex SMC interactions can be achieved by the exchange of policies in con-
junction with the events required for triggering these policies. Policies can be
used to prescribe how an SMC should behave in the context of an interac-
tion, i.e. how it should react to both internal events and external notifications
by invoking management actions locally or on remote SMCs. Thus the ability
of loading policies provides a mechanism for altering the behaviour of remote
SMCs at run-time. We rely on the concept of a mission to support policy ex-
changes between SMCs. A mission provides a mechanism for grouping the
duties (in terms of the obligation policies) that an SMC must perform, and is
specified in terms of two or more collaborating roles.
Missions are normally pre-specified by an application “programmer”. We rely
on the notion of expected interfaces (Section 3.3.2) to define a scope for spec-
ifying the policies contained in a mission. When a new SMC is discovered,
missions defined within the discoverer SMC can be loaded and instantiated on
the discovered SMC. Mission loading and instantiation are dependent on the
existence of authorisation policies allowing one SMC to perform these actions
on another (these are discussed in Section 3.5).
Figure 3.5: SMC mission exchange
Figure 3.5 illustrates a mission exchange between a doctor and a patient SMCs.
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When a doctor SMC discovers a patient’s body-area network SMC, a mission is
loaded and instantiated on the patient device if permitted, e.g. for ECG mon-
itoring relying on the sensors and devices available within the patient SMC.
Similarly, the patient may also load and instantiate a mission at the doctor,
defining the policies it expects the doctor to fulfill in the interaction, e.g. for
re-calibration of the patient’s sensors.
3.4.1 Mission Specification
A mission specification is defined in terms of expected interfaces of a number
of roles and consists of a set of obligation policies that must be loaded and
instantiated in a remote SMC performing role r. Formally, let R be a set of roles,
O a set of obligation policies and M a set of missions. A mission specification
m ∈M is defined as:
Missionm = 〈Rm, Om〉
Where:
• Om ⊆ O is a set of obligation policies with the subject role r, i.e. Om defines
the duties of the SMC that will be performing role r; and
• Rm ⊆ R is the union of the target roles in Om and the role r itself, i.e. Rm
are the roles needed for enforcing the obligations contained in the mission.
The mission specification may also specify an array of application-specific ar-
guments, e.g. thresholds, measurement rates, etc. At mission loading, values
for these arguments must be provided, which will be used when the policies
defined within the mission are instantiated in the target SMC, e.g. raise the
alarm if the patient’s heart rate is “rate ≥ v”, where v is the value provided at
mission loading.
Figure 3.6 shows an example of a mission for ECG monitoring, which is typi-
cally downloaded from a nurse into a patient SMC. In addition to the “nurse”
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1 <mission>
2 <arg name="nurse" type="interface/nurse"/>
3 <arg name="patient" type="interface/patient"/>
4 <arg name="time" type="integer"/>
5 <arg name="freq" type="integer"/>
6 <policy name="ECGMon" event="!nurse;.startMonitoring">
7 <action>
8 <use name="!patient;">
9 <scheduleTask freq="!freq;" time="!time;">
10 <use name="!patient;">
11 <readECG />
12 </use>
13 </scheduleTask>
14 <scheduleTask delay="!time;">
15 <use name="!nurse;">
16 <notify event="!patient;.monitoringReady"/>
17 </use>
18 </scheduleTask>
19 </use>
20 </action>
21 </policy>
22 </mission>
Figure 3.6: Patient monitoring mission (Ponder2 XML notation)
and “patient” roles, the mission takes two additional application-specific argu-
ments (“time” and “frequency”), whose values are specified when the mission is
instantiated. This mission defines the obligations that patients must enforce
in order to enable a nurse to perform an ECG. The specific nurse and patient
SMCs that are expected to participate in this interaction are also given upon in-
stantiation. Policies are specified in terms of the roles and application-specific
arguments (“!rolename;” and “!argumentname;”, respectively).
The mission in Figure 3.6 comprises an obligation policy named “ECGMon”
which is triggered by a “startMonitoring” event received from the nurse. The
policy action causes the patient to schedule two tasks: one reads the patient’s
ECG for a specified time and at a specific frequency, and the other notifies the
nurse when the monitoring has finished. This mission relies on the methods
“scheduleTask” and “readECG” that are expected to be present in the patient’s
customised interface, and on events that must be either generated or received
by the SMCs. The operation “notify” is part of the nurse’s core interface. The
argument of this method must be one of the notifications defined in the nurse’s
interface. The operation “load”, not shown in the example, is used to load a
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mission and is also part of the core interface of all SMCs.
In essence, missions are a constrained form of programming a remote SMC. Be-
fore instantiating the mission and its policies, the receiving SMC must validate
the mission to prevent it from compromising the integrity of the SMC.
3.4.2 Security Concerns in Mobile Code
When considering the ability of dynamically loading executable or interpretable
code into remote resources, security concerns must be taken into account. In
this section we briefly review the most frequent techniques for ensuring the
integrity of the target resource when running remote code: Proof-Carrying Code
(PCC) and the Java Sandbox model. We then elaborate the security require-
ments that have to be considered when missions are exchanged between SMCs
and describe how we address these issues in sections 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5.
Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [NL98] can be used to determine whether the pro-
gram code provided by a source system is safe to install and execute in a target
system, without requiring interpretation or any run-time checking. The notion
behind PCC is that the source system attaches to the code a proof that this
code does not violate a safety policy specified by the target system. This policy,
which is specified in first-order logic, defines the safety rules that the target
system desires to enforce for the untrusted code, e.g. memory safety, time lim-
its on execution and resource usage bounds. The proof is checked by the target
system using an automatic proof-checking process. The main advantage of the
PCC approach is that, after the proof has been validated, there is no need for
the target system to perform any run-time safety checks.
PCC comprises two main stages: proof generation and proof checking. In the
first stage, the code consumer receives the untrusted code and extracts from it
a safety predicate. The code must be inspected in search of instructions whose
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execution violates the safety policy defined by the target system. For each
instruction, a predicate is produced, which expresses the conditions where the
execution of the instruction is safe. The combination of these predicates forms
a safety predicate, which can be proved true only if the execution of the code
does not violate the target’s safety policy. This predicate is then sent to a proof
producer (either the source system or any other proof producer system), which
must prove the safety predicate using the axioms and inference rules defined
in the target’s safety policy. In the second stage, the target system receives
the proof from the proof producer, and checks the validity of the proof using a
simple and fast automatic proof checker, which is parameterised with the proof
and the safety predicate, and using the safety policy it determines whether the
proof proves the safety predicate or not. The code is considered safe to execute
if the safety predicate is correctly proved.
The safety predicate must be relatively easy to prove without extra knowledge
about the program to perform proof generation automatically. However, auto-
matic decision procedures do not exist (or are not effective) when generating
proofs for more complex safety predicates. In these cases, a semi-interactive
theorem prover is required, involving a person with a deeper understanding of
the code [NL98].
The Java Sandbox Model
Java supports the ability to load, on demand, programs into a remote resource.
The Java Sandbox provides the security model for applets and any other Java
applications, which restricts the actions performed by a remote program within
certain boundaries. This is also required for SMC missions, whose actions that
are executed must be confined to those determined by the target SMC.
In this section, Java is used to illustrate the verification steps that must be
performed when remote code is loaded into a device. Loading missions should
not be mistaken for loading Java bytecodes, which are a much more general
form of programming and whose verification is also more complex. Instead,
we use the Java model only as an analogy for identifying the various stages
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involved when remote SMCs load missions into each other.
The enforcement of the Java language rules occurs in three stages [Oak01]:
• Compiler enforcement: during development time, compiling the Java source
code;
• Bytecode verification: at the time the code is loaded into the remote host
(before its execution); and
• Run-time enforcement: is performed continuously during the execution of
a Java program.
The compiler performs various syntactic checks to ensure that the Java pro-
gram complies with the rules defined in the language. These checks include
verifying the access level of attributes, methods and classes (private, default,
protected, public), that variables are not used before they are initialised, etc.
Bytecode verification is needed because a remote malicious compiler may have
by-passed the language rules that were supposed to be checked during the
compiler enforcement stage. The main checks include verifying that the classes
are in the correct format, that final methods are not overridden, that there is
no illegal data conversion of objects, etc. A special case of bytecode verification
is called delayed verification, which delays some of the checks, provided these
are still performed before the code is executed. Finally, run-time enforcement
performs checks during program execution, such as array bound checking and
object casts.
In particular, one error that may be raised during run-time by the Java Virtual
Machine is of interest: java.lang.NoSuchMethodError. This occurs if an appli-
cation tries to call a specific method of a class, but the class no longer has the
definition of that method. Normally, the compiler would detected this condi-
tion, and this error can only occur if the class definition has changed during
run-time. Similarly, the interfaces that a mission depends on might be modi-
fied during its execution, e.g. one of the sensors provided by the patient may
fail, and an SMC must be prepared to handle this situation.
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SMC Remote Policy Mode
Proof-Carrying Code and the Java Sandbox model present two distinct ways
for ensuring that the code loaded from a source system will not compromise
the integrity of the target system. While PCC relies on the validation of a proof
that the code does not violate the safety policies in the target system, the Java
model confines the execution of the program within certain bounds in the target
system, and relies on three different steps where the security rules can be
enforced.
We chose to use an approach which is based on the Java model for defining
the security aspects of mission exchanges, as the more complex proofs in PCC
require a person with deep understanding of the code to define the proof. Ad-
ditionally, the proof in PCC may be several times longer than the actual code,
thus this approach is not suitable for resource-constrained devices. Finally,
PCC also requires the translation of the original code (that can be written in any
language) to a stream of instructions in a generic intermediate language [NL98],
which will abstract most of the constructs in the original language that are not
relevant to the safety policy.
Similar to the Java security model, an SMC mission must be checked in three
stages:
• Mission specification: must ensure that the source SMC has written a
mission that is syntactically correct and is equivalent to the compiler ver-
ification;
• Mission loading: allows the target SMC to perform verifications before ex-
ecuting the remote code. Similar to bytecode verification the target SMC
must check the code it receives from remote SMCs to prevent malicious or
accidental compromise of the target’s integrity;
• Mission execution: run-time verification that checks whether any inter-
face, that affects the behaviour of the mission, has changed during the
execution of the mission.
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The next sections will elaborate each of these stages.
3.4.3 Specifying a Mission
When a mission is specified, an initial verification is performed to ensure that it
complies with the expected interfaces of the roles involved. The mission is con-
sidered valid if all the operations, events and notifications used by the policies
within the mission are also defined in the expected interface of the respective
roles.
Formally, let Missionm = 〈Rm, Om〉 be a mission, and for all r ∈ Rm, let Ir,m be
the expected interface of r, then Missionm complies with the expected interface
of its roles if:
∀ obl ∈ Om | (r.operation “appears in” obl→ r ∈ Rm ∧ operation ∈ OIr,m)
∧ (r.event “appears in” obl→ r ∈ Rm ∧ event ∈ EIr,m)
∧ (r.notification “appears in” obl→ r ∈ Rm ∧ notification ∈ NIr,m)
Where 〈a〉.〈b〉 “appears in” 〈c〉 means that the operation, event or notification
“b” of role “a” is used in the specification of policy “c”. This verification is
equivalent to a syntactic checking of the mission.
3.4.4 Loading a Mission
When the source SMC loads a mission specification into the target SMC, the
source must specify the parameter values to be used upon mission instantia-
tion on the target side. The source defines the SMC instances needed for the
mission. The target must then instantiate the obligation policies contained in
the mission using the parameter values provided by the source. The target
must ensure that the mission passes through a series of checks, when loading
the mission and before instantiating its policies, in order to protect the SMC’s
integrity. These verifications must guarantee that the mission is well-formed,
that the mission parameters were provided correctly and that all mission depen-
dencies can be satisfied within the target’s local environment. These checks
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are discussed in the following.
Step 1: Check that the Mission is Well-Formed
The source SMC may maliciously or accidentally embed additional code in the
mission and attempt to load it in the target SMC. The first step in validating
the mission is thus to check that it is well-formed; namely, that it contains
only arguments and obligation policies and that it is syntactically correct. This
includes inspecting the policies in the mission and verifying that they solely use
operations, events and notifications pertaining to the roles given as arguments.
A policy attempting to invoke operations on other objects will generate an error
and abort the instantiation of the mission. This ensures that the mission is self-
contained and prevents malicious SMCs from “guessing” operations or other
resources available in the target SMC.
Step 2: Check Mission Parameters
When a mission provided by a source SMC A for a target SMC B interacts
with a third party SMC C, it is necessary to check that B is using the correct
relevant interfaces for C. The source SMC A cannot disclose to B the customised
interfaces that it has acquired for interacting with remote SMC C, i.e. the
argument values for the roles involved in the mission cannot be the customised
interfaces for the corresponding SMCs. Instead, the values must specify the
address of those SMCs, and it is the target’s responsibility to acquire specific
customised interfaces for executing the mission.
For example, consider a doctor loading a mission on a patient SMC, which
involves three roles: doctor and patient (as these are respectively the source
and target of the mission), and an additional nurse role (assuming the mission
involves invocations on a nurse interface, e.g. for setting an alarm off). In this
case, the doctor SMC cannot simply give an interface for the nurse SMC to
the patient, as it is likely that doctors and patients will have access to different
customised interfaces provided by nurses. Instead, the doctor must provide the
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address of the specific nurse SMC, leaving it up to the patient SMC to acquire
a suitable customised interface for that interaction (through the nurse’s core
interface).
Figure 3.7: Target SMC possesses more restrictive interfaces than source SMC
In Figure 3.7, the dashed lines represent interface exchanges (D is for doctor,
P is for patient and N is for nurse) and the solid line represents mission load-
ing. In this case, the nurse SMC exposes different interfaces to the doctor and
patient SMCs (N and N’, respectively). When receiving a mission, the patient
SMC must contact the nurse directly to obtain N’, which possibly defines a
much stricter set of functionality than N. This requires an additional check to
be performed by the target SMC, which is described in the following.
Step 3: Check Mission Dependencies
When receiving a mission, the target SMC must check the policy dependencies,
i.e. events, notifications and operations used by the mission’s policies, against
the interfaces of the SMCs which the target has access to. This can be achieved
by checking the policies within the mission against either: (a) the expected in-
terfaces the target knows for those SMCs or (b) the customised interfaces the
target has obtained from the remote SMCs once it has established an interac-
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tion with them. The former is sufficient because an interaction is established
with an SMC only if the customised interface received from that SMC supports
a superset of the events, notifications and operations defined in the expected
interface for the respective role. This enables delaying the binding to the remote
SMC until it is actually required, but is more restrictive since the customised
interface may offer additional operations that are not present in the expected
interface. The second approach is more permissive as it allows the mission to
contain policies that use operations not present in the expected interface but
requires establishing an interaction with the remote SMCs when the mission is
loaded.
Formally, the verification against the expected interfaces is identical to the one
described in Section 3.4.3. The verification in the second case uses the cus-
tomised interfaces obtained from the SMCs assigned to the roles, rather than
the expected interface associated with that role.
3.4.5 Executing a Mission
If all the verifications performed during mission loading are successful, the tar-
get SMC is ready to instantiate the obligation policies contained in the mission.
These are template policies, which were written in terms of the roles partic-
ipating in the mission and in terms of other application-specific arguments,
e.g. thresholds, measurement rates, etc. Role references are resolved using the
customised interfaces acquired by the target for the respective SMCs. Other
arguments are directly substituted for the values provided by the source SMC.
The policies contained in the mission are then instantiated in the target SMC.
Complex policy-based collaborations can be realised if multiple missions are
exchanged between the SMCs, e.g. the doctor can load a monitoring mission on
the patient, and both the patient and the nurse SMCs can load missions into
each other in a similar fashion. The policies loaded in a mission can trigger
internal actions within the target SMC based on events occurring in either of
the involved SMCs, or trigger remote invocations on the other SMCs as well.
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During mission execution, the interface of the involved SMCs may change, for
example, if an SMC acquires new resources or loses current ones, causing the
functionality that its interface provides to change accordingly. This can affect
mission execution, as the functionality that the mission expects (checked on
mission loading) may not be available any more.
When the interface of an SMC is modified because a resource has left, this
SMC automatically notifies its interacting partners using the event leftSMC,
which triggers partner SMCs running the mission to re-check the mission de-
pendencies with respect to that specific interface. This process is akin to the
check performed in step 3 of the mission loading verification. If the SMC deter-
mines that the modified interface no longer satisfies the mission dependencies,
the mission is stopped and the source of the mission, which originally loaded
it into the target SMC, is notified that the mission execution was interrupted.
3.5 Access Control for SMC Interactions
An SMC must be authorised in order to perform operations on a remote SMC.
Access control in SMC interactions is defined in terms of authorisation policies1
relating to operations in both core and customised interfaces.
Permissions are required for invoking application-specific operations on a cus-
tomised interface, either directly or as the action prescribed by an obligation
policy. There is a one-to-one correspondence between what is exposed in a
customised interface and the authorisations required for invoking application-
specific operations on that interface. For example, if a doctor SMC is willing
to expose a given functionality to a patient SMC through a customised inter-
face, the doctor must set the corresponding authorisations to allow the patient
SMC to invoke the operations on that interface. At the moment, we require
customised interfaces and the corresponding authorisations to be generated
manually. In particular, authorisations are finer-grained since the access to
a given operation may be conditional on the context of the SMC enforcing the
1The access control framework for the SMC and details on how authorisation policies are imple-
mented in Ponder2 are described in [RDD07].
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policy, e.g. a medication prescription can be requested only between 9am and
5pm. Intuitively the operations in a customised interface could be automati-
cally generated from the set of authorisations defined for an SMC, but further
work is needed to investigate this.
Permissions are also required for invoking operations on a core interface, e.g.
loading and unloading missions. In this case, the definition of which SMC is
supposed to send and which SMC is supposed to receive missions often de-
pends on the nature of the interaction, e.g. doctors will typically be allowed to
load missions into a patient. In Chapter 4 we will discuss the use of patterns of
interactions. Patterns assist in the specification of manager/managed relation-
ships between SMCs, and in deploying the required authorisations for mission
loading in the context of an interaction.
3.6 Case-Study: Illustrating Security Management
Collaborations between SMCs are created for a specific purpose: for exam-
ple, for defining the interactions between doctor, nurse and patient SMCs, or
for assembling a monitoring set-up involving the equipment and various re-
sources available at the home setting of a patient; another example is a set of
unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs) or robots assembled in a team for the
reconnaissance of hazardous areas or to realise rescue operations after floods
or earthquakes, carrying out tasks that are too dangerous for humans to per-
form.
These cross-SMC interactions concern both the management of the application-
specific aspects, e.g. healthcare monitoring, as well as the management aspects
of how SMC interactions themselves are established. In this section we concen-
trate on the latter and present a case-study illustrating how security manage-
ment of SMC interactions can be achieved through the use of roles, missions
and policies. These interactions can become compromised if malicious SMCs
are allowed to join, so there is an interest in the mechanisms which are re-
quired for the secure establishment and operation of these collaborations.
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The purpose of this section is not to introduce new algorithms or protocols for
security management, but instead to illustrate how SMC interactions can be
extended easily to include new security management mechanisms as required.
3.6.1 Management Requirements
The mechanisms considered essential for the construction of SMC interactions
include authentication, membership management and access control. These are
necessary because they guarantee that new members are authenticated before
being allowed to join the interactions, that failures of current participants can
be promptly detected, and that access control is applied to the services provided
by the participants of an interaction. Additionally, support for bootstrapping
and task-allocation within an interaction is required via a set of coordination
mechanisms. This is essential for enforcing maintenance actions and guaran-
teeing the integrity of the interactions.
We describe in this section how these management requirements can be ex-
pressed as roles, which are assigned to different SMCs within an interaction.
Distributed SMCs assigned to different roles then cater for the security man-
agement of an interaction, by enforcing the policies contained in a mission
specified for that role.
• Coordination role: is responsible for bootstrapping an interaction and as-
signing discovered nodes to roles. Assignment of SMCs to roles is flexibly
defined by policies which take into account the discovered SMC’s type
and its capabilities, obtained from the identity message sent by the re-
mote SMC when discovered. For example, in an SMC interaction for
reconnaissance operations, SMCs providing “video” capability are more
suitable for a “surveillance” role, whereas SMCs providing “storage” ca-
pability are more suitable for an “aggregation” role. However, this is still
subject to the SMC providing an interface which supports the functional-
ity required for that role’s expected interface. The SMC in charge of the
coordinator role loads the missions into the respective SMCs according to
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their roles. The coordinator also loads missions for the SMCs assigned to
the management roles. These missions contain policies for authentication
of other members and for membership management, for example. The
implementation of these policies is described in Chapter 6.
• Authentication role: is needed to validate the identity of SMCs that want
to join an interaction. It relies on the exchange of public-key digital cer-
tificates. The SMC assigned to the authenticator role is initially loaded
with the public-keys of the certification authorities (CAs) that are rele-
vant within the context of an interaction, e.g. British Medical Association
(BMA) certificates in an application for healthcare monitoring. Nodes that
wish to join the interaction must present certificates signed by these au-
thorities to the authenticator. However, this simple mechanism does not
cater for key revocations, and the use of non-PKI based authentication
[KZ03, SBS+02, SA00] would need to be investigated.
• Membership management role: builds upon the functionality provided by
the SMC’s discovery service to monitor the presence of member SMCs.
This is required because nodes may move out of communication range,
run out of battery power or disconnect. Participants are required to renew
their membership periodically with the SMC assigned to the membership
manager role. Membership renewal does not require digital certificates to
be revalidated, and renewals consist of simple events sent to inform that
a given SMC is still active in the context of the interaction. The mem-
bership manager keeps track of membership renewals that are received
from other members. Each time a renewal from a given SMC is received,
the membership manager extends the validity of that member’s entry for
a limited amount of time. Whenever the membership manager detects
that a member’s entry has expired because the member failed to renew its
membership within a given time frame, that SMC is considered to have
left and an event is propagated to the other participants of the interaction.
• Access control: is necessary for protecting the resources and services pro-
vided by each participant from unauthorised access. Its enforcement is
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distributed amongst all roles, in the form of authorisation policies, as typ-
ically each SMC is interested in protecting its own resources and permit
access to specific members within the interaction. However, if an SMC is
not capable of enforcing its own access control policies, it may outsource
these control decisions to another SMC or to its own trusted agent.
Specific SMC interactions can be extended with additional management roles
if necessary. The SMC infrastructure is not specific to a particular security
model. For example, threshold cryptography [ZH99] for preventing a compro-
mised authenticator from accepting rogue members in the interaction and in-
trusion detection [Sun96, Lun93] for monitoring potential risks and attacks are
examples of the mechanisms that can be added to a given interaction. Role al-
location strategies such as the one in OASIS [BMY02, YMB01, HYBM00] could
be encoded as a pattern for role assignment and mission loading. OASIS uses a
formal logic to specify precise conditions for entering a role, which are based on
the node’s credentials. The node is then issued with a role membership certifi-
cate (RMC) that can be used subsequently as one of the node’s own capabilities
to satisfy the conditions for entering a further role (a proof tree is built which
corresponds to the dependencies between these certificates). The much simpler
role assignment based on capabilities, as described earlier, was used to illus-
trate the management aspects of SMC interactions. Our objective however is
not in developing such mechanisms but rather to illustrate how security and
management procedures can be enforced amongst distributed participants of
an interaction according to their roles.
3.6.2 Management of SMC Interactions
Initially, the SMC which is assigned to the coordinator role may be also as-
signed to other management roles (e.g. authenticator role), since it alone ini-
tiates the interaction. However, as new SMCs are discovered, these functions
can be devolved to them by assigning new SMCs to the roles and loading the
respective missions. Figure 3.8 succinctly describes the overall operation of an
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SMC interaction. The SMC assigned to the coordinator role bootstraps the in-
teraction and periodically broadcasts its identity message, which also includes
in this example the address of the authenticator (1). An SMC that is interested
in joining the interaction contacts the authenticator and sends its credentials.
This in turn triggers a policy within the authenticator, which causes the cre-
dentials of the discovered SMC to be verified using the public-keys previously
loaded in the authenticator (2). Our implementation uses authentication based
on X.509 digital certificates, but other strategies could be loaded into the au-
thenticator in the form of policies.
Figure 3.8: Management and simplified policy-based interaction
If the credentials of the discovered SMC are successfully validated (and if needed,
the authenticator’s credentials are also successfully validated by the new SMC),
the authenticator sends an event to the coordinator, informing it that the dis-
covered SMC is allowed to join the interaction and what the SMC’s capabili-
ties are (3). Policies in the coordinator specify the preferable role assignment
strategy matching the role requirements and the SMC’s capabilities. The role
assignment process includes transferring the missions and authorisation poli-
cies that are meant to be enforced by that specific role to the new SMC (4). A
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mission specification m = 〈R,O〉 groups the obligations O that correspond to
the duties of the SMC and defines the set of roles R which are needed for the
enforcement of the policies. The SMC also receives the identity of the members
assigned to each role, and then directly contacts them to acquire the respective
customised interfaces for each one of these SMCs (as described in Section 3.4).
Membership management is also policy-based. Policies require each partici-
pant to send an event periodically renewing its membership with the member-
ship manager (5). In turn, the membership manager monitors the presence of
other members. The renewal event received from a member triggers a policy
in the membership manager which extends that member’s entry for a given
amount of time. When an entry expires because it has not been validated, an
event is raised locally in the membership manager, informing that the SMC
has left the interaction. This causes the membership manager to notify all
other participants so they can check whether they are still capable of enforc-
ing their missions (6). There is an obvious trade-off between how often SMCs
should revalidate their entry and how accurate the membership lists should be
kept. For this reason, these actions were defined as policies which can be easily
changed to adapt updating rates (and thus accuracy) to different requirements.
3.7 Discussion
This chapter identified basic mechanisms for supporting SMC interactions.
Through its interface, an SMC specifies which operations it provides for remote
SMCs, and which events the SMC is able to send or to receive from remote
SMCs. Whilst the functionality provided by the core interface is application-
independent and common to all SMCs, the customised interfaces of an SMC
specify different sets of application functionality that are offered to their inter-
acting partners. When a remote SMC is discovered, it is assigned in the discov-
erer’s domain structure, in a role that is compatible with that SMC’s interface.
Operations can be invoked and events can be exchanged, but more complex in-
teractions will typically involve policy exchanges, allowing an SMC to load a set
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of obligations into a partner SMC, in the form of a mission. Missions will only
be accepted by a target SMC if it can verify the mission’s integrity, as missions
are equivalent to a constrained form of programming remote SMCs. Invocation
of operations and mission loading are subject to authorisation policies allowing
one SMC to perform these actions on a remote SMC.
Cross-SMC interactions concern both the management of the application-specific
aspects, e.g. healthcare monitoring, as well as the management aspects of
how SMC interactions themselves are established. In this chapter we pre-
sented a case-study illustrating how security management of SMC interactions
is achieved through the use of the basic SMC elements, such as policies, events,
interfaces and roles. The purpose of this case-study was not to introduce new
algorithms or protocols for security management, but to illustrate how the same
principles apply to the management of the interactions themselves.
Interactions between SMCs are encoded in terms of policies and events, ac-
cording to the role each member performs. However, to apply this policy-based
infrastructure to the management of large-scale systems, it is necessary to be
able to structure complex SMC interactions, involving specific task-allocation
and event-forwarding strategies that can be rapidly instantiated among groups
of SMCs. For example, SMC interactions may be hierarchically composed of
smaller interactions, such as a large rescue team which has a medical team as
one of its members, that is itself a complex interaction. In this case, smaller
interactions should encapsulate their management details in order to allow the
system to scale up. Similarly, cross-SMC interactions can be established be-
tween a patient body-area SMC involving several other devices and the equip-
ment provided in the GP surgery, as well as between these and the devices
available in a home monitoring set-up for example.
The next chapter will introduce the use of software patterns as a means of engi-
neering larger policy-based interactions, or interactions formed by smaller SMC
collaborations. Interactions based on patterns rely on the principles presented
in this chapter and allow the systematic specification and instantiation of parts
of a collaboration by reusing and composing building block abstractions.
Chapter 4
Patterns for Building SMC
Interactions
Frequently a collaboration of SMCs may be part of a larger, and more complex
interaction. Building elaborate applications using solely elementary abstrac-
tions such as policies, roles and events can be difficult to manage and deploy.
This chapter describes the use of software patterns for engineering and struc-
turing complex policy-based interactions between SMCs. The use of patterns
provides a much more general model for the specification and instantiation of
SMC interactions and can accommodate a potentially unbounded spectrum of
interactions. Patterns allow the specification of SMC interactions through ab-
stractions for their structure, management and communication aspects. Pat-
terns can be reused and applied recursively for composing and federating SMCs
in a systematic manner, thus providing support for the construction of large
policy-based SMC collaborations.
4.1 Architectural Principles and Motivation
Christopher Alexander’s work, The Timeless Way of Building [Ale79], has influ-
enced the development of software engineering, in particular through software
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patterns and in the use of architectural styles for organising and structuring
software systems. His work was aimed at the use of patterns for urban plan-
ning and building architectural elements in the physical world, and how these
can be composed to address complex architectural needs and constraints, but
the same principles can be similarly applied for defining the architecture of
software elements.
Software architectures and architectural styles as discussed in Chapter 2 typi-
cally orchestrate the use of components and connectors as a means of structur-
ing software development [GS93, SDK+95, SDZ96, MMP00, MT00, TMD09]. Al-
though these do not cater for the adaptive behaviour of SMCs, similar principles
can be applied for structuring and reusing SMC interactions to form larger col-
laborations. In this chapter we describe the use of architectural styles to assist
in the design of policy-based SMC interactions. An architectural style enforces
important architectural decisions with respect to the organisation of SMCs, and
implements specific algorithms or protocols that constrain how SMCs achieve
the required exchanges of policies, events and interfaces. Building SMC inter-
actions solely in terms of these simple exchanges is challenging, and laborious
to manage and deploy. In contrast, architectural styles provide a more sys-
tematic manner for engineering large policy-based interactions, and support
to reason about how SMCs are composed and verify the correctness and the
properties achieved by a specific interaction. Architectural styles can express
designs and capture solutions in a manner that promotes their reuse across
applications. Although the identification and specification of these styles does
require human involvement, this is unavoidable because frequently best design
practices tend to be domain-specific and dependent on experience. Architec-
tural styles are similar in intent to software design patterns [GHJV95] in the
sense that they provide a set of standard solutions for recurring problems.
The consistent exchange of policies, events and interfaces can be seen as dis-
tinct perspectives of a policy-based SMC interaction. These perspectives are
complementary, as the exchange of policies must be accompanied by adequate
exchanges of events (required for triggering the policies) and interfaces (re-
quired for validating remote invocations prescribed by a policy). These multiple
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perspectives can then be used to emphasise and better understand indepen-
dent aspects of a policy-based SMC interaction, similar to the way that the
design aspects of a building can be considered independently (electrical wiring,
plumbing and heating, for example) [PW92]. This allows particular aspects of
an architecture to be highlighted whilst omitting others [TMD09]. We are inter-
ested in abstractions that concern three main aspects of SMC interactions:
• Management: defines how policies are exchanged between SMCs and un-
der which conditions these exchanges happen. Management (or task-
allocation) is achieved through the loading of policies which are grouped
into missions (see Section 3.4). However, policy exchanges may rely on
very specific abstractions. Some collaborations for example are reliant on
a single manager and multiple managed SMCs, while others allow multi-
ple managers to load tasks into a single SMC (which requires checking for
and resolving conflicts between the loaded policies [LS99]). Task loading
can be uni-directional or bi-directional (in the latter, each SMC is both
a manager and a managed node). Alternatively, tasks could be loaded
according to a bidding strategy where SMCs express their willingness to
receive tasks from an issuer. Finally, task-loading can be conditional to a
set of criteria, for example based on the capabilities provided by an SMC,
its profile or the credentials that the SMC possesses.
• Communication: defines flows of information typically through asynchro-
nous events between SMCs, as events are required for triggering policies,
although we do not require that all interactions between SMCs be event
driven. This varies from a simple diffusion of events from a source to a
target SMC to a more elaborate shared-bus between a set of SMCs that
works as a blackboard [EHRLR80] for shared events. Additional aggrega-
tion functions such as correlation of events provide flexibility in defining
event patterns for triggering higher-level events. Alternatively, store-and-
forward primitives are useful in ad-hoc settings where SMCs do not have a
permanent connection to their partners, and where events must be locally
stored for subsequent delivery.
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• Structural: structural aspects reflect how SMCs are organised with respect
to interface access, visibility and encapsulation, as interfaces define the
actions used in the policies. For example, peer-to-peer interactions typ-
ically rely only on a simple exchange of interfaces whereas compositions
also need to implement encapsulation and mediate access to internal re-
sources. Composed interactions allow one SMC to restrict the visibility of
its inner resources to external SMCs, creating an encapsulated structure.
Additional abstractions such as filtering of operations provide more flexi-
bility with respect to interface exchanges, allowing one SMC some degree
of control on the access to another SMC’s interface. A particular combi-
nation of structural abstractions provides very specific properties for the
interface exchange aspects of a collaboration.
The investigation of a number of application scenarios of collaborating SMCs
led to the identification of a catalogue of architectural styles for SMC interac-
tions, which is presented in the next section. A model for composing and fed-
erating SMCs by methodically combining individual architectural styles is then
described, which facilitates the building of complex interactions by reusing
styles as building block abstractions.
4.2 Catalogue of Architectural Styles for SMC Inter-
actions
A catalogue of architectural styles provides several useful abstractions for defin-
ing management relationships across self-managed cells. Our intention is to
provide a better understanding of these relationships and promote the reuse of
common abstractions for systematically building large-scale policy-based col-
laborations. Although a large number of different interactions can be defined,
typically applications tend to use small subsets of these interactions.
Table 4.1 presents a brief overview of a catalogue of architectural styles for
SMC interactions. As in all such catalogues we cannot aim to be exhaustive
4.2. Catalogue of Architectural Styles for SMC Interactions 69
Table 4.1: Catalogue of architectural styles for SMC interactions
Category Architectural
Style
Description
Structural Peer-to-Peer Ordinary, symmetrical mode of interac-
tion between SMCs that exchange in-
terfaces
Composition One SMC encapsulates another’s in-
terface and determines its visibility
through mediation
Aggregation Inner SMC becomes resource of outer
but without imposing encapsulation
(allows sharing)
Fusion Combines the interfaces, policies, and
managed objects of two constituent
SMCs into a new SMC
Management Hierarchical
Control
One top-level SMC controls the execu-
tion of a set of leaf SMCs
Cooperative
Control
One leaf SMC is controlled by a set of
cooperating manager top-level SMCs
Auction Task allocation employing a negotia-
tion approach (issuers and bidders)
Distributed
Control
Fully decentralised interaction where
SMCs can both load and receive tasks
from their partners
Communication Diffusion Provides a way of directly forwarding
events to interacting SMCs
Shared-Bus Provides a blackboard for decoupled
event-based communication among
SMCs
Correlation Individual events are combined for gen-
erating a higher-level event
Store-and-
Forward
Useful in ad-hoc settings where SMCs
do not have a permanent connection to
their partners
but focus solely on the frequently occurring styles that facilitate the design and
composition of SMCs by structuring the devolution of management responsi-
bilities and corresponding interactions. Each architectural style relies on dif-
ferent abstractions for interface, policy or event exchanges, and correspond
to the structural, management and communication aspects of an interaction
respectively. These categories can be seen as complementary perspectives for
defining policy-based interactions between autonomous SMCs. They are com-
plementary because a given exchange of policies must be accompanied by the
adequate exchanges of events and interfaces required for validating remote in-
vocations prescribed by a policy.
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In the following we outline individually each one of these architectural styles
and Section 4.3 describes how complex collaborations between SMCs can be
specified and instantiated by combining architectural styles as design elements
of an interaction. To simplify the presentation, the diagrams illustrate inter-
actions between simple SMCs. However, each one of these SMCs may be a
complex SMC itself which might have an internal structure comprising several
other SMCs.
4.2.1 Structural Styles
Structural styles define how SMCs are organised with respect to the access of
their interfaces. These involve abstractions such as encapsulation, or filtering
and mapping of interfaces, and also combining two or more constituent SMCs
to form a new SMC.
Peer-to-Peer (Figure 4.1) defines a relationship between “equal” peer SMCs,
which provide or request services to or from each other, while each peer re-
tains its autonomy and is free to establish additional P2P interactions with
other SMCs. No specific semantics of ownership, hierarchical organisation or
encapsulation is applicable. Invocations are subject to authorisation policies
allowing the partner to perform the actions but no predefined management or
control relationships are implied. A peer-to-peer interaction can be established
between a set of UAVs in the same rescue mission which collaborate and of-
fer services to each other: e.g. one UAV can request updates about hazardous
chemicals detected by a surveyor UAV, while the latter can also use the stor-
age service provided by a third UAV to back-up this information during field
operation.
Figure 4.1: Peer-to-peer architectural style
Composition (Figure 4.2) specifies an interaction between SMCs in which an
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outer SMC encapsulates one or more inner SMCs. The inner SMCs then be-
come managed resources of the outer SMC and the inners’ visibility outside the
composed structure is subject to and mediated by the outer SMC. The outer
may expose parts of the inner interfaces within its own interface. An inner
SMC is not allowed to be contained by other SMCs or to directly interact with
other SMCs outside the composition. Typically a patient body-area network
SMC, running on a Gumstix or smartphone, forms a composition with a set of
BSN sensors for health and environmental monitoring which are encapsulated
in the body-area SMC.
Figure 4.2: Composition architectural style (encapsulation)
Aggregation (Figure 4.3) specifies a relationship in which SMCs form a hierar-
chical structure and one of the SMCs (inner) becomes part of another (outer),
and may be mediated by the outer’s interface. This can be used to form hier-
archies of SMCs where lower-level SMCs provide services to higher-level ones,
without imposing strict encapsulation among SMCs. Thus in an aggregation
the inner SMC can also interact directly with other SMCs outside the aggrega-
tion if necessary (as a shared resource). For example, a specific UAV which is
part of a team of UAVs can be loaned to cooperating teams if required, which
then can directly access the shared UAV.
Figure 4.3: Aggregation architectural style (no encapsulation)
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Fusion (Figure 4.4) combines two or more constituent SMCs into a new SMC,
and the forming SMCs cease to exist. The resulting SMC provides an interface
combining the functionality previously provided by each constituent interface,
and enforces the set of policies previously enforced by each constituent SMC.
Finally, this new SMC must take over the collection of managed resources pos-
sessed by each constituent SMC. Fusion is more natural among complex SMCs
that represent logical collections of elementary SMCs. As an example, a fusion
may occur between two SMCs representing teams of UAVs on related missions,
which are combined to form a single larger team with a single commander for
all the UAVs.
Figure 4.4: Fusion architectural style
4.2.2 Management Styles
Management styles capture task-allocation strategies and control aspects. The
tasks exchanged between SMCs are specified in the form of missions, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.4. Missions are groups of policies that can be dynamically
loaded to change the behaviour of interacting SMCs at run-time. While mis-
sions define what tasks are being exchanged, management styles specify how
these exchanges occur. Management styles also assist in the specification of
manager/managed relationships between SMCs, facilitating the deployment of
the authorisation policies which are required for mission loading. Management
styles are complementary to the structure of an interaction, and architectural
styles of both categories can be combined. For example, a group of SMCs es-
tablish a peer-to-peer structural interaction (with no encapsulation or mapping
in the access of SMC’s interfaces) and use a distribution of tasks based on an
auction style. In other cases the same auction style can be used to define the
task-allocation, while relying on a composition for the structural organisation
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of SMCs.
Hierarchical Control (Figure 4.5) consists of a top-level SMC which controls
the execution of a set of leaf SMCs by delegating policies to them. This implies
that the top-level SMC has rights of programmability over the leaf SMCs, i.e.
the top-level SMC is authorised to load tasks and policies into the leaf SMCs.
It is a unidirectional interaction in that only the top-level SMC loads tasks
into the leaf SMCs. For example, in a search-and-rescue team a commander
UAV may have rights to manage the task-allocation of the various subordinate
UAVs. This does not imply that access to leaf-SMCs is mediated by the top-level
SMC, as the hierarchical control style is only concerned with task-allocation.
Hierarchies can obviously be multi-level.
Figure 4.5: Hierarchical control architectural style
Cooperative Control (Figure 4.6) defines a set of cooperating top-level SMCs
that control the execution of a leaf SMC by delegating policies to it. This im-
plies that the top-level SMCs have rights of programmability over the leaf SMC.
Similar to the hierarchical control style, this is a unidirectional interaction in
that only the top-level SMCs load tasks into leaf SMCs. These multiple man-
agers may cause conflicting policies to be loaded into the leaf, and this style
must address mechanisms to solve such conflicts, e.g. prioritisation of policies
or use of application-specific meta-policies [LS99]. For example, a shared UAV
subject to policies loaded from two cooperating coalitions, e.g. a US and a UK
coalition, relies on the cooperative control style to address the policy conflict
issues that may arise from this interaction.
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Figure 4.6: Cooperative control architectural style
Auction (Figure 4.7) provides a task-allocation model based on the contract net
approach used in multi-agent systems [Smi88]. It facilitates task distribution
using negotiation, where tasks are announced and SMCs decide whether to bid
for their execution. The top-level SMC (issuer) evaluates the bids and assigns
the task to the most appropriate leaf SMCs (bidders). The issuer SMC decides
what tasks to offer and bidders decide which tasks to bid for, possibly after a
policy defined negotiation. The decision of which bids to accept is made by the
issuer, who cannot directly impose task execution on a bidder. Thus, the auc-
tion style does not imply that the top-level SMC has rights over the leaf SMCs
and authorisations are only granted when the negotiation is successfully com-
pleted. The negotiation process is application-dependent, but typically involves
attributes related to the leaf nodes, e.g. knowledge bases available, capabili-
ties, current workload, etc. It is a unidirectional interaction in that only the
Figure 4.7: Auction architectural style
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top-level SMC is able to load tasks into the leaf SMCs. Task-allocation based
on capabilities available in autonomous robots [CKC04, INPS03] could be used
to encode bidding protocols for SMCs.
Distributed Control (Figure 4.8) represents a fully decentralised task-allocation
interaction among a set of SMCs. The nature of such an interaction is application-
dependent, where both SMCs act as managers and managed resources si-
multaneously and have rights of programmability, i.e. authorisations, over
each other. Policies associated with this style address general authorisations
amongst the SMCs, and general conflict resolution rules similar to those pro-
vided by the cooperative management style. For example, a doctor SMC may
load health-monitoring tasks into a patient SMC. Similarly, a patient SMC may
also need to load policies onto the doctor SMC to trigger re-calibration of the
patient’s sensors if needed, as this avoids the requirement for the doctor de-
vice to store calibration procedures for all possible patients. In this interaction
both SMCs have the authorisations required to load tasks into the respective
partner.
Figure 4.8: Distributed control architectural style
4.2.3 Communication Styles
Communication between SMCs typically occurs through asynchronous event
exchanges indicating context changes within an SMC, as events are required
for triggering policies running on remote SMCs. This category of architectural
styles defines patterns that specify how events are exchanged and how the
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event buses of various SMCs are interconnected. The intent of these styles is
not to restrict the ways SMCs can communicate, but instead to provide com-
mon means of event-forwarding patterns that will facilitate the implementation
of specific interactions.
Diffusion (Figure 4.9) defines the forwarding of events from a source to a tar-
get SMC. Diffusion has been widely used in computer network protocols and
data dissemination algorithms [Tan96]. This style can be expressed in different
topologies: Figure 4.9(a) shows the general case of branching diffusion, while
Figure 4.9(b) shows an example of a sub-case known as linear diffusion or
pipeline. This style specifies rules regarding the forwarding strategy and rout-
ing protocols to be employed. Ad-hoc sensors monitoring environmental data
in the field are likely to use the diffusion style to propagate monitored data
towards processing and logging “sinks”.
Figure 4.9: Diffusion architectural style: branching diffusion (a), which is the
general case, and linear diffusion (b), which is similar to a pipeline
Shared Bus (Figure 4.10) allows SMCs to interconnect their event buses to a
central SMC, which then relays published events to all connected SMCs. SMCs
can use the shared event bus as a blackboard for decoupled interactions, be-
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Figure 4.10: Shared bus architectural style
cause the publisher SMC does not require prior knowledge of the recipient
SMCs when publishing an event. Only selected types of events may be pub-
lished in the shared event bus, and an SMC has the choice of publishing certain
events only locally in its own event bus. This style can be used for communica-
tion among surveyor UAVs which collect layout information of a specific area,
where data about new obstacles found by a UAV is published in the shared bus
which permits all surveyors to keep a consistent view of the environment.
Correlation (Figure 4.11) addresses event correlation between SMCs. It can
be used for collecting events from different sources and generating higher-level
events or for collecting patterns of events over a period of time and generating
Figure 4.11: Correlation architectural style
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another event containing synthesised information, rather than just forwarding
raw events. For example, the information collected from various physiological
sensors in a body-area network can be correlated in a coarser-grained event,
such as a periodical report on the patient’s health condition.
Store-and-Forward (Figure 4.12) addresses issues on how to transfer events
between SMCs using the principles of delay-tolerant networking [Fal03]. It is
useful in ad-hoc settings where an SMC does not have a permanent connec-
tion to all other SMCs it wishes to interact with. The store-and-forward style
enables SMCs to communicate via multi-hop interactions, where SMCs act as
carriers of events targeted to other SMCs. This style specifies how to store and
transfer events to neighbour SMCs according to their availability, ensuring that
undelivered events are retained in the SMC for later delivery.
Figure 4.12: Store-and-forward architectural style
4.3 Composing and Federating SMCs
Based on the catalogue of architectural styles we present in this section a
methodology for engineering policy-based SMC interactions, which relies on
the combination of architectural styles as design elements of a collaboration
between SMCs. Under this perspective, each architectural style is used for
describing a specific abstraction for either:
(a) the exchange of policies; or
(b) the exchange of events required for triggering policies; or
(c) the exchange of interfaces for validating the actions prescribed by policies.
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As described in Chapter 3, SMC interactions rely on the notion of roles as
placeholders for remote SMCs discovered at run-time. Roles are kept in the
domain structure that implements a hierarchical namespace within each SMC.
A remote SMC is assigned to a role in another SMC if the former fulfills the
requirements for that role, e.g. credentials, capabilities. When an SMC is as-
signed to a role, policies specified for that role will automatically apply and the
respective missions will be loaded into the SMC.
In order to support the systematic specification and instantiation of complex
SMC interactions, we present a model which permits entire architectural styles
to be associated with (bound to) a group of roles. Each architectural style de-
fines a particular algorithm or protocol governing how the SMCs that will be
assigned to these roles should behave with respect to interface, event or policy
exchanges. When SMCs are assigned to roles, the architectural styles associ-
ated with their roles are instantiated1 and SMCs will establish an interaction
which is dictated by these styles.
The use of architectural styles provides a better understanding of the relation-
ships between SMCs and promotes reuse of common abstractions. The next
chapter will describe how the use of styles also facilitates the analysis and
verification of SMC interactions.
4.3.1 Bindings and Interaction Specification
We distinguish between specification and instantiation of an interaction. The
specification consists of a number of architectural styles which are associated
with specific roles in the local domain of an SMC, e.g. doctor, patient, sensor.
This defines how SMCs that will be eventually assigned to these roles are ex-
pected to behave towards each other. When actual SMCs are assigned to roles,
the styles which were previously bound to these roles will be instantiated, and
interactions will occur in the form of exchanges of policies, events and inter-
faces as prescribed by the styles.
1For the purposes of this discussion, the terms instantiation and deployment of an architectural
style are used as synonyms.
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Each architectural style defines its own set of style-specific roles, which refer
to the abstraction being enforced. For example, a composition style defines the
roles outer and inner, whereas a hierarchical control defines the roles manager
and managed and a diffusion style defines the roles source and target.
Roles in the local domain of an SMC are bound to the style-specific roles of a
particular architectural style. These bindings specify how remote SMCs that
will be assigned to those roles should behave within the context of an interac-
tion, e.g. as an inner w.r.t. a composition, as a source w.r.t. a diffusion.
Figure 4.13: Architectural styles and bindings
Figure 4.13 illustrates how roles in the domain within an SMC, architectural
styles and style-specific roles interrelate with each other: a given architectural
style, e.g. composition, is chosen and style-specific roles of this style, e.g. outer
and inner, are bound to roles, e.g. doctor, patient, sensor, defined within an
SMC’s domain. This corresponds to the specification of an interaction between
a group of roles. When remote SMCs are discovered and assigned to these
roles, such a style will be instantiated, thereby effecting a behaviour among the
respective SMCs. This behaviour is dependent on the semantics of the style
itself, as it refers to how interfaces, policies and events are exchanged.
An architectural style also specifies a set of requirements that roles have to
fulfill (or rather the SMCs assigned to these roles have to fulfill). For example, a
style that specifies the forwarding of the event highHR from one SMC to another
will typically require this event to be supported by the source’s interface. Thus
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a requirement is a function which associates a style-specific role with a number
of operations, events or notifications which must be supported by the SMC who
will be performing that specific role:
requirement : StyleRoles→ (Operations ∪ Events ∪Notifications)
Roles in the local domain of an SMC combine both the behaviours and require-
ments of all architectural styles which were bound to them. For example, a
given role can participate in an interaction with other SMCs simultaneously
as an inner (through a composition structural style) and as a source (through
a diffusion communication style). In this case, the role in question will thus
accumulate the behaviours and requirements defined by the two styles.
An architectural style is thus defined as a set of style-specific roles, an associ-
ated behaviour and a set of requirements:
style = 〈StyleRoles,Behaviour,Requirements〉
where style is an architectural style, StyleRoles is the set of roles defined by this
style, Behaviour is the implementation-specific behaviour defined by the style,
and Requirements is the set of requirements (in terms of operations, events and
notifications) that must be satisfied by each participant in order to accomplish
the behaviour prescribed by the style.
Each architectural style can be additionally parameterised according to the
abstraction it supports. This customisation involves either:
• what interface operations need to be filtered, mapped, etc (for a structural
style); or
• what tasks and policies need to be loaded and in what conditions (for a
management style); or
• what events need to be forwarded or subscribed to (for a communication
style).
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An interaction specification that is enforced by an SMC is defined by a number
of architectural styles (and their respective style-specific roles), and how they
are bound to roles defined within the SMC’s local domain:
specification = 〈Roles, Styles,Bindings〉
where specification corresponds to the interaction specification that an SMC
must enforce, Roles is the set of roles defined in the local domain of this SMC,
Style is the set of architectural styles bound to these roles through the set of
bindings Bindings.
A binding of a style with respect to an interaction specification associates each
style-specific role defined in the architectural style with a role within the SMC’s
domain. Hence:
binding(style, specification) ⇐⇒
∀ x ∈ StyleRolesstyle,∃ y ∈ Rolesspecification : y := y ⊕ x
where the operator ⊕ applied to a style-specific role and a domain role adds
to the latter the behaviour and requirements associated with the style-specific
role. Associating an additional set of requirements with a domain role corre-
sponds to adding new restrictions to the expected interface of that role, which
will have to be satisfied by the SMC assigned to it, as discussed in Section 3.3.2.
When remote SMCs are discovered at run-time, they will be assigned to roles in
the domain of another SMC if they satisfy the requirements for these roles, and
the architectural styles which were previously bound will be instantiated. These
will dictate how these SMCs should interact with each other (Figure 4.14).
Hence, an assignment of an SMC to a domain role within a specification will
cause the deployment of all styles bound to this role:
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assignment(SMC, rolespecification) ⇐⇒
∀ st ∈ Stylesspecification : ∀ x ∈ StyleRolesst : x⊕−1 rolespecification →
deployment(SMC, st, x)
where the operator ⊕−1 evaluates to true if an style-specific role and a domain
role were previously bound to each other. This causes the deployment of the
respective architectural style. The deployment of an architectural style is de-
fined by the behaviour associated with the style, in terms of how the exchange
of interfaces, policies or events is achieved. The deployment operation takes as
arguments an SMC, the architectural style to be deployed and the specific role
within the style that this SMC will be playing.
Figure 4.14: Composition model: (1) architectural styles are bound to roles in
the local domain; (2) remote SMCs are assigned to these roles; (3) styles are
deployed and the behaviour associated with each style is enforced in the SMCs
This composition model allows us to define layers of management for policy-
based SMC interactions independently, where the structural, communication
and management aspects can be specified by reusing common abstractions
expressed as architectural styles. There are dependencies among the archi-
tectural styles: structural styles must be deployed first, as they enable the
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exchange of customised interfaces, e.g. doctor interface, patient interface; com-
munication styles are then deployed to define patterns in terms of the events
provided by these interfaces; management styles must be the last, as the poli-
cies loaded depend both on the operations provided by the application interface,
as well as on the events forwarded by a communication style. The consistent
use of architectural styles is discussed in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Complex Styles and Distributed Enforcement
Certain combinations of architectural styles arranged in a particular manner
will occur more often in specific application scenarios, e.g. for care manage-
ment and physiological monitoring for a set of patients. For example, a body-
area network is typically structured as a composition encapsulating the sensors
and mediating (and filtering) access to its internal components. It normally re-
lies on a diffusion event-forwarding scheme, where sensors forward events to
the smartphone representing the patient SMC, which will possibly run other
tasks that make use of the information monitored. In the following we present
the notion of complex styles, and how different parts of an interaction can be
instantiated by collaborating SMCs in a distributed manner.
Complex Styles
We define a pattern of interaction as a combination of architectural styles ar-
ranged for a particular purpose. In essence, a pattern is a complex style realised
in terms of more primitive ones. A pre-defined pattern for a body-area network,
for example, can then be instantiated multiple times to enforce the interactions
among the sensors and devices available for each patient.
Figure 4.15 illustrates a succinct pseudo syntax for the textual description
of patterns (in the current implementation patterns are written in PonderTalk
which is more verbose − examples of patterns specified in the PonderTalk lan-
guage can be found in Chapter 6). In PonderTalk each architectural style is
also parameterised with the methods to be mapped or filtered, events to be for-
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warded or subscribed to, and missions to be loaded, however these details are
not shown in Figure 4.15.
1 //Collaboration specification
2 type pattern 〈PatternName0〉(...) {
4 import /factory/structural/composition;
5 import /factory/taskallocation/hierarchical;
6 import /factory/communication/diffusion;
8 type pattern 〈PatternName1〉(role R1, [mandatory] role R2, role R3) {
10 bind style composition(outer R1,inner R2,inner R3);
11 [on 〈event〉] bind style hierarchical(manager R1,managed R2,
managed R3);
12 [on 〈event〉] bind style diffusion(target R1,source R2,source R3);
13 }
14 inst pattern p1 = 〈PatternName1〉(SMCa, SMCb, SMCc) at SMC1;
16 . . .
18 type pattern 〈PatternNamen〉(...) {
19 . . .
20 }
21 inst pattern pn = 〈PatternNamen〉(...) at SMCn;
22 }
24 //Collaboration instantiation
25 inst pattern p0 = 〈PatternName0〉(...) at SMC0;
Figure 4.15: Pseudo syntax for the textual representation of a pattern of inter-
action
The specification of a pattern is defined by a set of domain roles (amongst
which some may be mandatory and others optional), a specific set of architec-
tural styles expressing the abstractions required by this pattern, and how the
domain roles are bound to style-specific roles. Bindings can be event triggered,
meaning that they are only established in certain circumstances. When a pat-
tern is instantiated, actual SMCs are passed as parameters and assigned to the
respective roles. Mandatory roles must have been assigned when the pattern
is instantiated, whereas optional roles can be discovered whilst the pattern is
already running, e.g. in a body-area pattern, the patient and heart rate sensor
roles are mandatory, whereas an oxygen saturation role may not be required
for pattern instantiation and the respective SMC may be discovered later on.
Multiple patterns can be combined, possibly containing other nested patterns.
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Each pattern is instantiated “at” an SMC, which is then responsible for in-
stantiating the architectural styles defined within the pattern and establishing
the respective interactions. This caters for the distributed enforcement of the
whole interaction, where different SMCs are responsible for realising different
parts of an interaction and each pattern can be independently specified and
instantiated. This is discussed in more detail in the following.
Distributed Enforcement
In large applications, architectural styles and patterns will be established be-
tween different groups of SMCs. While a patient’s smartphone will normally be
responsible for enforcing a body-area pattern among its sensors, a doctor SMC
will be for example interested in patterns for distributed monitoring of a set
of patients. Similarly, a pattern running at the patient’s home server will en-
force an interaction between the local devices and appliances to define a home
monitoring set-up SMC.
The interaction model based on architectural styles and patterns caters for the
systematic specification and instantiation of SMC interactions in that: (a) it
permits the establishment of different parts of an interaction (represented as
sub-patterns) by different SMCs within a large collaboration; and (b) the in-
ternal specification of each pattern relies on a combination of abstractions for
structure, management and communication that cater for the general organi-
sation of SMCs inside that pattern.
Each pattern defines an interaction between a subset of SMCs and can use
management and security strategies that differ from the ones used in another
part of the interaction. For example, role assignment based on capabilities
and authentication using public-key certificates (as illustrated in Section 3.6)
can be used for managing parts of a larger interaction whereas the pattern
enforced by another group of SMCs may rely on alternative role assignment
and authentication strategies.
The SMC in charge of instantiating (part of) the interaction specification will be
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responsible for establishing the interactions with other participant SMCs. This
consists of:
1. Determining who are the other participant SMCs. These can be:
(a) SMCs which are discovered at run-time;
(b) Pre-determined SMCs that parameterise the interaction specification;
2. Assign the SMCs to the roles defined in the interaction specification and
verify whether these can be fulfilled by the SMCs, according to the role’s
expected interface;
3. Each participant will receive a subset of these roles, according to who it is
interacting with (a role r1 is interacting with a role r2 if both r1 and r2 are
bound to style-specific roles within the same architectural style), and the
address of the SMCs assigned to these roles;
4. Each architectural style defined in the interaction specification is instan-
tiated by the SMC in charge of enforcing the specification. This consists
of:
(a) Instantiating structural styles for interface exchange;
(b) Instantiating communication styles for event exchange;
(c) Instantiating management styles for policy exchange;
5. Repeat the whole process for any sub-pattern defined within the interac-
tion specification.
Figure 4.16 illustrates the establishment of interactions based on patterns. In
this example, SMC0 is responsible for instantiating the interaction specification
defined in Pattern0. This pattern contains two individual architectural styles to
be instantiated by SMC0 between the participants SMC1 and SMC2, and also
two other nested patterns. SMC0 sends Pattern1, which consists of a composi-
tion and a hierarchical control style, to SMC1. Two nearby SMCs are discovered
by SMC1, and will be assigned to roles within the pattern if their interfaces ful-
fill the respective role’s expected interfaces. SMC1 will then instantiate the ar-
chitectural styles within Pattern1 between these SMCs. Similarly, SMC0 sends
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Pattern2 to SMC2. Each SMC which is responsible for enforcing a pattern is
in charge of instantiating the styles within the pattern and establishing the
respective interactions with other participating SMCs.
Figure 4.16: Distributed enforcement of architectural styles and patterns
When an architectural style is instantiated by an SMC, this will distribute dif-
ferent parts of the algorithm or protocol implemented within the style to the
other participant SMCs, according to their roles. By executing their fragments
of the algorithm or protocol, the collection of interacting SMCs will collabora-
tively enforce the semantics of the respective architectural style. In Chapter 6
we will give details on the runtime model that supports the instantiation of
patterns and the establishment of interactions between distributed SMCs, and
how these were implemented within the framework.
The use of styles and patterns provides a much richer model for the specifica-
tion, instantiation and reuse of SMC interactions. However, because different
parts of a large interaction will be enforced by different SMCs, these collab-
orations are more susceptible to inconsistencies that will prevent SMCs from
4.3. Composing and Federating SMCs 89
operating as originally expected. The correct specification and deployment of
SMC interactions are discussed in the next section.
4.3.3 Correct Specification and Deployment
Interactions between SMCs can be subject to a number of inconsistencies, both
during the interaction specification and during the interaction instantiation.
These inconsistencies are typically related to bindings, assignments and policies
within the context of an interaction.
Bindings
The way an architectural style is bound to a set of application roles defines how
the SMCs assigned to these roles will be expected to interact. If these bindings
do not respect the semantics of each style, the resulting specification may be
flawed. For example, with respect to the structure of an interaction, an SMC
encapsulated in a composition style should not be visible or accessible by SMCs
outside the composition.
Figure 4.17: Incorrect binding of roles
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Figure 4.17 illustrates an example of an incorrect specification in terms of bind-
ings. In this case, the Patient role is expected to establish a composition with
the Pacemaker role, which is thus bound to an inner style-specific role. How-
ever, the same Pacemaker role is also bound to a peer role in a peer-to-peer
interaction with an external diagnosis device. This violates the semantics of
encapsulation (where an inner SMC can only be accessed by its outer SMC,
and all invocations or event notifications come via the outer’s interface) defined
by the composition architectural style.
Inconsistent bindings also happen across styles from different categories: for
example, an event-forwarding style can only be bound if a style that first ex-
changes the interfaces required for supporting these events is already bound.
Assignments
Even if an interaction is correctly specified in terms of bindings, the assignment
of SMCs that do not provide suitable interfaces will impede the deployment of
the interaction. Thus the SMCs assigned to each role must satisfy the require-
ments defined by all the styles bound to that role in terms of operations, events
or notifications.
In addition, SMC assignments may also violate style semantics, even if the
bindings were correctly specified. Figure 4.18 illustrates an example of incon-
sistent SMC assignment, where both a composition and a peer-to-peer architec-
tural styles are bound to a set of domain roles. Although the bindings between
roles do not violate the semantics of encapsulation defined by the composition
style, SMC3 is assigned both to the Pacemaker role (which is bound to the inner
style-specific role of the composition) and to the Actuator role (which is bound
to a peer style-specific role of the peer-to-peer style). Even though the bindings
were specified correctly, this set of assignments caused the same SMC to par-
ticipate in a composition (as an inner) and in a peer-to-peer interaction with
another SMC, thus violating the semantics of encapsulation.
The verification of SMC assignments can be seen as run-time checks that must
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Figure 4.18: Incorrect assignment of SMCs
be performed when actual SMCs are discovered, whereas the verification of the
bindings can be seen as static checks of the interaction specification.
Policies
Finally, after all architectural styles are bound and deployed across a set of
SMCs, a policy-based collaboration must be effectively achieved. However, if
patterns are specified for loading policies into a specific SMC but this SMC
does not have access to the events required for triggering the policies (or these
events are never forwarded to the SMC), then the policies will never be triggered.
Similarly, an SMC may not have access to the interfaces required for validating
the actions prescribed by a policy.
Thus, additional checks must guarantee that the exchanged policies were ac-
companied by the adequate exchanges of events and interfaces required by
these policies. In the next chapter, we will describe how model-checking tech-
niques were applied to analyse and verify the consistency of policy-based SMC
interactions automatically.
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4.4 Discussion
Engineering large-scale policy-based systems using simple abstractions such
as policies, roles, interfaces and events can be difficult to manage and deploy.
The use of architectural styles and patterns to specify, instantiate and reuse
SMC interactions is a promising approach which incorporated ideas from soft-
ware architecture-based approaches [GS93, SDK+95, SDZ96, MMP00, MT00,
TMD09]. We proposed a catalogue of architectural styles that promotes the
reuse of common abstractions for the structure, management and communi-
cation aspects for SMC interactions. Collaborations of SMCs can interact with
other collaborations, and re-apply architectural styles recursively. This facili-
tates defining large-scale composable systems by reusing and combining com-
mon abstractions. Chapter 6 will present details on how these architectural
styles are implemented and Chapter 7 will describe a case-study illustrating
the use of SMCs and architectural styles in the design of a healthcare monitor-
ing application.
The different categories of architectural styles can be seen as complementary
perspectives for modeling policy-based SMC interactions. The proposal of a cat-
alogue of styles brings to light common types of interaction that are useful for
building collaborations between SMCs. However, this chapter does not present
an exhaustive catalogue and only focuses on the frequently occurring patterns
identified in a few application scenarios. Investigation of additional scenarios
and applications may uncover new patterns.
Our overall goal is to be able to dynamically form collaborations, compositions
and federations of SMCs suitable to particular application scenarios, e.g. care
management for a set of patients, by instantiating combinations of pre-defined
patterns. These application-specific patterns rely on the primitive architectural
styles and can be parameterised and instantiated for each patient SMC, using
the resources and devices available in a body-area network or in a home moni-
toring set-up, for example.
Although architectural styles proved a helpful abstraction for designing large-
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scale SMC interactions, the successful operation of these collaborations de-
pends both on their correct specification and on the suitability of the partici-
pating SMCs. The next chapter will present a formal specification of SMC be-
haviour and interactions, and how model-checking techniques can be applied
for verifying correct interaction specification and deployment.
Chapter 5
Formal Specification and
Model-Checking
This chapter presents a formal specification of the overall SMC behaviour and
its analysis in collaborations across SMCs. In these collaborations, consistent
policy deployment is crucial as often SMCs form autonomous administrative
domains and, when these SMCs are composed or federated, inconsistencies,
conflicting policies or unsuitability of the resources available will prevent them
from operating as originally expected. The definition of a formal model assists
in the design of SMC collaborations and allows the verification of the correct-
ness of anticipated interactions before these are implemented or policies are
deployed in physical devices, e.g. smartphones, sensors.
We chose the Alloy Analyzer [Jac02, Jac06] as the platform for the formal spec-
ification of the SMC behaviour. Alloy is a declarative modelling language based
on first-order logic and used for expressing complex structural constraints and
behaviour in a software system. It differs from pi-calculus [MPW92], ambient
calculus [CG98] and channel ambient calculus [Phi06] which model the com-
putation operationally. We found Alloy more natural and concise for describing
SMC interactions and the integrity constraints related to SMC management.
Models written in Alloy can be automatically checked for correctness using its
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analyser. Alloy performs a finite scope check, i.e. analysis is performed over
restricted scopes on the number of objects (instances) to be used, which is de-
fined by the user (the user-specified scope makes the problem finite and thus
reducible to a boolean formula). This is based on the small scope hypothe-
sis [Jac06], that for any flawed design a counter-example should be found by
an exhaustive search within a comparatively small, bounded scope.
The formal model presented in this chapter complements our framework for the
specification and establishment of SMC interactions. The tool support provided
by the Alloy Analyzer allows:
(a) formally capturing the static and dynamic aspects of the structure (through
signatures) and behaviour (through predicates) of a model for SMC inter-
actions;
(b) automatic verification of the consistency of specific collaborations between
SMCs by using its analyser;
(c) simulation of SMC behaviour in complex interactions involving pre-deter-
mined sequences of operations.
The model specification formally defines SMCs and interrelated concepts, e.g.
roles, interfaces, etc, and the SMC’s behaviour with respect to establishing
policy-based interactions with other SMCs, e.g. discovery, assignment, etc. The
model also logically defines properties that can be verified for SMC interactions,
e.g. an SMC satisfies the requirements for a role. We can then check whether
a specific set of SMCs and their policies (given as input) satisfy these logical
properties. The boolean evaluation of these properties is not affected by the size
of the interactions, rather it depends on whether these interactions conform to
a number of logical statements.
The formal model and the tool support are used to design and to check whether
SMC interactions can be established before implementing them and deploying
the policies in actual devices. A set of SMCs and their interfaces is given as
input to the model, which checks whether they are capable of establishing the
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Figure 5.1: Alloy analysis tool screenshot
interactions and enforcing their policies. These a priori checks cannot guar-
antee the correct enforcement of the interaction during run-time in which, for
example, a sensor may fail and the interaction may have to be re-checked.
Even though it would be possible to use Alloy to re-check such an interaction
dynamically, currently we only use the tool for performing design-time checks.
The tool can also be used to simulate SMC behaviour in complex interactions.
For example, given a particular configuration of doctor and patient SMCs, we
can simulate the discovery of a new sensor by the patient, then the loading of
a policy into the patient and the subsequent failure of another sensor. We can
add further steps in specific guided simulations [HR04] and verify properties in
different stages of this interaction.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a screenshot of the Alloy Analyzer: on the left hand side
the editor allows the specification of the model itself and the logical properties
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we want to verify. Predicates can be defined that specify a particular instance
of SMC interaction and whether this interaction satisfies a number of logical
properties. The results of the analyses are presented in the panel on the right
hand side. The toolset also provides a visualisation tool which can be used
to display examples or counter-examples graphically. This has helped us in
understanding the solutions found by the analyser. The figures in this chap-
ter were generated by this visualiser, with small hand edits of names to aid
comprehension.
The next sections will first describe the formal specification of SMCs and their
interactions, and then how analyses and verification of properties can be per-
formed using this formal model.
5.1 Modelling Structure and Behaviour
This section presents the specification of the formal model for SMCs. We con-
centrate on the specification of the structure and behaviour of the model. The
structure is determined by a set of signatures, which define the concepts rele-
vant to the model and their relation to other concepts, e.g. SMC, role, interface.
Signatures refer to the structure of the model specification, which is similar
to a class structure in the OO paradigm. This should not be mistaken for the
structural aspects of an interaction as defined by the structural architectural
styles in Chapter 4. The dynamic behaviour of the model is determined by a
set of predicates, which specify the effect of operations executed in the model,
e.g. SMC discovery, role assignment. The formal specification also consists of
a number of sanity constraints specified in Alloy in the form of facts. Facts
define properties that always hold in the model, for example, an interface is
always provided by one SMC so interfaces do not just occur unattached to any
SMC. These facts however are almost always trivial constraints and therefore
are omitted from this section, which instead focuses on the specification of the
structure and behaviour of the model alone.
In order to facilitate its understanding, the specification of the formal model is
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divided into two parts:
• Firstly, the basic SMC model defines the elementary concepts such as
SMC, Role, Interface, policies and the basic predicates for discovery of a
new SMC, departure of an SMC, role assignment and role de-assignment,
as well as the use of obligation and authorisation policies in collaborations
of SMCs;
• Secondly, the architectural model formalises the architectural aspects
of an interaction, such as architectural styles, bindings, etc, and shows
how architectural styles can be composed to form larger interactions.
5.1.1 Basic SMC Model
This model defines the elementary principles for policy-based interactions be-
tween SMCs, without yet considering the use of architectural styles for com-
posing these interactions. This forms the basis of a complete specification for
modelling SMC behaviour and interactions.
Structure
The most important component in the model is the SMC, which is modelled in
the signature SelfManagedCell (Figure 5.2). In the declaration of a signature
body, a number of relations are defined, which can be thought of as fields of
an object in the OO paradigm. The SelfManagedCell signature specifies four
unary relations1. The first two, provides and requires, define respectively which
interfaces an SMC is able to offer to remote SMCs and which roles an SMC
requires to be fulfilled. The other two relations, obligations and authorisations,
define the policies that an SMC is enforcing. SelfManagedCell is an abstract
signature, meaning it can be extended to define a specialised component in the
1In Alloy, a relation is defined as a set of ordered tuples, and the arity of the relation is the
number of elements in each tuple. Each tuple thus indicates that its elements are related in a
certain way, e.g. the arity-2 relation “assignment: Interface→ Role”, which will be discussed later,
associates interfaces with roles.
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model, e.g. DoctorSMC, PatientSMC, SensorSMC all extend the abstract signa-
ture SelfManagedCell.
1 abstract sig SelfManagedCell
2 {
3 provides: some Interface,
4 requires: some Role,
5 obligations: set Obligation,
6 authorisations: set Authorisation
7 }
Figure 5.2: Self-Managed Cell signature
An SMC provides one or more interfaces, which can then be assigned to a role
in a remote SMC. The signature Interface (Figure 5.3) defines the operations
(methods that can be invoked), the events (which can be published externally)
and the notifications (which are external events of which the SMC can be no-
tified) supported by an interface. In turn, these are defined in the Operation,
Event and Notification signatures (not shown here).
1 abstract sig Interface
2 {
3 operations: set Operation,
4 events: set Event,
5 notifications: set Notification
6 }
Figure 5.3: Interface signature
A Role (Figure 5.4) functions as a placeholder for remote SMCs. The relation
“assignment: Interface → Role” (which will be discussed shortly) is used to
define the assignment of an SMC’s interface to a role. The role’s expected
interface (requirements that must be fulfilled by interfaces assigned to the role)
is determined by the set of architectural styles which are bound to that role
(this will be discussed in Section 5.1.2).
1 abstract sig Role
2 { }
Figure 5.4: Role signature
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An SMC enforces two types of policies: the ConcreteObligation signature (Fig-
ure 5.5) defines the subject and target roles that the policy refers to, the event
that triggers the policy and the action to be invoked in response.
1 sig ConcreteObligation extends Obligation
2 {
3 subject: one Role,
4 event: one Event,
5 action: one Operation,
6 target: one Role
7 }
Figure 5.5: Concrete obligation signature
Similarly, the ConcreteAuthorisation signature (Figure 5.6) defines a subject
role, a target role, an action and the modality of the policy (which can be either
positive or negative). In both types of policies, the subjects and the targets are
roles within the context of the SMC in which the policy is enforced.
1 sig ConcreteAuthorisation extends Authorisation
2 {
3 modality: one Modality,
4 subject: one Role,
5 action: one Operation,
6 target: one Role
7 }
Figure 5.6: Concrete authorisation signature
Behaviour
Dynamic behaviour is modelled in Alloy through a number of predicates. A
common technique [HR04, Tut09] to represent dynamic behaviour is to define
declaratively how the occurrence of an operation affects the state of the system
being modelled. It is necessary to represent explicitly the state of the system
being modelled in Alloy, so we can show what properties hold before and what
properties hold after an operation is executed.
Typically an additional signature is used to represent the state of the system,
which in our case corresponds to an interaction between a set of SMCs. Then,
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for each operation we define a predicate that takes as arguments an instance
S and an instance S’ of this signature (to represent the “state” of the interac-
tion before and after the execution of the operation), and shows how S differs
from S’ in this predicate. This is equivalent to showing which properties hold
before and which properties hold after the execution of the operation. This
notion of “state” of an interaction was encoded in the signature Configuration
(Figure 5.7).
1 sig Configuration
2 {
3 participants: some SelfManagedCell,
4 assignment: Interface lone → Role,
5 loading: SelfManagedCell →
6 (ConcreteObligation + ConcreteAuthorisation),
7 active: set (ConcreteObligation + ConcreteAuthorisation)
8 } {
9 active in (participants.obligations
10 + participants.authorisations
11 + participants.loading)
12 }
Figure 5.7: Configuration signature
An instance of this signature thus represents a policy interaction between a set
of SMCs at a given time point. The signature specifies four relations: (a) the
set of participants in the interaction, (b) the assignments of participants (repre-
sented by their provided interfaces) to roles, (c) the policies that are exchanged
(loading) between these SMCs, and (d) the policies that are currently active in
each of the participating SMCs. An appended fact in this signature ensures
that the active policies within a configuration are either the policies already
inside one of the participants or the policies being loaded.
We specified the various operations required for modelling SMC behaviour as
predicates, that show which properties hold before and which properties hold
after the execution of the operation. Using this principle it was possible to show
the changes that happen when an SMC is discovered, when an SMC departs,
when an SMC is assigned to a role, when architectural styles are bound to
roles and when these styles are deployed. The basic SMC model caters for the
specification of:
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• Discovery of an SMC;
• Departure of an SMC;
• Assignment of an SMC to a role;
• De-assignment of an SMC from a role;
• Loading and activation of a policy;
• Unloading and de-activation of a policy.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the operation of assignment of interface itf of an SMC
smc1 to a role rol of another SMC smc2. It defines the assign operation where
conf and conf’ denote the interaction before and after the operation is executed,
respectively. It states that both smc1 and smc2 must already be participants
in conf (line 5), and that smc1 must provide itf whereas smc2 must require
rol in conf (lines 6-7). The operation causes the set of assignments in the new
configuration conf’ to be the same as the one before the operation plus the new
assignment itf → rol (line 11). Section 5.1.2 will discuss how the requirements
associated with a role are checked against the interface assigned to it.
1 pred assign [disj conf, conf’: Configuration,
2 smc1: SelfManagedCell, itf: Interface,
3 smc2: SelfManagedCell, rol: Role]
4 {
5 (smc1 + smc2) in conf.participants
6 itf in smc1.provides
7 rol in smc2.requires
8 conf.participants = conf’.participants
9 conf’.loading = conf.loading
10 conf’.active = conf.active
11 conf’.assignment = conf.assignment + (itf → rol)
12 }
Figure 5.8: Assign predicate
The assign operation does not affect the participants, loading and active prop-
erties of the interaction (lines 8-10); rather, these properties are modified by
separate predicates, which were specified in a similar manner. These individ-
ual predicates can then be combined to simulate SMC behaviour, for example,
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to represent the assignment of an SMC to a role followed by policy loading. This
can be done by defining a new predicate which combines assign to show how
the interaction initially passes from conf to conf’, and load to show how this
interaction then passes from conf’ to conf”. The final configuration conf” will
thus represent the resulting “state” of the interaction after the two operations
are executed.
Figure 5.9 shows an example of a valid SMC interaction which can be obtained
from the Alloy specification. In this example, PatientSMC requires the roles
Sensor and Doctor, and provides interface IPatient (which defines the opera-
tion startECG). Similarly, DoctorSMC requires the role Patient, and provides
interface IDoctor (which defines the operation load, the event loaded and the
notification stopped). In the example, interface IPatient, which is provided by
PatientSMC, is assigned to the role Patient, which is required by DoctorSMC.
Figure 5.9: Alloy graphical representation of a role assignment
Another example, this time describing a policy interaction across SMCs is
shown in Figure 5.10. DoctorSMC has an obligation policy Obl, which states
that the subject role (Doctor) must invoke on the target role (Patient) the action
startECG in response to the event highHR. Interface IDoctor provided by the
DoctorSMC is locally assigned to the subject role, and interface IPatient pro-
vided by the remote PatientSMC is assigned to the target role in the DoctorSMC.
5.1. Modelling Structure and Behaviour 104
PatientSMC enforces the positive authorisation Aut (labelled “modality: Posi-
tive”), which states that the subject role (Doctor) is allowed to invoke the action
startECG on the target role (Patient). The remote interface IDoctor provided by
the DoctorSMC is this time assigned to the Doctor role in PatientSMC. In this
example the same interface the doctor uses is exported to be seen by the pa-
tient. In PatientSMC, the local interface IPatient is assigned to the local Patient
role, which is also the target role of the policy being enforced by this SMC. Both
Obl and Aut policies are active in this interaction.
Figure 5.10: Alloy graphical representation of a policy deployment between
SMCs
Examples of the types of analysis we are able to perform using this formal
specification will be discussed in Section 5.2. Before that, we describe the
formalisation of the architectural aspects of an interaction.
5.1.2 Architectural Model
We defined the architectural aspects of SMC interactions, in particular styles
and bindings between style-specific and domain roles, in a separate model.
This distinction between the fundamental concepts and the architectural as-
pects of SMC interactions permits independent modelling and analysis of either
simple interactions or more complex interactions based on the use of styles.
The architectural model extends the basic SMC model with the signatures and
predicates necessary for the specification of these additional concepts. It sup-
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ports reasoning about SMC interactions based on the composition of architec-
tural styles, thereby allowing the verification of properties related to consistent
bindings and deployment of styles.
Structure
Architectural styles were modelled in Alloy using a three-level hierarchy, which
distinguishes between (a) the concerns that are common to all architectural
styles, (b) the concerns that are related to a specific category of architectural
styles, and (c) the concerns that are specific to a particular abstraction enforced
by an architectural style:
• The top-level signature ArchitecturalStyle is common to all styles, inde-
pendent of their category or the specific abstraction they support.
• Three other intermediate signatures, StructuralStyle, CommunicationStyle
and TaskAllocationStyle, are used to represent the mapping of interfaces,
forwarding of events and loading of policies respectively.
• Each style-specific signature then defines further constraints on how this
is achieved, i.e. how mappings should be performed, how events should
be forwarded and how policies should be loaded.
The signature ArchitecturalStyle (Figure 5.11) is the base signature of any ar-
chitectural style. It defines two relations: roles which specifies a set of style-
specific roles (defined by the signature ArchitecturalStyleRole, not shown here),
and expects which associates a style-specific role with a set of requirements (in
terms of operations, events or notifications).
1 abstract sig ArchitecturalStyle
2 {
3 roles: some ArchitecturalStyleRole,
4 expects: roles → (Operation + Event + Notification)
5 }
Figure 5.11: Base architectural style signature
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The exchanges of interfaces, events and policies were abstracted in three ad-
ditional signatures that extend ArchitecturalStyle, namely StructuralStyle, Com-
municationStyle and TaskAllocationStyle, referred to as intermediate signatures.
Figure 5.12 shows the three signatures, and how we modelled2 the exchanges
of interfaces, events and policies in terms of (1) the mapping of operations of an
interface, (2) the forwarding of events generated by an SMC to notifications re-
ceived by another SMC, and (3) the loading of policies3 into an SMC performing
a given style-specific role.
1 abstract sig StructuralStyle extends ArchitecturalStyle
2 {
3 mapping: Operation → Operation
4 }
6 abstract sig CommunicationStyle extends ArchitecturalStyle
7 {
8 forwarding: Event → Notification
9 }
11 abstract sig TaskAllocationStyle extends ArchitecturalStyle
12 {
13 loading: ArchitecturalStyleRole → Obligation
14 }
Figure 5.12: Intermediate structural, communication and task-allocation style
signatures
Finally, each individual architectural style extends one of the three intermedi-
ate signatures to define specific constraints on how this behaviour is achieved.
The definition of each architectural style is accompanied by the specification
of additional signatures that represent the style-specific roles (not shown here)
which are pertinent for a given style, e.g. Inner and Outer are empty signatures
that extend ArchitecturalStyleRole, and are used specifically in the context of a
composition. Figure 5.13 illustrates how the signature Composition, which ex-
tends StructuralStyle, was defined. Rather than explaining in detail the syntax
we present in Table 5.1 an intuitive description of the most common operators
2The Alloy specification abstracts some of the details when modelling the architectural styles;
for example, a structural styles is more generally modelled as a mapping of operations, which
corresponds to a mapping from the Outer to the Inner (in Composition), or an empty mapping
(in Peer-to-Peer) for example. Other forms of behaviour, such as the filtering of operations were
deliberately omitted to make the model simpler to understand.
3In our model, the set of policies loaded by a task-allocation style corresponds to the mission
specification which is sent to an SMC.
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1 sig Composition extends StructuralStyle
2 { }
3 {
4 roles in (Outer + Inner)
5 #(roles & (Outer)) == 1
6 #(roles & (Inner)) >= 1
7 all conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration |
8 (this in conf.bound)
9 ⇒ no (((roles & Outer).(conf.binding)
10 & (roles & Inner).(conf.binding)))
12 all conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration |
13 (this in conf.deployed)
14 ⇒ no (((roles & Outer).(conf.binding).∼(conf.assignment)
15 & (roles & Inner).(conf.binding).∼(conf.assignment)))
17 // requirements
18 expects in ((roles & (Inner)) → Operation)
20 // behaviour
21 all conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration | (this in conf.deployed)
22 ⇒ mapping in
23 (((roles & (Outer)).(conf.binding)).∼(conf.assignment).operations)
24 → (((roles & (Inner)).(conf.binding)).∼(conf.assignment).operations)
25 }
Figure 5.13: Composition signature
used in this example for those not familiar with Alloy. The style specification
does not define new relations in its body, but instead simply adds further con-
straints through a number of appended facts, just after the signature body. The
definition of this style relies on an ArchitecturalConfiguration, which represents
an instance of an interaction at a given time point, similar to a Configuration
(Figure 5.7). In particular, “binding” is a relation “ArchitecturalStyleRole→ Role”
(defined in Figure 5.15) that associates a given style-specific role with one of the
roles required by an SMC. The relations “bound” and “deployed” define which
architectural styles were bound in this interaction, and among those, which
ones are already instantiated/deployed in the participant SMCs. Firstly, the
specification restricts the style-specific roles for a composition: style-specific
roles can be either Outer or Inner, with exactly one instance of the former and
one or more instances of the latter (lines 4-6). Then two further constraints are
added which state that the bindings (resp. assignments) of the Outer role must
be disjoint from the bindings (resp. assignments) of the Inner roles, i.e. an
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Table 5.1: Common Alloy operators
Operator Description
Intersection (“&”) Defines the intersection between two sets, thus
“(roles & (Inner))” in line 6 of Figure 5.13 returns
the set of all style-specific roles which belong to
that style and which are of the type Inner.
Relational inverse (“∼”) Used to reverse a relation, so given for example
the relation “conf.assignment: Interface → Role”,
which can be used to obtain the Role to which a
given Interface was assigned, “∼conf.assignment”
inverts that relation to “Role → Interface”, which
can be used to obtain the Interface assigned to a
given Role.
Relational join (“.”) Used to compose two relations. For example, the
expression defined in line 23 of Figure 5.13 cor-
responds to the set of all “operations” provided
by the interfaces which are assigned to the set
of roles (“∼(conf.assignment).operations”), which
are bound to the Outer style-specific role (“((roles
& (Outer)).(conf.binding)”) in this composition. In
this case, “binding” is a relation “Architectural-
StyleRole → Role” (defined in Figure 5.15) which
can be used to obtain the domain role to which a
given style-specific role was bound.
SMC cannot be outer and inner at the same time in a composition (lines 7-15).
The composition signature also constraints the requirements of the style to a
set of operations that are associated with the Inner style-specific role (line 18).
Finally, the composition defines the behaviour that must be added when the
style is deployed, in the form of mapping of operations from the interface of the
Outer SMC to the interface of the Inner SMC (lines 21-24).
The enforcement of encapsulation in a Composition is carried out during the
binding operation (as part of the model behaviour, which will be discussed
shortly). This checks that the addition of the new bindings to the current
interaction will not result in a set of inconsistent bindings (when the system
changes from a “state” S to a “state” S’). The condition that verifies whether
the encapsulation property is satisfied is illustrated in Figure 5.14. It specifies
that a new structural style “st” can only be bound if the following applies for
any other structural style “otherstyle” which is already bound. Let conf and
conf’ be the representation of the interaction before and after the new binding
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happens respectively:
1. If “st” is a composition (line 3), then there is no intersection between the
resulting bindings of its inner role (line 4) and the existing bindings of any
“otherstyle” (line 5), except if this overlapping happens with an Outer role
of “otherstyle”. In this latter case the intersection would result in a multi-
level composition, which preserves encapsulation and is therefore a valid
structure; and
2. If “otherstyle” is a composition (line 8), then there is no intersection be-
tween the existing bindings of its inner role (line 9) and the bindings of the
new style (line 10), i.e. new bindings are not overlapping with roles that
were already encapsulated.
1 all otherstyle: (conf.bound & StructuralStyle)
2 {
3 (!(no (st & Composition))
4 ⇒ no ((st.roles & Inner).(conf’.binding)
5 & ((otherstyle.roles).(conf’.binding) −
6 ((otherstyle & Composition).roles & Outer).(conf’.binding))))
7 and
8 (!(no (otherstyle & Composition))
9 ⇒ no ((otherstyle.roles & Inner).(conf’.binding)
10 & (st.roles).(conf’.binding)))
11 }
Figure 5.14: Verifying if encapsulation is preserved during binding
Other architectural styles were similarly modelled in Alloy, thus allowing us to
define specific abstractions for interface mappings, event forwarding and policy
loading.
Behaviour
The behavioural aspects of the architectural model concentrate on two distinct
steps related to SMC interactions: (1) interaction specification and (2) interaction
instantiation. Interaction specification is defined by the bindings between style-
specific roles and the roles required by an SMC, and this specifies how SMCs
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assigned to these roles will be expected to behave. Interaction instantiation is
represented by the deployment of styles previously bound to a set of roles,
when actual SMCs are assigned to these roles. The deployment causes a new
dynamic behaviour to be added to the current interaction (when the system
passes from state S to S’), which is defined in terms of forwarding of events,
mapping of interfaces or exchange of policies, depending on the architectural
style being deployed.
The predicates defined in this model cater for the specification of:
• Binding and unbinding of an architectural style;
• Deployment and removal of an architectural style.
To distinguish the state of the system before the execution of an operation
from the state after the operation, we defined an additional signature, named
ArchitecturalConfiguration (Figure 5.15). Similarly to the predicates defined in
the basic SMC model, the various operations for binding and deployment of
architectural styles were modelled by showing how instances of Architectural-
Configuration differ before and after an operation is executed.
1 sig ArchitecturalConfiguration extends Configuration
2 {
3 patterns: some Pattern,
4 bound: set ArchitecturalStyle,
5 deployed: set ArchitecturalStyle,
6 binding: ArchitecturalStyleRole → lone Role,
7 forwarding: Event → Notification,
8 loading: SelfManagedCell → Obligation,
9 mapping: Operation → Operation
10 } {
11 bound in patterns.styles
12 deployed in bound
13 binding in (bound.roles → lone participants.requires)
14 }
Figure 5.15: Architectural configuration signature
An ArchitecturalConfiguration extends Configuration (defined in Figure 5.7) and
includes the architectural aspects of an interaction through a number of addi-
tional relations:
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1. a set of patterns involved in this interaction (the Pattern signature consists
of a set of architectural styles, and was omitted from this discussion);
2. a set of architectural styles currently bound;
3. a set of bindings which bind style-specific roles to SMC roles;
4. a set of architectural styles currently deployed; and
5. a behaviour added by each style, in the form of:
(a) forwarding of events;
(b) loading of policies; or
(c) mapping of operations provided by an interface.
The appended facts (lines 11−13) constrain these relations by specifying that
bound styles can only be the ones defined within the patterns involved in this
interaction, that deployed styles can only be among the ones which were al-
ready bound, and that the bindings must be specified in terms of the roles
belonging to the bound styles and the roles required by the participants of this
interactions only.
Figure 5.16 shows an architectural configuration obtained from the Alloy model.
In this example interaction PatientSMC requires two roles, Patient and Sensor,
and these application roles are bound to a number of style-specific roles. The
Sensor role is bound to Source (through a Diffusion style), Managed (through
a HierarchicalControl style) and Inner (through a Composition style). Similarly,
the Patient role is bound to Target (through a Diffusion style), Manager (through
a HierarchicalControl style) and Outer (through a Composition style). This archi-
tectural configuration means that whichever SMCs are assigned to the Patient
and Sensor roles required by PatientSMC, they will behave according to the re-
spective parts defined by each architectural style bound to their roles. Each
architectural style specifies (a) what it expects from the SMCs that will be even-
tually assigned to the roles, as well as (b) the behaviour to be added to the
interaction after the style is deployed (forwarding, loading or mapping).
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Figure 5.16: Alloy graphical representation of an architectural configuration
This example in particular illustrates the deployment of the Diffusion style (the
style is labelled as “$deploy style”). This style is marked as “expects: Source
→ alert”, which states that, for whichever SMC is performing the Source role,
its interface must provide the alert event. By following the binding of the style-
specific role Source to the domain role Sensor, observing that interface ISensor,
which is provided by SensorSMC is assigned to this role, we can see that this
interface indeed provides the alert event, thus satisfying the requirements of
the style. Similarly, this style is also labelled as “forwarding: alert → highHR”
(this corresponds to the behaviour that must be added to the interaction after
the style is deployed). The deployment of this behaviour can be seen through
the arrow labelled “forwarding” between the alert event (provided by interface
ISensor, which is assigned to the role Sensor, which is in turn bound to the
style-specific role Source) and the highHR notification (provided by IPatient,
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which is assigned to the role Patient, and bound to the style-specific role Tar-
get). The behaviour added by the deployment of other types of architectural
styles can be shown in a similar manner, in the form of mapping of interfaces,
forwarding of events or loading of policies.
This model can then be used to check, for example, whether all the SMCs en-
forcing policies have the required events forwarded to them (as these events are
required for triggering the policies) as well as whether all SMCs have access to
the interfaces required for enforcing the actions prescribed by policies. Alter-
natively, the formal analyses of a specific SMC interaction may determine that
a valid interaction is not achieved for a given set of SMCs and policies, and that
additional abstractions must be added to the interaction, e.g. an event must be
forwarded or additional interfaces must be exchanged. These are discussed in
the next section.
5.2 Model Analysis
Formalising SMC behaviour enables reasoning about interactions, to verify
whether they are correctly specified and deployed and whether they achieve
their intended behaviour. This increases confidence in the robustness of policy-
based SMC interactions, as we are able to analyse them rigorously prior to
instantiation and deployment in actual devices. Based on the types of incon-
sistencies described in Section 4.3.3 (with respect to bindings, assignments
and policy deployments), we discuss here various types of verifications we are
able to perform automatically.
We distinguish between:
• Static checks: properties that must hold for any instance of the model,
and must never produce a counter-example provided the semantics of
the model was specified correctly, e.g. an SMC that is already composed
should never be allowed to participate in any interaction outside that com-
position according to the rule of encapsulation. Such verifications are
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specified in the form of assertions, that can be checked through an ex-
haustive search for a given (finite) number of instances for each one of the
signatures defined in the model, i.e. considering a given number or SMCs,
roles, interfaces, architectural styles, etc; and
• Dynamic checks: verifications that represent properties we want to test
for a specific instance of the model, e.g. after a task loading style is de-
ployed we can verify whether all SMCs enforcing policies have the re-
quired events forwarded to them, or whether further abstractions must
be added. These verifications are usually specified as predicates, which
define a property which must be satisfied by a particular instance of the
interaction, i.e. an instance of Configuration or ArchitecturalConfiguration;
The list below is not exhaustive, but it exemplifies the types of analysis we are
able to perform using the formal model specified in this chapter:
• Check whether the role requirements are satisfied by the SMCs assigned
to these roles;
• Consistent policy deployment where all obligation policies have a corre-
sponding positive authorisation, and no modality conflicts occur;
• Roles bound in a composition have no interactions with other roles outside
that composition.
• Ensure a given SMC is bound to a particular abstraction, e.g. sensor SMCs
should always be encapsulated by a patient SMC;
• An event-forwarding style can only be bound if a structural style is already
bound ensuring the interfaces required for event forwarding were already
exchanged;
• All policies have access to the events required for triggering these policies
(either the SMC enforcing the policy provides the event or it is forwarded
from a remote SMC);
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• All policies have access to the interfaces required for action invocation
(either the target SMC provides the action or it is mapped from another
SMC).
We can further check for application-specific properties of an SMC’s behaviour,
whether in given circumstances authorisations permit the execution of actions
that would threaten the integrity of the SMC or whether failure or departure of
devices leaves the SMC in a state where it is no longer able to fulfill its primary
functions. This is particularly important when developing body-area networks
for health monitoring as the integrity of the sensor configuration influences the
medical interpretation of the physiological parameters collected.
Below, we describe in more detail a number of dynamic verifications that can
be performed using the formal model, namely for checking role assignments,
policy deployment, and consistent combination of architectural styles.
5.2.1 Role Requirement
When architectural styles are bound to the roles required by an SMC, the re-
quirements of each style become automatically associated with these roles.
Thus, the roles required by an SMC will combine the requirements of all styles
bound to them. This requires verifying that whichever SMC is assigned to one
of these roles, its interface satisfies all the requirements associated with that
role.
1 pred verifyRoleRequirements [conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration]
2 {
3 all pat: conf.patterns, sty: conf.deployed, styrol: sty.roles {
4 !(no styrol.(sty.expects)) ⇒ one itf: conf.participants.provides {
5 ((itf → styrol.(conf.binding)) in conf.assignment) and
6 (styrol.(sty.expects) in (itf.operations
7 + itf.events
8 + itf.notifications))
9 }
10 }
11 }
Figure 5.17: Verification of role requirements
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Figure 5.17 illustrates the verifyRoleRequirements predicate used to verify this
condition. It states that for the specific configuration given as argument, for
all styles deployed and for all style-specific roles defined for these styles, the
following must hold: if a style-specific role defines a non-empty set of require-
ments, then there must exist an interface provided by one of the participants
such that this interface is assigned to the role bound to the style-specific role
in question, and all the requirements associated with this style-specific role are
satisfied by the union of such interface’s operations, events and notifications.
This property ensures that the SMCs involved in this interaction are capable of
satisfying the requirements associated with their roles.
5.2.2 Policy Deployment
The formal specification also facilitates the checking for conflicting or incon-
sistent policy deployment across SMCs. Two types of checks are discussed in
the following: the verification of (a) whether all obligations enforced by collab-
orating SMCs have a corresponding authorisation policy, and (b) whether the
policies enforced by a set of SMCs are free from modality conflicts. More tra-
ditional types of policy analysis, such as application-specific conflicts [LS99]
can be defined in a similar manner, e.g. nurses should never be authorised to
administer medication on themselves.
Figure 5.18 illustrates the noUnauthorisedObligation predicate which deter-
mines whether all obligations have a matching positive authorisation. It states
that for any SMC smc1, and for all active obligation policies, if smc1 is en-
forcing this policy, then there must be an active positive authorisation policy,
enforced by an SMC smc2 which specifies the same action as in the obligation,
and which has the same SMCs assigned to the subject and target roles in both
policies.
The SMC interaction previously illustrated in Figure 5.10 shows an example
of a valid policy interaction between SMCs, because each obligation policy has
a corresponding authorisation policy that allows the action specified by the
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1 pred noUnauthorisedObligation [conf: Configuration]
2 {
3 all smc1: conf.participants, obl: (conf.active & ConcreteObligation){
4 (obl in (smc1.obligations + smc1.(conf.loading)))
5 ⇒ some smc2: conf.participants,
6 aut: (conf.active & ConcreteAuthorisation) {
7 (aut in smc2.authorisations)
8 and (aut.modality in Positive)
9 and (obl.action == aut.action)
10 and some smcsubj: conf.participants |
11 (((obl.subject).∼(conf.assignment) in smcsubj.provides)
12 and
13 ((aut.subject).∼(conf.assignment)) in smcsubj.provides)
14 and some smctarg: conf.participants |
15 (((obl.target).∼(conf.assignment) in smctarg.provides)
16 and
17 ((aut.target).∼(conf.assignment)) in smctarg.provides)
18 }
19 }
20 }
Figure 5.18: Verification of whether obligations have a matching authorisation
obligation to be executed in the target SMC. The assignments presented in
Figure 5.10 ensure that the SMCs assigned to subject and target roles in an
obligation are also assigned to subject/target roles in a matching positive au-
thorisation policy.
Another property that can be easily checked for a given interaction is the oc-
currence of modality conflicts. Figure 5.19 illustrates the noModalityConflict
predicate which determines whether an interaction between SMCs is free from
modality conflicts. It states that for the configuration given as parameter, no
two active authorisation policies exist in any SMC such that the subjects, tar-
gets and actions of the policies overlap, but their modalities are opposite.
Figure 5.20 illustrates an example of a modality conflict between SMCs. Doc-
torSMC has an obligation policy Obl, which defines Doctor and Patient as (re-
spectively) the subject and target of the policy, the event highHR as the event
required for triggering the policy, and the action startECG as the action to be
executed when the policy is triggered. Doctor and Patient are roles required by
this SMC. PatientSMC has two authorisation policies, Aut0 and Aut1, which de-
fine Doctor and Patient as (respectively) the subject and target in both policies,
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1 pred noModalityConflict [conf: Configuration]
2 {
3 all smc: conf.participants {
4 no disj aut1, aut2: (conf.active & ConcreteAuthorisation) {
5 (aut1 + aut2) in (smc.authorisations)
6 and (aut1.action == aut2.action)
7 and (aut1.modality != aut2.modality)
8 and some smcsubj: conf.participants |
9 (((aut1.subject).∼(conf.assignment) in smcsubj.provides)
10 and
11 ((aut2.subject).∼(conf.assignment)) in smcsubj.provides)
12 and some smctarg: conf.participants |
13 (((aut1.target).∼(conf.assignment) in smctarg.provides)
14 and
15 ((aut2.target).∼(conf.assignment)) in smctarg.provides)
16 }
17 }
18 }
Figure 5.19: Verification of modality conflicts
with respect to the action startECG. However, while Aut0 is a positive authori-
sation (labelled “modality: Positive”), Aut1 is a negative authorisation (labelled
“modality: Negative”). In terms of assignments, DoctorSMC provides interface
IDoctor, which is assigned to the subject role (Doctor) of its obligation policy,
and the same interface IDoctor is also assigned to the role Doctor required by
the remote PatientSMC (Doctor is the subject role of both authorisation policies
Figure 5.20: Invalid policy configuration between SMCs
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enforced by that SMC). Similarly, PatientSMC provides interface IPatient, which
is assigned to the target role (Patient) of both authorisation policies, and the
same interface IPatient is also assigned to the role Patient required by the re-
mote DoctorSMC (Patient is the target role of the obligation policy enforced by
that SMC).
This is an example of an invalid policy configuration between SMCs because
it contains a modality conflict. This happens because Obl (which is enforced
by DoctorSMC) has two matching authorisation policies (which are enforced
by PatientSMC): one (Aut0) that allows the execution of the action specified
by the obligation policy, and another (Aut1) that denies the execution of the
same action, i.e. the action startECG defined in the obligation policy is both
allowed and forbidden to be executed by the authorisation policies enforced by
PatientSMC.
5.2.3 Style Deployment
The formal specification also facilitates the checking of consistent deployment
of architectural styles among SMCs. For example, we can check whether after
the deployment of a task-loading style all SMCs enforcing policies have the
required events forwarded to them, or whether additional abstractions must
be included to the interaction. Similarly, it is possible to check whether these
policies have access to all the required interfaces, as these are necessary for
validating the remote actions prescribed by the policies.
Figure 5.21 illustrates the verifyNoPolicyWithoutEvent predicate which checks
whether all SMCs enforcing obligation policies have access to the events re-
quired for triggering these policies. It checks, given a configuration, whether
any SMC enforcing any obligation policy loaded by a task-allocation style either
(a) provides the event required for policy triggering through one of its own in-
terfaces or (b) receives the event via an event forwarding style already deployed
in the same configuration.
Figure 5.22 exemplifies part of a configuration which does not satisfy this prop-
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1 pred verifyNoPolicyWithoutEvent [conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration]
2 {
3 all pat: conf.patterns,
4 sty: (pat.styles & conf.deployed & TaskAllocationStyle) {
5 let policySet = sty.roles.(sty.loading) {
6 all pol: policySet {
7 all smc: pol.∼(conf.loading) |
8 (pol.event in (smc.provides.events)) or
9 ((pol.event → smc.provides.notifications) in conf.forwarding)
10 }
11 }
12 }
13 }
Figure 5.21: Predicate for checking whether an SMC either raises or receives
the events required for triggering its obligation policies
erty. In this case, DoctorSMC was loaded with the obligation policy Obl1. The
policy specifies that it is triggered by the event highHR. However, the interface
provided by DoctorSMC does not support event highHR, nor is this event for-
warded to the SMC. This means that because the event will never be raised in
DoctorSMC, the policy will never be triggered.
Figure 5.22: Example of an incorrect policy deployment
Similarly, we can define a predicate that verifies whether an SMC has access
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to the interfaces required for validating the actions prescribed by a policy. Fig-
ure 5.23 illustrates the verifyNoPolicyWithoutAction predicate. It checks, given
a configuration, whether in any SMC enforcing any obligation policy loaded by a
task-allocation style either (a) the policy’s target provides the action required for
policy triggering through one of its own interfaces or (b) this action is mapped
to the policy’s target’s own interface via a structural style already deployed in
the same configuration.
1 pred verifyNoPolicyWithoutAction [conf: ArchitecturalConfiguration]
2 {
3 all pat: conf.patterns,
4 sty: (pat.styles & conf.deployed & TaskAllocationStyle) {
5 let policySet = sty.roles.(sty.loading) {
6 all pol: policySet {
7 all smc: pol.∼(conf.loading) |
8 pol.action in
9 (pol.target & smc.requires).∼(conf.assignment).operations or
10 pol.action.ˆ(conf.mapping) in
11 (pol.target & smc.requires).∼(conf.assignment).operations
12 }
13 }
14 }
15 }
Figure 5.23: Predicate for checking whether an SMC has access to the actions
prescribed by its obligation policies
These checks guarantee that interactions were specified correctly and that the
SMCs involved are capable of enforcing their policies, before these interactions
are implemented in physical devices. Manual implementation demands con-
stant re-verification every time an interaction increases in size, and every time
this happens it is more likely errors or inconsistencies will occur. In contrast,
the predicates defined in the formal model can be used to verify automatically
both smaller as well as more complex interactions, as they logically define what
properties must hold for the interaction to be considered correct.
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5.3 Discussion
Several studies have looked at the (conflict) analysis of policies in various
forms [FKMT05, BLR03, CFP+06, RLSC+05], some of them based on model-
checking techniques. Some of this work continues to date focusing on more
complex policy languages and forms of analysis [JLT+08, CLM+09]. In partic-
ular, [BLR03, CLM+09] use event calculus to represent temporal enforcement
of policies, showing how the fulfillment or violation of obligations affects the
behaviour of the system and of other policies. In contrast to these studies our
focus is not on the ability to detect policy conflicts, but to specify unambigu-
ously the desired behaviour of interacting Self-Managed Cells and then verify if
these SMCs are capable of enforcing their policies. The model specification pre-
sented in this chapter does not cater for the temporal enforcement of policies,
i.e. we do not model a policy being triggered by an event. This type of analysis
is possible but would require the formalisation of each of the managed object’s
behaviour in an SMC. Instead, this model focuses on the correct establishment
of interactions and subsequent policy deployment.
Using this formal specification we can model specific policy-based SMC in-
teractions and verify the correctness of these interactions before their actual
implementation and deployment in physical devices. In this chapter a few ex-
amples of model verifications that can be performed were discussed: we can
type-check role assignment across distributed SMCs ensuring that the SMCs
involved in the interaction support the requirements for their respective roles,
we can detect omissions from the configurations e.g. obligation policies that do
not have a corresponding authorisation policy, and we can analyse consistent
architectural style deployment where the exchange of policies must be accom-
panied by adequate exchanges of events and interfaces. Similarly, it is possible
to check for application-specific properties of an SMC’s behaviour which are vi-
olated due to dynamic changes such as the loading of new policies, the failures
of components or the addition of new ones.
The formal model presented in this chapter is used for design-time analysis of
SMC interactions, in order to verify whether a given set of SMCs are capable
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of establishing specific policy-based collaborations which satisfy a number of
properties. This analysis is typically performed before implementing the inter-
actions and deploying the policies in physical devices. However, during run-
time, resources may fail, SMCs may leave an interaction and other SMCs may
join it. Therefore, support for the dynamic verification of SMC interactions is
also needed. Even though the formal model presented in this chapter could also
be used to perform run-time verifications, this would require re-evaluation of
the predicates defined in Alloy when changes in the available resources within
the SMC occur. This limitation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
The next chapter describes the implementation aspects of SMC interactions
and our prototype, and presents its evaluation.
Chapter 6
Implementation and Evaluation
This chapter discusses the implementation of the framework for specification
and establishment of SMC interactions, and then describes its evaluation. The
evaluation covers three different perspectives, in particular focusing on the
memory footprint and performance of the implementation, and on the functional-
ity it supports for developing real applications. While memory and performance
will be discussed in this chapter, the functional evaluation is presented in the
form of a case-study scenario which will be described in the next chapter. Be-
fore describing the implementation aspects of our prototype and its evaluation,
we present a brief overview of the Ponder2 framework.
6.1 Ponder2 Framework
The implementation of the framework for SMC interactions was done in Java,
relying on the infrastructure provided by the Ponder21 policy framework. Pon-
der2 comprises a general-purpose object management system. It implements
a policy execution framework that supports the enforcement of both obligation
and authorisation policies. Policies are written in terms of managed objects
(MOs), which are stored in a local domain service which implements a hierar-
chical namespace.
1http://www.ponder2.net
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Ponder2 provides built-in support for the creation of a set of core managed
objects, e.g. events, policies, etc, however the infrastructure is extensible and
allows the creation of user-defined custom managed objects, e.g. adapters for
interfacing with a temperature sensor. These managed objects are programmed
in Java as well. Managed objects serve as factories for creating object instances
(i.e. for a given application) which are subsequently stored within the local
domain. Managed objects may also be held transparently in a remote Ponder2
system, and different underlying transport protocols are natively supported to
facilitate remote communication, e.g. RMI, HTTP, etc.
A command interpreter provided by Ponder2 supports a high-level configura-
tion and control language called PonderTalk, which allows the invocation of
actions on these managed objects. PonderTalk’s syntax is based on Smalltalk,
in which messages can be sent to objects. A PonderTalk statement is defined
as a reference to a managed object (possibly stored in the domain hierarchy),
followed by zero or more messages to be sent to the object. A message may be
a simple command or it may be parameterised. The example below illustrates
an example PonderTalk statement:
root/myObject print : “Hello World”.
In this example, the message “print:” is sent to the object “myObject” which is
stored in the “root” domain of the local Ponder2 instance. The message receives
as argument the string “Hello World”. This example assumes that “myObject”
accepts the “print:” message, otherwise an exception will be raised.
PonderTalk commands are linked to Java methods defined in the correspond-
ing managed object by using Java annotations (i.e. @Ponder2op()). Thus, a
PonderTalk command such as:
root/myObject addPolicyBehavior : “policy” to : “role”.
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is linked to a Java implementation in the corresponding managed object by
using a Java annotation of the form:
@Ponder2op(“addPolicyBehavior : to : ”)
public void p2 addPolicyBehaviorTo(P2Block policy, String roleName)
{
//Implementation of the method comes here
//...
}
This decouples the Java implementation of the methods from their invocation
for the purposes of configuring and controlling a Ponder2 system. New factory
objects can be loaded in a Ponder2 interpreter and objects can be created from
these factories on demand, permitting commands to be sent to these objects dy-
namically via PonderTalk messages. This mechanism is of central importance
in realising the SMC’s control-loop and its adaptation strategy, as it allows new
management policies to be created as required during run-time and actions to
be invoked automatically in response to context changes that occur within each
SMC. Further details about Ponder2 and PonderTalk’s language syntax can be
found in the Ponder2 website (http://www.ponder2.net).
6.2 Prototype Implementation
A prototype was implemented in order to demonstrate the concepts presented
in this thesis. The presentation of the prototype is divided into two parts: ini-
tially, we describe the implementation of the basic aspects for facilitating SMC
interactions, which support the establishment of SMC collaborations and pro-
motes task exchanges based on the roles to which these SMCs were assigned.
We then discuss the implementation of a library of architectural styles for sys-
tematically building SMC collaborations, which supports a much more general
model based on richer abstractions for the structure, management and com-
munication aspects of an interaction.
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6.2.1 Methodology Overview
Ponder2 supports the specification of the core concepts which are pertinent to
the SMC model, such as events and policies. However, to realise the frame-
work proposed in this thesis, a number of Ponder2 extensions were required.
This section presents an overview of the main steps involved in specifying and
enforcing SMC interactions, the main components in our implementation, and
the runtime support required for our framework.
The specification and establishment of SMC interactions consists of:
1. Defining how a number of roles are expected to interact with each other
via policy, event and interface exchanges, by reusing architectural styles
and pre-defined patterns of interaction;
2. Verifying the consistency of this interaction specification according to a
number of pre-defined logical properties by using the SMC formal model
and the Alloy Analyzer;
3. Deploying the interaction specification in one or more devices running the
SMC runtime. Each device will either:
(a) Instantiate the interaction with other devices; or
(b) Participate in an interaction instantiated by another device;
4. Repeat step 3 for any sub-patterns defined in the interaction specification.
Figure 6.1 presents an overview of the methodology for specifying and estab-
lishing SMC interactions. Initially, an application designer can rely on a num-
ber of abstractions for specifying an SMC collaboration for a given purpose,
e.g. healthcare monitoring. This specification is defined in terms of a number
of roles that define the placeholders for actual SMCs, a repository of manage-
ment policies pertinent to a particular scenario, and a repository of architectural
styles and patterns that provide reusable abstractions to define how policies
are exchanged, and how the necessary exchanges of events and interfaces for
policy enforcement are achieved.
6.2. Prototype Implementation 128
Figure 6.1: Specification and establishment of SMC interactions
The interaction specification is then given as input to the formal Alloy model
for analysis, which can be used to verify a number of properties with respect
to this specific interaction between SMCs. If the specification is successfully
validated, it is ready for deployment in physical devices. Upon receiving an
interaction specification, a device will instantiate the styles and patterns of
interaction and establish an interaction among a group of SMCs. Sub-patterns
in this specification can be further re-deployed in other SMCs, which will be
responsible for enforcing different parts of a large interaction. It would be
possible to use the formal model to re-check the interaction during runtime,
e.g. if a sensor fails, to ensure the policies can still run, however the use of
model-checking in our implementation has been limited to design-time checks.
The different SMCs responsible for instantiating parts of an interaction or sim-
ply participating in an interaction instantiated by another SMC must run the
SMC runtime. The SMC runtime builds on the Ponder2 interpreter and adds to
it a number of extensions required for facilitating SMC interactions (Figure 6.2).
The standard functionality provided by Ponder2 implements (a) the discovery
service, which permits the SMC to advertise itself to both devices and other
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SMCs, (b) an event bus, which supports the underlying event-based infrastruc-
ture within the SMC, and (c) the policy service itself, which allows the specifi-
cation and enforcement of both obligation and authorisation policies. The im-
plementation of these services is presented in detail in [KDL+07, K+07]. These
enable the basic functionality of the SMC as a feedback control-loop. Ponder2
also provides (d) a command interpreter, which allows PonderTalk commands to
be sent to configure and control the Ponder2 system.
Figure 6.2: SMC runtime (shaded blocks are standard Ponder2 components)
Our framework for SMC interactions adds a number of extensions to this infras-
tructure: a core interface enables the exchanges of policies, events and inter-
faces between SMCs. The implementation of its functionality relies on specific
managed objects that implement XML parsing of missions and their verifica-
tion, and brokers that allow the subscription and forwarding of events between
remote SMCs. A particular SMC can also have a dynamic set of application-
specific managed objects (MOs) that implement non-standard functionality,
e.g. adapters for local sensors, authentication algorithms, etc, and this func-
tionality is made available to remote SMCs via pre-specified customised inter-
faces. Roles are defined as placeholders in the domain structure provided by
Ponder2, and we implemented syntactic verification between a role’s expected
interface and the SMC’s provided interface before assigning SMC’s to roles.
Finally, a library of reusable architectural styles enables the systematic spec-
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ification of how a group of roles must interact. The implementation of these
mechanisms is discussed in more detail in the following.
6.2.2 Basic SMC Interactions
As mentioned earlier, although the infrastructure provided by Ponder2 sup-
ports the core concepts which are pertinent to the SMC model, such as events
and policies, several specialised managed objects had to be implemented in
order to extend Ponder2 with the required functionality for supporting basic
SMC interactions, e.g. interfaces, roles, missions. The implementation of these
managed objects was done in Java, and these are used as factories for creating
the specific object instances which are used by an application, e.g. a patient’s
interface, or an ECG monitoring mission. These are discussed in the following.
Roles and Policies
The Role managed object implements a placeholder within the local domain of
the SMC, to which remote SMCs can be assigned. The role object defines an
expected interface which specifies the requirements that remote SMCs must
satisfy in order to be assigned to these roles, in terms of operations, events
and notifications. This matching between the role’s expected interface and an
SMC’s provided interface can be seen as matching the pieces in a jigsaw puzzle,
where required roles must be fulfilled by the correct SMCs in order to form an
entire application (Figure 6.3). In our implementation, the role’s expected in-
terface is syntactically matched against an SMC’s provided interface, although
a more flexible approach could define the use of ontologies for increasing the
expressiveness in interface comparison.
Role extends Ponder2’s Domain, and implements additional checks for verifying
interface compatibility. Policies are then defined in terms of a number of roles,
such as “coordinator”, “authenticator”, “surveyor”, etc. The policies will apply
to the SMCs which are assigned to the respective roles, provided these SMCs’
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Figure 6.3: Roles used as placeholders for constructing SMC applications
interfaces support the requirements for their roles. This process is sketched in
Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Roles, expected interfaces and policies
Figure 6.5 illustrates an obligation policy being associated with the “authentica-
tor” role (subject). The policy itself is defined within a PonderTalk block, which
defines a section of one or more statements (within square brackets) whose ex-
ecution can be delayed until it is decided that the block should be evaluated.
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This allows policies to be defined during specification time, delaying their cre-
ation until they are loaded into an SMC. The snippet contained in the block in
the example defines the creation of a policy from an “ecapolicy” factory. The
policy specification is created and stored in the role, however the instantiation
of the actual policy will be delayed until an SMC is assigned to the respective
role during run-time. This policy specification was implemented to define the
authentication of a discovered SMC, as described in the case-study presented
in Section 3.6. The policy is triggered by an event of the type “nodeReplied”,
which must be supported by the authenticator’s interface. This in turn causes
the action “verifyCredentials” to be executed locally on the authenticator2 itself
(target). In our implementation the SMC assigned to the authenticator role sup-
ports the operation “verifyCredentials” and provides an implementation for the
validation of X.509 digital certificates through a custom managed object which
uses the standard java.security package.
1 addPolicyBehavior:
2 ([/policy
3 at: "pol1"
4 put: [obj := /factory/ecapolicy create.
5 obj event: /event/nodeReplied.
6 obj action: [:name :address :cap :credentials |
7 /roles/authenticator
8 verifyCredentials: name
9 from: address
10 capabilities: cap
11 credentials: credentials.].
12 obj active: true.] value.
13 ])
14 to: /roles/authenticator.
Figure 6.5: Authentication policy in PonderTalk
Similarly, Figure 6.6 illustrates an obligation policy associated with the “coor-
dinator” role (subject). This policy specification was implemented to define the
preferences for the assignment of SMCs to roles, as described in Section 3.6.
The policy is triggered by an event of the type “nodeAuthenticated”, which must
2For the purposes of this implementation, mock certification authorities (CAs) were created,
and X.509 digital certificates from these CAs were generated, using the OpenSSL package
(http://www.openssl.org/). Certificates were then loaded into the SMCs that will join an inter-
action, whereas the SMC assigned to the authenticator role was parameterised with the relevant
PKs for these certificates.
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be supported by the coordinator’s interface. The condition for policy triggering
evaluates whether the string “video” is among the list of capabilities “cap” of
the SMC indicated by the event. The list of capabilities supported by the SMC
is obtained from one of the arguments of the event. If the condition is satisfied,
the “assign” action is invoked in the surveyor role (target), which will cause the
assignment of the SMC (whose “name” and “address” were also provided as
parameters of the event) to the respective role.
1 addPolicyBehavior:
2 ([/policy
3 at: "pol2"
4 put: [obj := /factory/ecapolicy create.
5 obj event: /event/nodeAuthenticated.
6 obj condition: [ :cap | "video" in cap].
7 obj action: [ :name :address |
8 /roles/surveyor
9 assign: name
10 from: address].
11 obj active: true.] value.
12 ])
13 to: /roles/coordinator.
Figure 6.6: Role assignment policy in PonderTalk
Core and Customised Interfaces
Interfaces define the functionality supported by SMCs. Each SMC provides
one or more interfaces to remote SMCs. The implementation of interfaces was
divided into two managed objects:
• CoreInterface: defines a set of primitives that are common to all SMCs,
independent of their application purposes and supports operations for
interface exchange and binding, and interface mapping. It also provides
operations for exchange and subscription of events, as well as operations
required for the exchange of missions and installation of policies; and
• CustomisedInterface: extends CoreInterface and adds to it application-
specific functionality, e.g. defines operations for reading sensor data, or
for setting new thresholds.
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The functionality provided by a customised interface depends on the local re-
sources and application-specific services that the SMC implements. For exam-
ple, an SMC whose interface specifies an operation for verification of public-key
credentials must implement the application-specific managed objects that sup-
port this functionality. Similarly, an interface can define functions for reading
measurements of a sensor provided the SMC implements the managed objects
that physically communicate with the sensor device.
Mission Specification and Loading
The Mission managed object is parameterised with a set of roles, and implic-
itly their expected interfaces, and groups a set of obligation policies which can
be loaded into a remote SMC. We implemented the checks discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4, that must be performed at mission specification in the source SMC,
and at mission loading in the target SMC. This is summarised in Figure 6.7.
At mission specification (left hand side of the flowchart), the mission is parsed
and each policy written in terms of the roles defined in the mission is matched
against the expected interfaces of the respective roles. Thus if policy “p” spec-
ifies that action “a” must be invoked on role “r”, the mission will only be val-
idated if action “a” is defined in the expected interface of role “r”. Although
matching is currently only based on syntactical equivalence, a more flexible
approach could take advantage of subsumption and ontological reasoning to
add a fine level of granularity and expressiveness for interface comparison.
The source then specifies the argument values for the mission, both the ad-
dress of actual SMCs for the role arguments as well as any application-specific
argument used by the policies, e.g. thresholds, rates, etc. If the source has the
required authorisations, the mission is sent to the target SMC.
At the target SMC, the mission specification is validated before its policies are
instantiated (right hand side of the flowchart). The first verification checks
the mission structure and whether the specification contains only obligation
policies written in terms of the roles which are part of the mission. Any attempt
to load additional embedded code inside the mission, or invoking operations on
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Figure 6.7: Mission specification and loading flowchart
objects other than mission roles causes the mission loading to be aborted. For
each one of the roles, a customised interface is obtained for interacting with the
respective SMC by contacting the SMC directly using the address provided by
the source. Finally, the mission specification is matched against the interfaces
of the respective roles. This verification can be against either the expected
interface for each of the roles or against the customised interface of the actual
SMCs assigned to these roles. In our implementation, we have chosen the latter
option as it enables the mission to take advantage of operations provided by the
specific SMC that the target will be interacting with, e.g. the nurse in a specific
GP clinic or ward may make available specialised operations in addition to the
standard functionality defined in the nurse’s expected interface.
6.2. Prototype Implementation 136
6.2.3 Architectural Styles and Patterns
More general interactions can be defined through the use of architectural styles.
Interactions based on architectural styles allow the systematic construction of
SMC collaborations which rely on much richer abstractions for their struc-
ture, task-allocation and communication aspects. A library of architectural
styles was implemented in Ponder2 to show how styles can be rapidly and flex-
ibly instantiated for building SMC interactions. Each style can be arranged
independently in patterns of interactions, as the structure of the interaction
should be defined independently from the way tasks are allocated and events
are forwarded. We implemented managed objects to support the specification
of various of the architectural styles presented in the catalogue in Chapter 4,
and also a library where they can be chosen for constructing SMC interactions.
Style Implementation
The implementation of architectural styles is inspired by a technique for imple-
menting layered object-oriented design known as mixin layers [SB02, SB98].
Mixin layers are used to define templates that specify a collaboration between
a set of classes. A collaboration, in turn, defines a set of related roles. To some
extent, collaborations in the mixin layer model can be seen as architectural
styles in the model for SMC interactions, in that in both cases an independent
aspect of the collaboration is designed as an interaction between a group of
roles. The work on mixin layers is presented from a programming language
standpoint, but an overview of the approach is shown in Figure 6.8, where
three different objects, A, B and C, each supporting multiple roles, are si-
multaneously participating in collaborations c1, c2 and c3. Each collaboration
prescribes certain roles for the objects, and an object does not need to play
a role in all the collaborations. Similarly, in our framework each architectural
style defines a number of roles, and SMCs play different roles in multiple styles.
The use of mixin layers to define distinct layers of functionality to a group of
interacting objects is related to the manner in which aspect-oriented program-
ming is used to change the programmed semantics of a group of collaborating
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Figure 6.8: Mixin layers approach for interaction decomposition: collabora-
tions are horizontal rectangles, object classes are vertical rectangles, and their
intersection are roles within a collaboration
objects by defining a range of crosscutting concerns [KH01, KHH+01].
An architectural style prescribes how a group of interacting roles must perform
the exchanges of interfaces, events or policies. A set of domain roles within
an SMC is said to be interacting if they are bound to style-specific roles within
the same architectural style. Thus, architectural styles are applied on top of
the roles defined in the SMC’s domain and the respective interactions will be
executed when actual SMCs are assigned to these roles, similar to what occurs
when objects are assigned to roles in a collaboration in the mixin layer model.
In our implementation, each architectural style managed object functions as a
factory for creating different parts of a large interaction, which defines a spe-
cific algorithm or protocol for the exchange of interfaces, events or policies.
Figure 6.9 shows how a composition interaction is created from a “Composi-
tion” managed object in PonderTalk. Style-specific roles (“outer” and “inner”,
in this case) defined in this managed object are bound to roles defined in the
SMC’s local domain (“Patient”, “SensorHR” and “SensorTemp”). Each architec-
tural style is also parameterised with style-specific properties: an instance of
the “Composition” managed object in this case is parameterised with mappings
or filterings relevant to that application scenario. In this example, the oper-
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1 comp := /factory/structural/composition create.
2 comp outer: "Patient".
3 comp inner: "SensorHR".
4 comp inner: "SensorTemp".
5 comp map: "SensorHR.read" to: "readHR".
6 comp map: "SensorTemp.read" to: "readTempC".
7 comp map: "SensorTemp.read" to: "readTempF"
8 filter: [ :readTempF | (1.8 * readTempF) + 32 ].
Figure 6.9: Code for the instantiation of a composition style between a patient
and two sensors, written in Ponder2 syntax
ations “SensorHR.read” and “SensorTemp.read” are mapped to the operations
“readHR” and “readTempC” exported by the interface of the SMC assigned to
the “Patient” role. A filter is also applied to the operation “SensorTemp.read”
(which converts the temperature readings from Celsius to Fahrenheit). The fil-
ter operation receives a PonderTalk block which defines the filter itself. Finally,
the encapsulation is enforced in the composition style by stopping the inner
SMCs from being discoverable. This will hide the sensors from external SMCs,
keeping sensors as managed resources of the SMC assigned to the “Patient”
role, but the selected operations will be mapped to the latter’s interface.
The implementation of an architectural style managed object relies on the func-
tionality supported by each participant’s core interface to effect a specific algo-
rithm or protocol that will achieve the exchange of policies, events or interfaces
according to the abstraction defined by the style. The style managed object
specifies what each style-specific role must execute in order to implement the
style’s semantics, and when actual SMCs are assigned to the respective roles
the operations defined in the style are executed using the functionality defined
in the SMCs’s core interfaces. For example, the implementation of the Diffusion
style requires installing an event forwarder at the source SMC, and installing
the respective event templates at the target SMCs. Thus every time a specific
event occurs inside the source SMC’s event bus, this event will be automatically
propagated to the target SMC’s event bus, which will be able to handle such
event because the necessary event templates were in place. This is achieved by
using the operations “p2 installEventForwarder” and “p2 installEvent” available
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in the core interface of each SMC. The implementation of this style is illustrated
in Figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: Diffusion style implementation
Similarly, the implementation of the SharedBus uses the primitives defined in
the core interface in a slightly more complex way in order to obtain the desired
behaviour between multiple publishers and a centralised blackboard: a pub-
lisher must forward events raised within its event bus to the blackboard, which
in turn must forward these events to all the other publishers. Event templates
must be installed, so other SMCs are able to handle the events raised by a
publisher, and each publisher must install an event forwarder to the black-
board, which in turn also installs an event forwarder to the publishers. The
implementation of the SharedBus style is illustrated in Figure 6.11.
The behaviour of an architectural style (how the exchange is to be achieved) is
defined only once, in the respective style’s managed object, more specifically in
the method “p2 deploy”. Each architectural style managed object defines how
the different participants must behave in order to collaboratively enforce the
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Figure 6.11: Shared bus style implementation
semantics of the style. A given SMC does not need to implement all possible
style managed objects, but only those which are relevant to the interactions in
which the SMC participates. When an SMC is assigned to a domain role which
is bound to an architectural style MO via a style-specific role, the fragment of
Ponder2 code for this role (defined in the style MO) will be executed in the corre-
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sponding SMC. Note that loading additional managed objects or Java code into
the participating SMCs is not a requirement for establishing a new interaction,
as these SMCs may already have the relevant style MO definitions locally and
then only execute the fragments of code defined for their style-specific roles.
The core interfaces of the SMCs participating in the style are used for installing
the different parts of the algorithm or protocol that defines the semantics of
the style (Figure. 6.12). Thus each architectural style managed object can be
seen as a collaboration between a group of interacting roles in the mixin layer
model, which ensures that the semantics specified by a style is enforced in the
involved SMCs.
Figure 6.12: The implementation of each style is based on the mixin layer model
and relies on the functionality provided by the core interface of the participant
SMCs. These operations are executed when actual SMCs are assigned to roles
There are dependencies among architectural styles: structural styles must be
deployed first, as they enable the exchange of application interfaces, e.g. doctor
interface, patient interface; communication styles are then deployed to define
patterns in terms of the events provided by these interfaces; task-allocation
styles must be the last, as the policies loaded depend both on the operations
provided by the application interface, as well as on the events forwarded by a
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Figure 6.13: Architectural styles class diagram
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communication style. Figure 6.13 illustrates a UML class diagram of the archi-
tectural style managed objects which were implemented in the core framework,
i.e. the diagram excludes application-specific styles.
Patterns of Interaction
Patterns of interaction enable the specification and instantiation of interactions
based on a specific combination of individual architectural styles. The Pattern
managed object supports the specification of a set of roles and how these roles
are arranged by individually combining architectural styles or sub-patterns.
The interaction is systematically defined by binding architectural styles to these
roles. The actual SMCs which must be used in this interaction will be assigned
to the respective roles at pattern instantiation.
Figure 6.14 illustrates the creation of a bodyarea pattern which specifies the in-
teractions between “Patient”, “SensorHR” and “SensorTemp” roles. The pattern
relies on a composition structural relationship between the “Patient” (outer),
and “SensorHR” and “SensorTemp” (inner) roles. The composition maps the
1 bodyarea := /factory/pattern
2 create: "BodyArea"
3 placeholders: #("Patient" "SensorHR" "SensorTemp").
4 bodyarea bind:
5 [ comp := /factory/style/structural/composition create.
6 comp outer: "Patient".
7 comp inner: "SensorHR".
8 comp inner: "SensorTemp".
9 comp map: "SensorHR.read" to: "readHR".
10 ].
11 bodyarea bind:
12 [ corr := /factory/style/communication/correlation create.
13 corr correlator: "Patient".
14 corr source: "SensorHR".
15 corr source: "SensorTemp".
16 corr subscribe: "SensorHR.HR" as: "HR".
17 corr subscribe: "SensorTemp.temp" as: "temp".
18 corr raise: "Patient.critical"
19 condition: [:temp :HR | ((temp at: "value") > 40) &
20 ((HR at: "value") > 150) ].
21 ].
Figure 6.14: Body-area monitoring pattern in Ponder2 syntax
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operation “read” from “SensorHR” to the patient’s interface (“readHR”). The
pattern in particular uses the correlation style to implement communication
between the “SensorHR” and “SensorTemp” (source), and “Patient” (correlator)
roles. In this example, heart rate and temperature events are used as pa-
rameters of a correlation function which raises the event “critical” in case the
temperature readings are above 40 and heart rate readings are above 150. The
correlation function parameterises the style and is flexibly defined as a Pon-
derTalk block, which permits the specification of logical statements with the
same degree of expressiveness of standard Ponder2 logical expressions.
The framework also supports the creation of more specialised architectural
styles which can be included in the library for subsequent reuse. For example,
a specialised correlator managed object can be created by extending the stan-
dard correlator architectural style managed object. A customised correlation
function can then be defined in the subclass, which builds on top of the more
general mechanism for event correlation provided by the super class. Similar
types of customisation can be achieved by specialising the other styles. The
extensibility of the framework is discussed in more details in Chapter 8.
6.3 Prototype Evaluation
The evaluation presented in this section focuses on two different aspects, namely,
the memory consumption and the performance of the prototype implementation.
These are discussed in the following.
6.3.1 Memory Consumption
This evaluation aims to show that the infrastructure for SMC interactions can
be deployed in resources with limited computational power and memory, which
are likely to be found in wireless ad-hoc networks involving smartphones, as
well as unmanned vehicles and other small computing devices. Our prototype
for supporting SMC interactions was deployed in two classes of lightweight,
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constrained devices: Gumstix3 and Koala robots4 (Figure 6.15). The Gumstix
has a 400 MHz Intel XScale PXA255 processor with 16 MB flash memory and
64 MB SDRAM, running Linux and Wi-Fi enabled. The Koala robot has a Mo-
torola 68331, 22 MHz onboard processor, 1 MB ROM and 1 MB RAM. The robot
is extended with a KoreBot module which has a 400 MHz ARM PXA255 proces-
sor, 64 MB SDRAM and 32 MB flash memory, running Linux and also Wi-Fi
enabled. In addition, the robot has 16 infrared proximity sensors around its
body, and a video camera. Both run the lightweight JamVM5. In the experi-
ments we used JamVM version 1.4.5 and GNU Classpath version 0.91.
Figure 6.15: Gumstix (left) and Koala robots with video surveillance capabilities
(right): each robot has 16 infrared proximity sensors around its body, and a
video camera
The size of the bytecodes required for running the prototype, including Ponder2
and necessary Java libraries, is 710 KB. The size of a typical policy written in
Ponder2 is about 620 bytes (but this certainly depends on the complexity of
the policy). The size of a typical interaction specification containing 5 roles,
each role specifying 5 policies, written in Ponder2 is about 20.4 KB (but this
is also subject to the complexity of the policies, number of policies, and num-
ber of roles in the specification). In terms of memory usage during run-time,
we observed that a Gumstix running in a “Coordinator” role, and keeping the
interaction specification and all the objects loaded in memory, required 15 MB
for the Ponder2 process and 9,224 KB for the rmiregistry process6 (RMI is one
3http://www.gumstix.com
4http://www.k-team.com
5http://jamvm.sourceforge.net
6By comparison, an empty JamVM and rmiregistry uses about 3,200 KB and 5,900 KB respec-
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of the communication protocols supported by Ponder2, and the one used in our
experiments). A Koala robot running an application role (containing 5 policies)
required 8,384 KB for the Ponder2 process and 4,492 KB for the rmiregistry
process. Increasing the number of policies loaded in the robot from 5 to 10
caused a negligible overhead in terms of memory consumption. The small
footprint needed for our role management infrastructure indicates that other
devices with a similar configuration and capacity could also have been used.
6.3.2 Performance
This section describes performance measurements of our prototype. The tests
consisted in measuring the time taken for a Gumstix to assign a discovered
Koala robot to a role, and then to load a variable number of policies. We have
measured both the time taken to transfer and deploy only the policies, as well
as the whole assignment process. The latter involves the transfer of the policies,
the transfer of additional information such as event templates, the creation of
role placeholders in the remote SMC, sending an event informing that a new
SMC has joined the interaction, and the attribution of the discovered SMC to
the role in question.
The graph in Figure 6.16 depicts our results. They show that for roles with a
small number of policies the total cost of assignment is dominated by the cost
of tasks not related to policy transfer, but as we increase the number of policies
per role, this fixed cost tends to become negligible in comparison to the cost
of loading and deploying policies (which increases linearly with the number of
policies). This suggests that the prototype is able to support more complex roles
where the only significant cost is the policy transfer, because the residual com-
ponent of the assignment time remains constant. We also observed that most
of this time (about 97% on average) is spent on RMI serialization and network
delay when transferring data from the Gumstix to the robot, and only a small
part corresponds to the time that is actually spent by the robot to instantiate
tively, and a JamVM running an empty Ponder2 instance and rmiregistry uses about 8,200 KB
and 5,900 KB respectively.
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Figure 6.16: Total assignment time versus policy loading and deployment time
the policies. We expect that Ponder2’s ability of supporting alternative commu-
nication protocols will mitigate this overhead. The evaluation of other aspects
of the strategy, in particular the cost of role replacement when an SMC fails,
remains to be done as future work.
6.4 Discussion
A prototype for SMC interactions was implemented in Java, which relies on the
infrastructure provided by Ponder2. This chapter presented the implementa-
tion of basic SMC interactions, and then the more general use of architectural
styles to enforce strategies of interface, event and policy exchanges. The use
of architectural styles provides a more comprehensive model for specifying, in-
stantiating and reusing interactions between SMCs. Architectural styles allow
the rapid instantiation of different aspects of a collaboration, by supporting
template interactions that enforce a specific algorithm or protocol for interface,
event and policy exchanges. We deployed the prototype on constrained devices,
such as Gumstix and Koala robots, in order to assess the suitability of the
implementation in this class of resources. The memory footprint and perfor-
mance results obtained in our experiments show that real policy-based SMC
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applications can run effectively in these devices.
The functional evaluation of our model consists of a case-study which will be
presented in the next chapter. The case-study describes an application for
the monitoring and treatment of diabetes, which relies on a number of SMCs
and distributed policies to realise the desired collaboration between sensors,
diagnostic devices and other resources. This case-study will better illustrate
how the use of architectural styles facilitates the engineering of larger policy-
based SMC collaborations, as well as interactions across collaborations, and
the benefits of this approach.
Chapter 7
Case-Study: E-Health
Monitoring
This chapter presents the use of the Self-Managed Cell framework in the de-
sign of an application for the monitoring and treatment of diabetes mellitus.
There is an increasing interest in diabetes prevention and control, especially in
the United Kingdom, due to the high percentage of the National Health budget
spent on the treatment of this condition. The management and treatment of
diabetes requires a complex combination of monitoring and drug delivery ac-
tivities, which frequently depend on each other, e.g. extra physical activity will
temporarily decrease insulin dosages. Cholesterol levels and cardiac monitor-
ing also play an important role in the treatment of a patient with this condition.
In this chapter, we characterise the requirements for monitoring this condition
and present how a system for diabetes monitoring and treatment can be de-
signed through the composition and interaction of SMCs in a body-area and
home monitoring set-up. These SMCs rely on policy-based interactions where
adaptive actions are executed in response to measurements performed by on-
body sensors in order to realise diabetes management.
Our focus is on the interactions between the SMCs that realise this scenario,
rather than the detailed care protocol for diabetes management. Complex al-
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gorithms for the assessment of the patient’s condition or similar functionality
is assumed to be implemented as part of the application-specific managed ob-
jects. For example, we assume that an algorithm that classifies accelerometer
input into activities is available.
7.1 Diabetes Mellitus
Diabetes mellitus is a syndrome of disordered metabolism often caused by a
combination of hereditary and environmental factors, resulting in abnormally
high blood glucose levels (a condition known as hyperglycemia) [UK09]. Blood
glucose levels are controlled by the hormone insulin, which regulates the up-
take of glucose from the blood into cells. Diabetes mellitus leads to high blood
glucose levels due to defects in either insulin production (diabetes mellitus type
1) or insulin action (diabetes mellitus type 2) in the body (in this case the pa-
tient does not lack insulin but rather has resistance to its action).
Average glucose levels are around 80−120 mg/dl (or 4.4−6.6 mmol/l) before
meals, and below 180 mg/dl (or 10 mmol/l) two hours after meals.1 High glu-
cose levels are considered to be above 288 mg/dl (or 16 mmol/l). Incorrect
treatment of diabetes may lead to hypoglycemia, i.e. abnormally low blood glu-
cose levels, below 72 mg/dl (or 4 mmol/l). Hypoglycemia may be caused by too
much or incorrectly administered insulin; too much, unplanned or incorrectly
timed exercises (physical activities decrease insulin requirements); or insuffi-
cient carbohydrate intake.
Medical conditions often associated with diabetes include high blood pressure
and elevated cholesterol levels. Blood pressure levels for patients with diabetes
should be kept below 130/80 mmHg.2 This is achieved via drug therapy, and
each added drug reduces blood pressure by 5−10 mmHg. This can also require
extra monitoring and diagnosis to detect abnormal heart activity, e.g. by using
an ECG monitoring device. Blood fat levels (total including cholesterol) should
1mg/dl is milligrams per decilitre, and mmol/l is millimoles per litre
2mmHg is millimetres of mercury
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be kept below 72 mg/dl (or 4 mmol/l). Other illnesses and infections can raise
blood glucose levels and require it to be tested more often.
Diabetes management depends on a complex combination of monitoring and
treatment activities. In the next sections we present the requirements and
the design of a policy-based application for the monitoring and treatment of
diabetes using the Self-Managed Cell framework.
7.2 Requirements for Diabetes Monitoring and Treat-
ment Application
We present the design of a body-area and home monitoring set-up that moni-
tors context, patient activity and physiological parameters, and enforces drug
delivery and data forwarding according to an initially pre-defined but adap-
tive collaboration between SMCs. Body sensors are used to keep track of the
health condition of a patient, and to respond rapidly to abnormal values in the
form of either on-body actuation, e.g. drug delivery, pacemaker activation, or
the invocation of external services, e.g. requesting emergency assistance, data
forwarding. We assume the use of implanted insulin delivery pumps that are
activated in response to measurements made by blood glucose sensors. Blood
pressure control can be achieved in a similar manner, relying on drug delivery
pumps that react to monitored blood pressure levels.
An outline of the system’s operation would typically be:
• Blood glucose levels are continuously monitored by glucose sensors, and
these measurements are used for controlling the automatic administra-
tion of insulin via an insulin pump.
• Blood pressure levels are also monitored by sensors, and values are used
for triggering the administration of drugs for hypertension control.
• The amount of daily physical activity the patient has undergone, e.g. run-
ning, walking, sitting, lying, is monitored using accelerometers. This is
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used to adjust insulin delivery dosages, as physical activity decreases ar-
tificial insulin requirements.
• Diabetes is frequently associated with cardiovascular problems. Heart
rate is monitored by sensors attached to the patient, e.g. a chest strap
with embedded sensors, transmitting heart beat signals to a receiver,
e.g. smartphone. Based on the signal transmitted, the smartphone can
determine the current heart rate and proceed with further actions. For
example, temporarily triggering an ECG (electrocardiogram) device avail-
able in the home environment, which can detect the waveform of heart-
beats and record it, thus providing to the doctor relevant data on the heart
condition of the patient, e.g. detecting repetitive patterns of abnormalities.
ECG results typically include: (a) heart rate, (b) heart rhythm and (c) heart
waveform.
• Data from the on-body sensors is collected and correlated on a smart-
phone, and transmitted to a local database in the home environment for
synthesis and subsequent analysis.
• Continuous monitoring must allow data gathering and synthesis in the
home environment, correlating glucose, cholesterol, physical activity and
blood pressure levels for a period of weeks or even months.
• Subsequent delivery of synthesised data on a daily/weekly/fortnightly ba-
sis (depending on the patient risk condition) to an electronic patient record
repository provided by the GP, e.g. via a web-service interface.
• The failure of any body sensor must be immediately reported to the pa-
tient’s GP, requesting device replacement if necessary.
In the next sections we show how our requirements can be addressed by the
design of an autonomous application that relies on policy-based interactions for
performing adaptive actions. We are thus interested in adaptive autonomous
behaviour and how the various devices and services required for realising this
scenario are composed into more complex autonomous structures and interact
with each other. We do not consider security aspects, e.g. privacy of patient
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Table 7.1: Basic SMCs used in the diabetes scenario
Self-Managed Cell Description
Patient Patient’s smartphone managing the body-area
SMC
Surgery Web-service SMC that automatically updates GP
records
Doctor Doctor’s smartphone used for interacting and
managing patient’s devices
Glucose sensor Sensor SMC for glucose monitoring
Blood pressure sensor Sensor SMC for blood pressure monitoring
Accelerometer Sensor SMC for activity monitoring
Cholesterol sensor Sensor SMC for fat levels monitoring
Heart rate sensor Sensor SMC for heart rate monitoring
Drug pump Actuator SMC for drug injection and hypertension
control
Insulin pump Actuator SMC for insulin injection
Server Local database for sensor data collection in the
home environment
ECG device Electrocardiogram diagnosis device
Alarm Display for notifications in the home environment
records or cryptography of exchanged data, at this stage as work on these
issues is ongoing elsewhere [KLS09, ZSLK09, Keo05, KLS04].
7.3 Application Outline
Based on the requirements described in the previous section, Table 7.1 lists
the basic SMCs used in the construction of this scenario. These are divided
into four groups of interacting SMCs:
• A personal SMC controlling a patient’s body-area network for health mon-
itoring typically runs on a smartphone or Gumstix3 device hosting SMC
management services that control several sensors such as glucose, blood
pressure, cholesterol and acceleration hosted on BSNs4 (Body Sensor
Nodes). Actuators, such as an insulin pump or drug pump SMC, are em-
ployed and activated according to conditions monitored by the sensors.
3http://www.gumstix.com
4http://vip.doc.ic.ac.uk/bsn/
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• A doctor or nurse SMC would typically interact with patients, loading
monitoring tasks and collecting results. Monitoring tasks permit contin-
uous observation of the patient’s condition in his own home environment.
Tasks loaded by the healthcare worker continually run on the patient’s
SMC, relying on information provided by his body sensors. In some cir-
cumstances, e.g. nurse visits or a regular visit to the GP, the patient also
runs tasks for the re-calibration of his sensors, using devices owned by
the healthcare worker.
• A home monitoring system collects data monitored by the patient’s body-
area network, correlating glucose, cholesterol, physical activity and blood
pressure levels for a period of weeks or even months. When risky con-
ditions are detected, e.g. hypoglycemia, alarms can be used to notify the
patient that extra care must be taken, e.g. to take fast-acting carbohydrate
such as glucose tablets − quantities will vary according to the situation,
and instructions should be provided with the alarm. Data is temporarily
stored locally for synthesis and identification of trends in the patient con-
dition. Depending on the severity of the patient’s condition, e.g. propensity
to cardiovascular problems, ECG monitoring can be added to the moni-
toring set-up.
• A link between the patient’s home monitoring system and the GP surgery
is used to deliver periodically synthesised data to an electronic patient
record repository provided by the GP. In an emergency, data is used to re-
quest immediate assistance, e.g. if the glucose levels reach critical thresh-
olds, if the blood pressure is not effectively lowered by the administration
of drugs or if an imminent heart attack is detected.
Figure 7.1 outlines the SMCs involved in this scenario and their interactions.
Interaction (1) refers to the interaction between doctor and patient, for the
purposes of loading monitoring tasks or re-calibrating the patient’s sensors.
This is triggered when the patient visits the clinic, typically over a Bluetooth
connection between the patient and doctor smartphones. Interaction (2) cor-
responds to the body-area network comprising the patient’s smartphone and
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Figure 7.1: Diabetes monitoring scenario: each numbered triangle represents
an interaction that requires a different combination of management abstrac-
tions.
the several sensors and actuators used for diabetes monitoring and treatment.
Communication between these devices and the patient smartphone typically
occurs through IEEE 802.15.4 radio links. Interaction (3) forms the home
monitoring environment, involving devices for data storage, alarms and ex-
ternal diagnostic available at the patient’s home, interacting with the patient’s
own body-area network, often via a Wi-Fi connection between these resources.
Finally, interaction (4) refers to the home environment and GP surgery inter-
action, through which the patient’s records are updated or emergencies are re-
ported. This interaction typically occurs via HTTP, considering the GP provides
a web-service SMC for updating patient’s records. Although the Self-Managed
Cell concept provides a suitable abstraction for representing the autonomous
components involved in this scenario, we still need adequate abstractions for
expressing their interactions.
The next sections will elaborate these interactions using the principles pre-
sented in this thesis.
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7.4 Patterns of Interaction
We can define patterns of interaction to be enforced by different SMCs in this
collaboration. Patterns exhibit very specific management properties with re-
spect to interface, task and event exchanges, which are dictated by the prim-
itive styles that these patterns are composed from. In this section we present
how two of these patterns are realised: a body-area pattern and a home moni-
toring pattern.
7.4.1 Body-Area Pattern
The arrangement of architectural styles presented in Figure 7.2 corresponds
to a possible pattern for the body-area monitoring. It comprises the interac-
tions between the device hosting the patient SMC and the sensors and actu-
ators. This set of interactions (architectural styles) is typically established by
the patient device. In the body-area network, the patient device and the several
Figure 7.2: Body-area network pattern.
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sensor and actuator SMCs are organised in a composition relationship as it re-
quires encapsulation of the constituent devices. This is because we want the
sensors to be visible and controlled solely by the patient device, and avoid sen-
sors which belong to one body-area network to be discovered and interact with
other external SMCs. Although the resources are encapsulated in the body-
area network, operations that need to be accessed by the healthcare worker for
reading sensor measurements or setting new thresholds are typically mapped
and accessible from the patient’s device interface. The body-area interaction
typically relies on a simple event diffusion style from the sensors to the patient
device. Normally, the sensors of a body-area network do not depend on each
other’s events − if that were the case, a shared bus or blackboard would be
more suitable.
The pattern also comprises the interactions between the doctor and patient,
especially for the purpose of the exchange of monitoring and re-calibration
missions. This part of the interaction is typically enforced on the healthcare
worker device, and can for example be triggered when the patient visits the GP
surgery. A peer abstraction is more suitable for the interaction between patient
and doctor, as a patient may interact with multiple doctors, and a doctor may
interact with multiple patients. These interactions do not require mapping,
filtering or encapsulation abstractions.
Based on the functional requirements identified in Section 7.2, the tasks that
are required to be exchanged between the SMCs in this scenario are:
• Diabetes monitoring mission: this is the most important and also the
most complex of the missions. It runs on the patient device and relies on
the information provided by multiple sensors, e.g. glucose, blood pressure,
cholesterol, heart-beat, accelerometer, to assess the patient condition and
possibly to trigger adaptive actions, like the activation of insulin or drug
pumps (some of these policies are illustrated in Figure 7.3).
• Sensor re-calibrating mission: is used by the patient for re-calibrating
his sensors, using devices provided by the doctor or another healthcare
worker. Sensor accuracy often depends on their calibration. Calibration
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1 // insulin infusion policy
2 on glucose(level) do
3 if level > 120 then
4 /resources/insulinPump.dose(level - 120)
6 // potential hypoglycemic condition policy
7 on glucose(level) do
8 if level >= 72 and level < 80 then
9 /events/alert.raise("hypoglycemic condition " + level)
11 // confirmed hypoglycemic condition policy
12 on glucose(level) do
13 if level < 72 then
14 /event/alert.raise("hypoglycemic condition " + level)
16 // confirmed hyperglycemic condition policy
17 on glucose(level) do
18 if level > 300 then
19 /events/alert.raise("hyperglycemic condition " + level)
21 // blood pressure control policy
22 on bp(level) do
23 if level > 130 then
24 /resources/drugPump.dose(level - 130)
26 // physical activity reduces insulin requirements, and other
27 // policies must be activated
28 on context(activity) do
29 if activity == "vigorous" then
30 /policies/normal.disable();
31 /policies/active.enable()
Figure 7.3: Example policies used in the diabetes monitoring mission.
1 // patient visits the GP and doctor re-calibrates the sensors
2 on energy(level) do
3 /resources/patient/accel.set("sedentary", level <= 2);
4 /resources/patient/accel.set("light", 2 < level <= 4);
5 /resources/patient/accel.set("moderate", 4 < level <= 6)
6 /resources/patient/accel.set("vigorous", level > 6)
Figure 7.4: Example policies used in the sensor re-calibration mission.
type and method is obviously dependent on the parameter being moni-
tored by the sensor. For example, accelerometer-based activity monitoring
can be used to measure the duration and frequency of activity undertaken
under different intensity categories, such as sedentary, light, moderate
and vigorous [PAVB02]. Calibration can be based on energy expended
(kcal/min), using specialised equipment available when the patient visits
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the GP (Figure 7.4).
During patient visits to the GP, a distributed control style is typically established
between doctor and patient SMCs which allows them to load missions mutually
into each other. This allows a doctor SMC to load diabetes monitoring tasks
into a patient SMC, but similarly a patient SMC also loads policies onto the
doctor SMC to trigger re-calibration of the patient’s sensors (the latter avoids
the requirement for the doctor SMC to store calibration procedures for each
individual patient).
7.4.2 Home Monitoring Pattern
The arrangement of architectural styles presented in Figure 7.5 corresponds to
a possible pattern for the home environment monitoring. It comprises the inter-
actions between the devices locally available in the home environment, e.g. lo-
cal server, alarms, ECG diagnostic device, and the personal device hosting the
patient SMC. These interactions are typically enforced by the local server, to
Figure 7.5: Home monitoring pattern.
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control the interactions with other devices and appliances. The interaction in
the home monitoring environment has an aggregation structure as it enables
some degree of hierarchical organisation and filtering/mapping in the access
to resources and appliances whilst still permitting the sharing of internal re-
sources, e.g. the patient’s body-area, with external SMCs that exist outside the
aggregation. Event forwarding from the patient device into the home environ-
ment relies on a diffusion style to notify the occurrence of alarms, but also on a
correlator to relay coarser grained information with respect to glucose or blood
pressure monitoring − average levels over an hour, for example. Additionally,
an event diffusion of heart rate events is required between patient and ECG
devices.
This pattern also comprises the interactions between the home environment
and the remote surgery, especially for the purpose of reporting the patient con-
dition, which is also normally enforced by the home server. This interaction
between the home environment and the GP follows a peer structure, similar
to the interaction established between doctor and patient SMCs. For notifying
an emergency, a diffusion of events between home environment and surgery is
often required.
According to the functional requirements identified in Section 7.2, the tasks that
must be exchanged between these SMCs are:
• ECG monitoring mission: in advanced stages of diabetes, the patient has
a higher propensity to cardiovascular problems, and a doctor may recom-
mend intensive monitoring and recording of the electrical activity of the
heart, e.g. to anticipate the occurrence of a heart attack. This is achieved
by a mission running on an ECG monitoring devices locally available in
the home environment. A high heart rate triggers an ECG monitoring
device, which can detect the waveform of heart-beats and provide to the
doctor relevant data on the heart condition of the patient in his daily life.
Such a device can temporarily record heart rate, heart rhythm and heart
waveform, which can then be stored locally or sent to the GP (some of
these policies are illustrated in Figure 7.6).
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1 // activates the ECG monitor for a given period of time
2 on hr(rate) do
3 if rate > 140
4 /resources/ecg.start(30s)
6 // takes appropriate action depending on the results of
7 // an ECG monitoring
8 on ecgStopped(rate, waveform) do
9 if rate > 140 and rate < 160 then
10 /resources/localserver.store(rate, waveform);
11 /events/alarm.raise(rate, waveform)
13 // takes appropriate action depending on the results of
14 // an ECG monitoring
15 on ecgStopped(rate, waveform) do
16 if rate >= 160 then
17 /resources/localserver.store(rate, waveform);
18 /resources/surgery.callEmergency(rate, waveform)
Figure 7.6: Example policies used in the ECG monitoring mission.
• Data collection and synthesis mission: a data collection and synthesis
mission is typically running on the home monitoring environment. It can
be used for storing patient’s data in a data collection hub available at the
patient’s home and for subsequently generating a synthesised summary
of the collected data on a daily/weekly/fortnightly basis (depending on
the patient’s level of risk). This can later be sent to an electronic patient
record repository provided by the GP (some of these policies are illustrated
in Figure 7.7).
1 // handles alert event, e.g.˜displays message on a plasma TV
2 on alert(msg) do
3 /resources/alarm.display(msg)
5 // periodically updates electronic patient record
6 on time(00:00) do
7 if updated == "true" then
8 record = /resources/database.retrieveRecord();
9 /resources/surgery.updateRecord(record)
Figure 7.7: Example policies used in the data synthesis mission.
Data collection and synthesis mission is typically loaded by the patient SMC
into his own home environment via a hierarchical control style. In cases where
the patient is deemed to be in a more severe health condition, ECG monitoring
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may be prescribed by the doctor. In this case, the diabetes monitoring mission
will contain an additional ECG monitoring mission, to be loaded into an ECG
monitoring device available at the home environment (also via a hierarchical
control style).
This scenario requires only relatively simple task-allocation styles, as typically
auction of tasks or tasks loaded by multiple managers are not common in an
e-health monitoring application. However, we identified the use of more com-
plex patterns of task allocation in scenarios for collaborating teams of UAVs in
search-and-rescue missions [SFLS+08b].
7.5 Discussion
The case-study presented in this chapter described an application for the mon-
itoring and treatment of diabetes. We demonstrated how the framework pro-
posed in this thesis facilitates the construction of large policy-based SMC col-
laborations, as well as interactions across collaborations. We showed how
policy-based collaborations are established between a number of SMCs rep-
resenting sensors, diagnostic devices and other resources.
The use of styles promotes the systematic specification of these interactions.
Architectural styles can capture standard solutions for composing SMCs, and
allow others to reuse these solutions to resolve recurring problems encoun-
tered throughout the development of complex applications. The use of styles
also enables the rigorous verification of these interactions and reasoning about
their properties to guarantee the integrity of collaborating SMCs. However, the
benefits of a software engineering approach are clearer if one considers the
use of application patterns for specific domains, e.g. healthcare monitoring pat-
terns. These rely on the general styles of structure, task-allocation and com-
munication, but can be tailored and customised for a given scenario, defining
application-specific functionality. Patterns can thus be reused and instantiated
multiple times, using the sensors and resources available for each patient.
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The formal model for SMC interactions which was specified in Alloy can be
used to analyse the behaviour of SMCs in this scenario. The ability to analyse
SMC interactions is crucial in order to verify whether they are correctly speci-
fied and deployed and whether they achieve the behaviour that is intended for
them. Types of analysis that can be used include: (a) ensure a given SMC is
bound to a particular abstraction, e.g. sensor and insulin pump SMCs should
always be encapsulated and managed by a patient SMC; and (b) whenever an
architectural style is deployed, all the roles bound to that style must be already
assigned, ensuring the application has all the required devices to operate. The
manner in which these properties can be verified using our formal model for
SMC interactions was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Chapter 8
Discussion and Critical
Evaluation
This chapter presents a more general discussion of the framework proposed in
this thesis, in terms of its usability, scalability and extensibility. The limitations
and deficiencies of the framework are also discussed.
8.1 Usability
Usability includes aspects such as reuse of code and ease in rapidly instanti-
ating different types of interactions. Our experience in developing policy-based
SMC applications shows that the use of architectural styles satisfies these two
issues when deploying SMC interactions. The parameterisation and instanti-
ation of an individual architectural style typically requires about 10 lines or
less of PonderTalk code. For comparison, the same interaction written man-
ually without the aid of styles would require about 30 lines of code. This is
a factor of 3 increase, and for an application containing 100 of such interac-
tions, that is 3,000 instead of 1,000 lines. An interaction for the exchange of
interfaces, events or policies between a set of SMCs can be set up using ar-
chitectural styles, by instantiating a single managed object which encapsulates
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the required support.
Manually setting up an interaction, for example an event sharing scheme sim-
ilar to the SharedBus style, using only primitive abstractions not only requires
a considerable amount of code to be written, but it is also error-prone. This
is because the programmer is responsible for using the primitive abstractions
for correctly setting up policies for event forwarding and installing the required
event templates in disparate locations to handle these events. In contrast, the
architectural style automatically defines the algorithm or protocol for the se-
mantics for a given interaction, and distributes fragments of it to distributed
SMCs according to their roles.
8.2 Scalability
The use of architectural styles reduces the complexity and size of the inter-
actions, by structuring and decreasing the number of necessary bindings be-
tween SMCs. For example, the size of an interaction for event sharing between
SMCs can be drastically reduced by using an abstraction such as the Shared-
Bus style, when compared to a straightforward forwarding of events. Table 8.1
shows a comparison between the number of necessary bindings to achieve the
event exchanges in both cases.
Table 8.1: Comparison between the number of bindings using a SharedBus
style and a simple approach for event forwarding
#SMCs #Bindings #Bindings
(Diffusion) (SharedBus)
2 1 1
3 3 = 2 + 1 2
4 6 = 3 + 2 + 1 3
5 10 = 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 4
6 15 = 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 5
7 21 = 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 6
... ... ...
n (n - 1) + (n - 2) + (n - 3) + ... + (n - n) n - 1
A similar comparison can be made between abstractions for structuring an
interaction; between peer-to-peer collaborations and compositions. Indeed, one
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of the motivations for compositions is to hide the complexity of large SMCs that
comprise a set of smaller, yet autonomous, components, e.g. a body-area SMC.
The number of interface exchanges for completely unstructured interactions,
e.g. peer to peer, assuming that full connectivity is applied is given by the
formula
2× ((n− 1) + (n− 2) + (n− 3) + ...+ (n− n));
by comparison, partitioning an interaction between two compositions of one
level only reduces the number of interface exchanges in the best case to
2 + 2× ((n− 2) + (n− 4) + (n− 6) + ...+ (n− n)).
This is indicated in Figure 8.1 which illustrates the number of interface ex-
changes for interactions involving from 2 to 6 SMCs, arranged either as peer to
peer collaborations or compositions.
This indicates that the use of architectural styles mitigates the problems of
scaling to larger systems, with respect to both programming complexity and
the number of interactions that must be established among components. Engi-
neering SMC interactions through the use of architectural styles and patterns
thus provides a measurable gain over unstructured solutions.
8.3 Extensibility
The categories of architectural styles can be seen as complementary perspec-
tives for modelling the structural, task-allocation and communication aspects
of an interaction. The catalogue presented in this thesis certainly is not com-
plete. Instead we have focused solely on the frequently occurring styles that
facilitate the design and composition of complex SMCs in our application sce-
narios.
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Figure 8.1: Interface exchanges in compositions and peer-to-peer interactions
The framework for SMC interactions can be extended in three different ways:
1. By recombining existing architectural styles into patterns of interactions,
using a specific set of roles and architectural styles and their customisa-
tions, e.g. events to be forwarded, methods to be filtered and missions to
be loaded. These complex interactions are specified solely in PonderTalk,
and can be subsequently reused to form parts of a larger and more com-
plex interaction.
2. By programming additional managed objects defining new architectural
styles which can be added to the library of styles. These new managed
objects must extend adequate classes in our framework and implement
the abstract methods which they define. The definition of a new architec-
tural style requires considerable programming effort, however, once im-
plemented and checked that it conforms with the formal specification of
SMC interactions, it can be reused as necessary.
3. By subclassing existing architectural styles to create more specialised
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ones that can be included in the library for subsequent reuse. Typically,
architectural styles define a generalised protocol or algorithm through
which the exchange of events, interfaces and policies is achieved. Flex-
ibility is obtained in the implementation because styles can be parame-
terised with PonderTalk blocks, which concretely define parts of the pro-
tocol or algorithm defined by the style. This was indicated by the cor-
relation function which parameterises the correlator style, or the filter-
ing function which parameterises the composition style, both discussed in
Section 6.2.3. Based on this a specialised style managed object can pre-
define a concrete built-in function for interface filtering, event correlation,
mission bidding, etc, which builds on top of the more general mechanism
defined in the corresponding super class.
We expect that the investigation of other scenarios could result in the iden-
tification of additional abstractions for SMC interactions as many styles and
patterns of interaction are specific to the application domain. Styles tailored to
particular application scenarios, such as care management for a set of patients,
can thus be defined and included in our library of styles.
8.4 Limitations
The work presented in this thesis is by no means complete, and a number of
limitations and deficiencies were identified throughout its development. These
are discussed in the following.
8.4.1 Security Mechanisms
Section 3.6 briefly discussed the minimum security requirements we identified
for collaborations between SMCs and we illustrated the security management
aspects of SMC interactions using these minimum requirements. However, the
development of security management protocols for SMC interactions is outside
the scope of this thesis. The work on doctrines [Keo05, KLS04] has previously
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investigated the formation of policy-based communities of autonomous nodes,
focusing on the security protocols for realising trust-based authentication, ac-
cess control and membership management. Our framework does not address
privacy issues or cryptographic protection of exchanged data as work on these
within the context of SMCs is being investigated elsewhere [KLS09, ZSLK09].
Instead, we focused on the definition of a framework for specification, instan-
tiation and reuse of SMC interactions, which can accommodate additional se-
curity requirements as needed through the addition of new management roles
which can then be used to address the security needs of a particular appli-
cation, e.g. threshold cryptography [ZH99], intrusion detection [Sun96], DDoS
detection [TSD07].
8.4.2 Dynamic Restructuring
This thesis focused on providing abstractions for systematically designing and
establishing larger policy-based SMC interactions from simpler ones. The frame-
work can accommodate dynamic discovery and departure of SMCs, dynamic re-
assignment of roles to the available SMCs, and dynamic loading and unloading
of policies.
However, changes in the requirements of scenarios and applications may re-
quire a new configuration of architectural styles to replace an old one. This
involves the re-specification and re-checking of an entire new interaction before
it can replace an old interaction. Currently this is not done automatically, as
interaction specification and translation from PonderTalk to Alloy notation for
the purposes of model-checking is performed manually. Collaborating SMCs
may also need to synchronise and achieve a safe state [KM90], e.g. all events
forwarded were already delivered, before their current interaction configuration
can be replaced. This still requires further investigation.
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8.4.3 Model-Checking and PonderTalk to Alloy Translation
The declarative specification style used in Alloy was simple to use and the asso-
ciated tool set offered rapid feedback on the model specification. The analyser
is used both (a) to validate universal assertions with respect to general SMC
interactions, e.g. a composed SMC never establishes interactions outside the
composition, as well as (b) to check logical properties automatically for a spe-
cific instance of SMC interaction. The former requires an exhaustive search
through a user-specified scope on the number of objects to be used, which
makes the problem finite and thus reducible to a boolean formula, and de-
pending on the size of the problem this kind of analysis may take several hours
to complete. However, these are not expected to be performed online, as the
purpose of this kind of analysis is to verify whether the implementation of the
model itself correctly expresses the semantics of SMC interactions and whether
unorthodox configurations of SMCs are ruled out of the model.
In contrast, the verification of logical properties for a specific instance of SMC
collaboration is a much faster and more straightforward analysis. The predi-
cates for the verification of properties receive as input the precise instance we
want to verify, containing all the SMCs, interfaces, policies, etc, to evaluate
the logical property. This requires expressing a specific interaction, e.g. all the
SMCs available, their interfaces, the policies we want to load and the architec-
tural styles that we want to use, in Alloy notation. Currently, the translation
of a PonderTalk specification into Alloy notation to be used as input of these
logical predicates has to be done manually. This is the main reason why we
only use Alloy for verifying interactions prior to deployment in physical devices.
However, if translation between PonderTalk into Alloy can be done automati-
cally, dynamic changes in the SMC could be automatically translated and ver-
ified in Alloy during run-time. However, model checking of specifications still
requires significant computational resources.
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8.4.4 Prototype Implementation
The prototype has demonstrated the feasibility of the concepts presented in
this thesis. However, this prototype can be improved in many ways with added
tool support and a specification editor. The specification of SMC interactions
and definition of patterns are written manually in PonderTalk, with no syntax
validation or guidance in correctly specifying the interactions. Additionally, in
the current implementation an interaction specification written in PonderTalk
needs to be manually loaded into a physical device, e.g. SSH to a Gumstix and
copy the specification file into it, which will then discover and bootstrap the
interactions with other SMCs according to the specification file. We recognise
that improved tool support could aid the specification of these interactions, as
well as their automatic distribution and deployment into remote devices.
Our implementation runs on JamVM version 1.4.5 and GNU Classpath ver-
sion 0.91, which are supported both in Gumstix and in Koala robots. How-
ever, JamVM does not run on BSN sensors which are much more resource-
constrained, and we were not able to run our prototype on these devices. Al-
though previous work has defined a lightweight implementation of the policy
service that can run on BSNs [K+07], our prototype assumes the existence of
more powerful devices (similar to a Gumstix) capable of running the JamVM
and thus the full-blown SMC framework.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
This chapter describes a summary of the work presented in this thesis, and
discusses what has been achieved. The directions for future work resulting
from the evaluation of the framework presented in the previous chapter are
also outlined, and finally the concluding remarks are presented.
9.1 Review and Discussion of Achievements
Management in ubiquitous systems cannot rely on human intervention and
centralised decision-making functions. This is due to their complexity and
because these systems are composed of resources and devices which are in-
herently mobile and cannot refer to centralised management applications for
their reconfiguration. The Self-Managed Cell provides an infrastructure for the
management of autonomous components which is based on a policy-driven
feedback control-loop, where policies provide the means for adapting the func-
tioning of an SMC in response to changes in its own context, e.g. failures of
components or performance degradation. Individual SMCs thus form devolved
administrative domains charged with enforcing local decision rules that govern
their own behaviour. However, applications typically consist of ad-hoc collabo-
rations of devices and resources and therefore require elementary SMCs to ne-
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gotiate the necessary interactions with other components in their surroundings
and be assembled into larger and more complex structures based on the same
principles of self-management. Most of the examples used in this thesis are
derived from requirements in the context of healthcare monitoring applications
comprising autonomous sensors and actuators and in the self-management of
teams of unmanned autonomous vehicles. However, the principles and results
are more generally applicable to other ubiquitous scenarios, such as in the
management of large virtual organisations.
This thesis presented an integrated framework which supports the design and
the rapid establishment of policy-based interactions by systematically compos-
ing simpler abstractions as building elements of a more complex collabora-
tion, using the Self-Managed Cell as the underlying infrastructure. We distin-
guish between the overall organisation of the interaction (structural aspects),
the manner in which policies are exchanged (task-allocation aspects) and how
events are forwarded between SMCs (communication aspects). These can be
seen as complementary perspectives of a policy-based interaction, and for each
of them we propose the use of interaction patterns that can be independently
specified, instantiated and reused to form larger SMC collaborations.
We first identified the underlying principles for supporting SMC interactions.
Through careful analysis of our application scenarios we observed that these
interactions rely on essentially the same three basic exchange mechanisms:
(a) the exchange of policies; (b) the exchange of events required for triggering
policies; and (c) the exchange of interfaces which are required for validating
the actions prescribed by policies. These laid the groundwork for supporting
the composition and federation of SMCs. In particular, the notion of missions
is used to define a group of policies which are loaded into a remote SMC in
order to prescribe how it should behave within the context of an interaction.
A key observation is that a mission is akin to a form of constrained program-
ming, and thus the framework caters for the careful verification of a mission
before its policies are granted permission to execute on a remote SMC. These
observations have been previously described in [SFLD+07, SFL07].
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Basic SMC interactions can be used for the management of the application-
specific aspects of an application, e.g. healthcare monitoring, reconnaissance
and rescue operations, as well as for the management aspects of how SMC
interactions themselves are realised. We illustrated an example of how SMCs
can be used for realising the security management of their own interactions and
this revealed itself to be a key decision. As a result, we identified a number of
management tasks which are needed for supporting secure SMC interactions,
but more importantly, we demonstrated that the infrastructure is flexible and
can accommodate additional security functions according to the requirements
of a particular collaboration. This was presented in detail in [SFLS+08a].
Building elaborate applications using solely these elementary abstractions can
be difficult to manage and deploy and we advocate the use of software engineer-
ing principles, such as patterns and software architectures, for systematically
building policy-based SMC interactions. We defined a catalogue of reusable
patterns and provided a more general infrastructure for specifying, instantiat-
ing and reusing SMC interactions. Patterns support the definition of specific
algorithms and protocols which govern how the exchanges of policies, events
and interfaces must be achieved, and are used to define independently the
task-allocation, communication and structural aspects of an interaction. Pat-
terns can then be composed in a methodical manner thereby facilitating the
engineering of larger policy-based SMC interactions. The use of patterns was
first proposed in [SFLS09].
We implemented a framework which realises SMC interactions and includes
both the specification, establishment and operation of simple SMC interac-
tions, as well as a library of reusable architectural styles for composing and
federating SMCs. Our evaluation demonstrates that the policy-based infras-
tructure scales down and can be used effectively in constrained devices with
limited computational power and memory. This was confirmed by a practical
evaluation of the performance of our framework executing in these devices.
Our evaluation also indicates that the use of patterns for engineering SMC in-
teractions mitigates the problems of scaling to larger systems by reducing both
the programming complexity and the complexity of the interactions established
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between components during run-time. A case-study scenario presenting how
SMCs were used for building a policy-based application for diabetes monitoring
and treatment was presented in order to complement the functional evaluation
of our work, demonstrating how real-world applications can be realised using
our framework.
The successful operation of SMC collaborations, however, depends both on
their correct specification and on the suitability of the participating SMCs. We
modelled in Alloy a formal specification of the SMC behaviour, which makes
possible the rigorous verification of specific SMC interactions. Interactions can
be checked automatically to guarantee that SMCs are able to enforce their
policies before these interactions are deployed in physical devices, e.g. smart-
phones, Gumstix, sensors. Part of this formal specification was presented in
[SFLSE09].
9.2 Future Work
Several limitations have been identified in the discussion presented in the pre-
vious chapter. We now consider directions for future work.
The security aspects for establishing SMC interactions must be adequately ad-
dressed. This thesis briefly discussed the minimum security requirements, but
further work needs to investigate the development of appropriate security man-
agement protocols for SMC interactions. Work on this direction has started to
be addressed elsewhere [KLS09, ZSLK09, Keo05, KLS04].
Our overall goal is to be able to form compositions and federations of SMCs
dynamically, suitable to particular application scenarios, such as care man-
agement for a set of patients, by instantiating combinations of pre-defined pat-
terns. A promising research direction is the identification of application pat-
terns for specific domains, e.g. monitoring patterns, or data analysis patterns.
These will rely on the basic patterns of structure, task-allocation and commu-
nication, and add to them application-specific functionality. A mission, which
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has been hitherto used as a means of packaging a set of policies, could have
its behaviour augmented by supporting the specification and enforcement of
application patterns that are transferred into an SMC.
The framework presented in this thesis provides the mechanisms for specify-
ing and instantiating SMC interactions, however applications still have to be
“built” manually from styles, missions, interfaces, etc. Support for the au-
tomatic generation of SMC interactions and the use of goal refinement and
planning techniques is still a focus of active research. These could be used to
select automatically the abstractions in a specific application scenario. High-
level user requirements, for example ECG monitoring, could then be refined into
concrete federations of SMCs using the required policies and the mechanisms
for realising the corresponding application.
9.3 Closing Remarks
Devolved management is the key for addressing the complexity of large-scale
ubiquitous systems which are formed as collaborations of smaller, yet autono-
mous, components. The work presented in this thesis investigated how policy-
based autonomous components can be federated and composed to form larger
ubiquitous applications. This thesis relied on previous research to address a
new problem: engineering policy-based ubiquitous systems. We adapted and
incorporated techniques from autonomous systems, multi-agents and software
engineering principles, and identified how these studies could benefit the con-
struction of policy-based systems. This is built upon previous work on policy-
based management developed at Imperial College over the past 20 years.
The use of patterns for systematically building policy-based systems is a novel
and promising approach. Although we have concentrated on the Self-Managed
Cell framework, the principles and techniques proposed in this thesis can ben-
efit the engineering process of pervasive and autonomous systems in general.
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